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PREFACE

The strategic defense initiative has
brought the issue of strategic

defenses and particularly ballistic missile
defenses back to the
forefront of the ever raging national security
debate.

Issues that were

thought foreclosed by the ABM Treaty in 1972 have
reemerged as

a

host of

new questions have been instigated by President
Reagan's speech of March
23,

1983.

This study will address the major implications
and issues

associated with the launching of the SDI.

Five chapters assess these

issues which include the lessons of the first ABM debate,
prospective

BMD models, the potential

impact of

a

U.S. BMD on U.S. nuclear policy

and associated obstacles to any change, the future role and
composition
of U.S. offensive nuclear forces, and the future of arms control.
I

would like to give credit and thanks to Carol A. MacDougall for

her tireless support throughout the long months of writing as well as
her many hours reviewing the paper for overall quality.

I

would like to

thank Professors Eric Einhorn, Edward Feit, and Stephen Pelz for their

guidance, support, and keen insights in helping to make this

better study.

I

much

also would like to thank William Martel for his support

and direction in undertaking this project.
to all

a

I

of them for their important and useful

am grateful

and indebted

suggestions and

contri buti ons
As an employee of the United States Government,

in

no way should

any of this work be construed to be U.S. government policy or position.
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ABSTRACT
The Strategic Defense Initiative: Implications
for
U.S. Deterrence Policy

February 1987
Alan S. MacDougall, B.A. Saint Anselm College
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Eric Einhorn

This dissertation concerns the issues surrounding the debate over
the strategic defense initiative and its implications for U.S.

deterrence policy.

While ballistic missile defenses (formerly called

ABMs) were believed foreclosed from the nuclear balance as

a

result of

the ABM Treaty, the SDI program has Drought ballistic missile defenses
back into the strategic equation.

It

is possible to suggest that

missile defenses, as envisioned by President Reagan, may make
significant contribution to U.S. national security.

a

Given this

proposition, the dissertation follows the analysis as outlined below:
1.

The original ABM debate of the late 1960s is reviewed with

respect to the arguments of proponents and opponents of the ABM.

This

debate led the U.S. to accept the dominance of offensive nuclear forces
in the nuclear balance.

Additionally, the U.S. decided to adhere to

a

policy for assured destruction based on the precept of mutual national

vulnerability.
2.

While the U.S. had foresworn working on ballistic missile

defenses during the 1970s, the strategic nuclear balance and foundations
of deterrence have changed.

As a result, the U.S.

vi

is seeking to

evaluate the potential advantages of
ballistic missile defenses.

Three
defense models are analyzed relative to
their missions as well as major

obstacles to their implementation.
3.

United States strategic nuclear policy
has evolved since the

late 1960s to incorporate three major
policy schools:

destruction, countervailing, and nuclear
war-fighting.

assured

Ballistic

missile defenses fit with these policies in
quite different ways.
Additionally,

a

U.S. ballistic missile defense will

have profound

implications for the stability of the nuclear balance.
number of major obstacles to the integration of
U.S.

a

There are

a

missile defense into

nuclear policy to include technology, program costs, and
major

political hurdles.
4.

United States strategic offensive nuclear forces may be altered

significantly by the deployment of

a

missile defense.

However, new

offensive weapons such as the cruise missile and advanced bomber could
enhance the ability of offensive forces to penetrate strategic defenses.
5.

A U.S. missile defense could effectively break up the ABM

Treaty and spell an end to the arms control process.
the SDI also may serve as an impetus to

a

new arms control treaty which

incorporates reductions in offensive nuclear forces.

vii

On the other hand,
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INTRODUCTION
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE:

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DETERRENCE POLICY

An analysis of the political

ballistic missile defense

associated with

a

is

and strategic implications of

the heart of this paper.

The central

issue

strategic defense, as envisioned by President
Reagan's

strategic defense initiative (SDI), is the
potential for

a

complete

revisTon of U.S. deterrence thought and specifically
strategic nuclear
policy.

While the current strategic defense debate

is

a

critical

element in the future direction of U.S. deterrence
thought and nuclear
policy, there are

a

number of factors that will impede change.

The

politics of defining U.S. nuclear policy and arms control with
the
Soviet Union may restrain the efforts of proponents of

a

radically

different U.S. deterrent posture.

Strategic analysts of the nuclear era, both inside and outside the
government, generally accept the proposition that nuclear war

prevented by

policy and condition for deterrence.

a

further prescribes the notion of

a

is

This proposition

nuclear balance of power in which

there can not be any hope of political or strategic gain from the

initiation of

a

nuclear war.

The basis of these concepts and the

foundation of the nuclear balance between the U.S. and Soviet Union has
been the dominance of offensive nuclear weapons since 1945.

An

effective defense against offensive nuclear weapons could thoroughly
re-write the way the U.S. has thought of deterring nuclear war and

1

maintaining the nuclear balance.

In

effect, the development of

strategic defenses leads the U.S. to
question the basic purpose of
strategic nuclear policy and the
composition of its nuclear forces.
It

is the

Us

objective of this thesis to describe
and analyze the

possible implications of the development
of strategic defenses for the
various components of U.S. deterrence
theory and policy. As U.S.

deterrence theory entails
nuclear policy,

a

a

number of related components

force development policy,

examine how

a

declaratory

weapons employment policy

a

should war occur, and an arms control policy

-

-

it

is essential

to

strategic defense could impact each of these
areas.

a

this context, the general

In

thesis question can be made as follows:

What are the political and strategic implications
of ballistic

missile defenses for U.S. strategic nuclear policy,
U.S. nuclear
forces, and the strategic arms control

process?

A number of more specific questions come to mind
when considering the

subject:
1.

How does the current debate over BMD compare with the ABM

debate of the 196Us and if they are different why?
2.

Will

a

defense dominated strategic balance profoundly change

nuclear doctrine or merely alter its basis?
3.

What would be the focus of U.S. nuclear policy respecting our

policy for deterring nuclear war?

continue to maintain
4.

a

the U.S.

policy for retaliation?

What mix of offensive and defensive weapons will

security in
5.

a

For example, will

ensure U.S.

BMD dominated balance?

What are the options for U.S. policy during

a

transition

period to

a

defense dominated balance that can
maintain

a

stable

transition?
6.

What are the different BMD models and
system's architecture

and how effective are they likely
to be against the emerging

offensive threat?
7.

What might be the impact on the levels
of damage that could

result in

BMD world?

8.

What roles can arms control play in

9.

What are the political

A

will

a

defense transition?

obstacles to BMD deployments?

reasonable assumption might be that ballistic
missile defenses

become

future.

a

a

part of U.S. or Soviet strategic forces in the
near

The potential

for BMD to revolutionize the way the U.S. views

the nuclear threat demands that its implications be understood.

That

is, as ballistic missile defenses become an increasingly
important

component of the strategic nuclear equation, it will be crucial
to
have explored the implications for policy and nuclear force that will

inform and guide the decisions concerning the possible roles for

a

U.S. ballistic missile defense.

Chapter One will address the major currents and tenets of the
original ABM debate.

In

particular, it will

focus on the arguments

for and against the ABM systems of the 1960s and how they influenced
U.S. deterrence thought in the 1970s.

The lessons of the original ABM

debate are invaluable to the current defense debate.

The similarities

and differences between the aryuments concerning the ABM then and BMD

today are critical to our understanding of the implications that

strategic defense might have for U.S. nuclear policy today.

a

The cycle of offense and defense in
weapons technology

development, policy revision, and strategy
has been dynamic for many
decades.

The ABM debate of the 1960s emerged
while the advantages of

offensive nuclear forces over defenses
were increasing.

maintained

a

The U.S. had

clear advantage in the numbers of
nuclear weapons

deployed and their relative capabilities
as compared to the Soviet
Union as the first U.S. ABM system, the
Nike-Zeus, was developed in
the late 1950s.

A primary impetus

for the ABM system was the Soviet

Union's growing capability to develop

force in the 1960s.

a

credible and threatening ICBM

The U.S. began to explore missile defenses
as

means to maintain some margin of strategic superiority
vis

a

a

vis the

Soviet Union and to address the potential vulnerability
of U.S.

nuclear forces to

a

projected quickly growing Soviet nuclear force.

The thrust of the current strategic defense debate stems from
an

essentially different set of strategic dilemmas.
nuclear forces have become more vulnerable to
over the past decade and, as

a

a

United States
Soviet nuclear attack

result, the strategic balance between

the superpowers is considered increasingly less stable by many U.S.

analysts.

The Reagan Administration, upon entering office, charged

that U.S. strategic forces were at their weakest point relative to

Soviet forces in many years and that the situation would worsen unless
new programs were initiated.

There was really very little doubt in the 1960s that U.S.

offensive forces were capable of carrying out their deterrent mission

whether or not an ABM system was deployed by either superpower.
emerging vulnerability of U.S. offensive nuclear forces to

a

The

.

counterforce attack today,

a

result of the MIRVing and
decreasing CEP

of Soviet nuclear forces, has
led many strategic analysts
to question

the continued deterrent credibility
of U.S. offensive nuclear
forces
to deter Soviet aggression and
maintain stability in

a

crisis

envi ronment

The guiding principle of U.S. nuclear
deterrence theory is the

proposition that neither superpower can
risk
the threat of assured national
to traditional

annihilation.

nuclear war because of

a

This threat, according

deterrence doctrine, is made credible by
the mutual

vulnerability of each nation to
nuclear forces.

a

retaliatory strike by either side's

The only means of assuring this threat,
according to

the theory, is the maintenance of an invulnerable
offensive nuclear

force capable of retaliating after any initial
attack.

During the early 1960s, as ICBMs and submarines became
more
reliable vehicles for launching nuclear weapons, the U.S.
sought to

develop and procure
The technical

a

redundant TRIAD of offensive weapon systems.

objective was to ensure the free flight of U.S. nuclear

warheads to the Soviet Union in case of war.

The ABM was envisioned,

apart from this goal, as

a

a

means of degrading

Soviet

intercontinental missile attack and protecting U.S. population centers
and industrial

resources.

These defense objectives were later

replaced by the less demanding goal

of protecting U.S.

ICBMs from a

counterforce attack and the nation from third country threats as the
ABM systems proved less capable against increasingly sophisticated

offensive forces.
The success of the Safeguard program developments led to

a

number

of questions in the strategic
community.

to catch up with that of the
U.S.

As the Soviet arsenal

began

in the late 1960s, would
a policy

for massive retaliation or
counterforce make any sense?

Massive

retaliation had been an outgrowth of
U.S. strategic bombing concepts
employed in World War

II

and had been extended to U.S.
nuclear policy.

Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara,
had advocated
policy for the U.S. in the early
1960s as

nuclear superiority.
national

a

a

counterforce

means of preserving U.S.

Both policies began to appear less
in the U.S.'s

interest as its superiority in nuclear
weapons eroded.

As a

result, U.S. policy began to shift in
favor of an assured retaliation

posture.

Central

vulnerability was

among its tenets was the idea that
societal
a

reality of the nuclear era and that this
condition

could not be transcended.

The Safeguard system was assessed to be

capable of augmenting U.S. nuclear forces but could
not protect the
U.S. against

a

determined attack, hence, offensive forces would

continue to maintain the burden of deterrence.
McNamara later argued that an enemy need only saturate U.S.
defenses to achieve wartime objectives.

The defense capabilities of

ABMs could only delay an enemy's development of offensive capabilities
to attack with success.

In

summary, the ABM emerged as the strategic

balance was becoming more equal and the offensive arms race came to be
seen as

a

greater threat to strategic stability than the vulnerability

of the nation at large.

However, national vulnerability remains the

building block of nuclear deterrents in an offensive nuclear balance.
From these strategic conditions emerged the dominance of
for assured destruction.

Later codified in the SALT

I

a

policy

talks, assured

destruction became U.S. strategic
gospel and is seen by its
advocates
as the only means to prevent
the use of nuclear weapons by
preserving
a

credible threat for retaliation.

dominance of this policy was
redundant nuclear force.

a

In

conjunction with the growing

perceived requirement to maintain

The deployment of

a

a

strategic Triad of

ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers
is an effective means for
ensuring

that U.S.

retaliatory forces can withstand any
attack and still strike

back with tremendous power.

That is, should any part of the Triad
be

destroyed, any of the other legs can launch
against an enemy.

The U.S. decided that

a

a

devastating retaliation

force level

equivalent to

roughly 1,054 ICBMs, 600 SLBMs, and roughly
450 strategic bombers was

sufficient to meet its deterrent objectives.

These forces were judged

by the Department of Defense to be capable
of causing

damage' to any enemy under any condition.
of its nuclear weapons at

a

level

'unacceptable

The U.S. froze the numbers

consistent with assured destruction

pol icy.

The two major U.S. ABM programs of the 1960s, the Nike and

Safeguard ABMs, would not have changed the U.S. force posture

appreciably.

In

effect, the ABM debate helped solidify U.S. strategic

nuclear policy and force posture behind assured destruction.

The

potential usefulness of ABM defenses for either superpower accelerated

development and deployment of multiple independently targeted reentry
vehicles (MIRVs), thereby enhancing the offense's overall assured

destruction capability.

Yet, the development of the ABM was felt most

strongly in the strategic arms control arena.

Arguments against an ABM system gained support with the emergence

of assured destruction policy.

The U.S. began to favor

a

parity of

forces between the U.S. and Soviet
Union as an effective means of

preserving

a

stable strategic balance.

Opponents of the ABM concluded

that one of the more threatening
prospects for U.S. security was an

all-out offensive arms race.
a

primary impetus to

a

Defenses, in this context, were seen
as

new offensive arms race.

As such, United

States security could be guaranteed only if
neither superpower sought

superiority and each restrained its offensive
arms developments.
These arguments, in turn, supported arms control
as
arms race and help promote

a

a

means to cap the

stable nuclear balance.

The development of the ABM led, in part, to

a

to U.S. strategic policy, forces, and arms control

number of changes
positions.

These

revisions eventually led to the severe limitation of ABM
deployments

through the ABM Treaty.

effect, the ABM was unable to meet the

In

criteria for strategic and arms control stability imposed by champions
of assured destruction, which represented an emerging principle
of

U.S.

strategic nuclear policy.
The Reagan Administration and other proponents of

a

missile defense system today argue that the deployment of

ballistic
a

missile

defense will strengthen deterrence by negating the offensive threat,
thereby enhancing U.S. security.
threat of retaliation can avert

Proponents also argue that

a

They question whether deterrence by
a

nuclear holocaust indefinitely.

BMD system is the only alternative to

a

destabilizing offensive nuclear arms buildup that has been ongoing
since the signing of the ABM treaty.

Ashton Carter and David Schwartz have identified three currents

in the

pro-BMD arguments.

They state that strategic
defense is seen

as a viable option to the present
offensive nuclear balance as

result of:

the moral

1.

repugnancy with the vulnerability
of the

nation to nuclear devastation; 2.
to U.S.

ICBM forces;

a

and 3.

the increasing counterforce threat

the disenchantment with the arms
control

process and its inability to restrain the
arms race and contain the
Soviet nuclear threat.

Chapter TWO will address various defense
models and their related
technology.

The extent to which U.S. strategic
nuclear policy is

revised by the deployment of

a

BMD system is

for which the deployment is undertaken.

was conceived as an 'area wide city"

a

function of the goals

For example, the Sentinel ABM

defense.

The technical

infeasibi lity of an area defense led Department of
Defense analysts to

conclude that deterrence could continue to be better served
by

credible offensive retaliatory force.
is

a

Today the Reagan Administration

questioning whether deterrence might be better served by the

protection of U.S. cities and strategic forces against
nuclear attack.

A BMD could function to defend U.S.

a

Soviet

retaliatory

forces and preserve the strategic balance by helping to close the

so-called 'window of vulnerability'.

maintaining

a

credible U.S. deterrent,

The responsibility for
in this

from various strategic force basing modes to

a

situation, would shift
shared responsibility

on the part of the defense system.

Ballistic missile defense also could be used to protect military
targets, such as command-control-communication centers and critical

military satellites.

As such, defenses could serve to augment U.S.

wartime escalation capabilities in

a

nuclear war-fighting mode as

suggested by Colin Gray.
Lastly, BMD might be used to defend
U.S. population.

have

a

In

this role,

a

'valued'

targets such as the

defense system would be expected
to

considerable advantage over offensive
nuclear weapons as to

prevent confident targeting on the part
of an enemy.

Chapter Three will address the degree
of fit or conflict between
BMD and U.S. strategic nuclear policy
as currently formulated.

For

example, how will BMD influence U.S. policy
for retaliation, national

command authority (NCA), strategic stability,
and losses in each phase
of confrontation: peace, crisis, trans-attack,
and post-attack?

that the purpose of this thesis is to provide

explanation of
in this

a

U.S.

a

Given

description and

BMD posture and doctrine, the question implicit

analysis is how will the integration of BMD with U.S.

strategic nuclear policy enhance U.S. security and degrade
the Soviet

nuclear threat?

An explanation of the political

and strategic

implications of BMD in various scenarios can be made and will focus
on
the following aspects: targeting, weapons, and collateral damage.

United States strategic nuclear policy is currently composed of
elements from assured destruction policy, countervailing policy, and

war-fighting policy.
this elements of

The Reagan Administration would like to add to

strategic defense policy.

a

are based on the premise that the U.S. will

attack on

a

level

Current U.S. policies

retaliate against

that threatens unacceptable damage.

a

Soviet

However, the

options for and roles which retaliation could play change with the

implementation of

a

defensively augmented strategic balance.

With the

incorporation of BMD, the policy
of retaliation becomes
the effectiveness of the BMD
system.

a

function of

If the U.S.

deploys a perfect
BMD system, one capable of
destroying every missile launched
in a
Soviet attack, a policy of retaliation
is unnecessary.
At less than a
perfect level of effectiveness, the
U.S. will be left with a
number of
options for retaliation, such as
responding on an equal level of

intensity either against similiar,
or very different, targets
as those
involved in the initial Soviet attack.
If the U.S. chooses to retain
its current policy of retaliation

(the most probable scenario in an

imperfect BMD environment), it would
then have the option of

conducting an immediate or

a

delayed response.

However, immediate

retaliation may introduce overwhelming numbers
of RVs into the attack,

confusing the BMD system and thereby greatly
reducing its
effectiveness.
with

a

launch

A delayed

response would be less likely to interfere

BMD system, but would allow the Soviets the
opportunity to
a

second strike.

In

both cases, the U.S. must take into

consideration the potential capabilities of Soviet
countermeasures

,

to

include the deployment of their own BMD system.
United States strategic nuclear policy is designed to deter

Soviet aggression, preserve the nuclear balance, and maintain

stability within the U.S. and Soviet strategic relationship.

Each

nation is attentive to opportunities and disadvantages at the margin
of the strategic balance.
in the present balance.

A BMD system could make a marked difference
In

order to assess the impact

could have on strategic stability,
is meant by

'stability'.

it

is

a

BMD system

important to understand what

One must keep in mind that stability is

actually only relevant in

crisis situation.

a

For it is in these

instances that the threat to use
nuclear weapons is greatest
and where
the stability of the balance
is likely to determine
whether or not

nuclear weapons are used.

For instance, if the nuclear
balance is

very stable, neither side is as
likely to believe that gains
can be
made by escalating a crisis and
using nuclear weapons.
At the most basic level,

which make the initiation of

stability is composed of conditions
a

nuclear war as unlikely as possible.

One component of stability begins
with an appreciation of the

unimaginable destruction any nuclear war
would cause.
balance will

The strategic

remain stable as the appreciation for
nuclear devastation

continually is realized by each nation.

Should one side perceive

favorable opportunities at the margin of the
balance, strategic
stability is likely to weaken, portending
disastrous results.
Strategic stability also can be defined in terms
of force
postures.

Here the superpowers seek to make

a

nuclear attack as

uninviting as possible by deploying their forces in
as an invulnerable
mode as possible.

The United States, for its part, has emphasized its

strategic Triad thereby assuring
capabi

1

a

redundancy of retaliatory

ities.

Strategic stability is likely to be affected by the deployment of
a

BMD system under differing strategic conditions.

In

peacetime,

a

BMD system might increase the uncertainty of an attacker's success and

thereby enhance deterrence against

a

calculated military stike.

crisis conditions, the effectiveness of

a

Under

BMD may influence the

decision as to when and how to escalate beyond the nuclear threshold.

.

During an attack, the decision to
escalate the intensity of nuclear
attacks might depend on the integration
of a BMD system into a

war-fighting strategy.

In a

post-attack environment, decisions
as to

the prolongation and/or conclusion
and post-war strategy might
depend
on the success of the BMD system.
The development and deployment of

expected to provoke
to challenge

a

U.S.

a

a

BMD system by the U.S.

number of Soviet responses.

is

The Soviets may try

BMD system by escalating their
offensive nuclear

buildup and increasing their defensive
programs.
The Soviets may view the U.S. BMD program
as

challenge and respond in

a

number of other ways.

respond through the arms control
U.S. BMD efforts,

debate.

a

a

technological

The Soviets could

process, seeking to delay or restrain

strategy the Soviets used in the original ABM

Soviets have already proposed

a

complete ban on space-based

weapons
A more ominous

attack on

a

implication is the threat of

a

Soviet preemptive

U.S. BMD system or U.S. offensive weapons.

Many critics

of the U.S. BMD program, such as the Union of Concerned
Scientists,

have suggested that

a

U.S. BMD deployment would increase Soviet

insecurity and vulnerability as to portend
That is,

a

Soviet first strike.

highly destabilized balance might arise in the event that

the U.S. could defend itself against
a

a

retaliatory strike.

To avoid

a

a

Soviet first strike as well as

destablizing BMD deployment, the

U.S. might attempt to deploy its BMD while reducing offensive forces

(particularly MIRVed counterforce ICBMs) during
period.

a

defense transition

.

Chapter Four will discuss issues
concerning the alternative level
of offensive and defensive weapons
that the U.S. will have to
choose
between.
As well, it will be necessary
to address the value of the

ballistic missile in the face of an
effective ballistic missile

defense and the emergence of other,
potentially more penetrable
weapons systems, such as advanced cruise
missiles with stealth
technol ogy

The stability of the strategic balance
also is dependent on the

nuclear weapons currently deployed to
support U.S. deterrent policies.
The deployment of

a

BMD system will

have important implications for

the posture and composition of U.S. offensive
nuclear forces.
In

view of the potentially destabilizing effects
of

unlikely that the U.S. will dismantle entirely
forces.

Yet, the U.S. might consider

preserve

a

stable strategic balance.

a

Us

a

BMD, it is

strategic offensive

number of options to help

The U.S. could increase its

offensive nuclear forces, although this option may be seen
as the most

threatening by the Soviet Union.
an increase in U.S.

The Soviets are likely to perceive

offensive forces as an attempt by the U.S. to

attain strategic nuclear superiority.
its forces at current levels.

would call

Second, the U.S. could maintain

However, the most stabilizing option

for reductions in U.S. offensive forces during the

transition period.

Yet, this kind of transition is likely to be the

most difficult to attain.

Such

a

balance would probably require

in-depth agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union about the

composition of their respective offensive nuclear forces.

Offensive

arms reduction agreements have alluded arms control talks between the

two nations for nearly twenty
years and are unlikely to
become easier
to reach in the currently
antagonistic atmosphere.
The U.S. nuclear arsenal
possesses both countervalue and

counterforce targeting capabilities.

If, as expected, BMD
degrades

Soviet nuclear attack capabilities,
the U.S. could continue to
target
Soviet ICBMs in an attempt to
minimize further Soviet attacks.
The
U.S. also would have the option
of allocating its offensive
forces

against Soviet countervalue targets in

destruction mode.
effectiveness

a

In

more traditional assured

a

both cases, U.S targeting will
depend on the

BMD system might have against

The deployment of

a

a

first strike.

BMD by the U.S. also will bring into
question

the future effectiveness and deterrence
value of the ballistic

missile.

As the ABM brought into question the
value of the single

warhead ICBM and helped foster the development
of the MIRV, the
current BMD developments will undoubtedly raise
questions about the

effectiveness of current U.S. nuclear forces.

obsolescence of the ICBM and SLBM may cause
and advanced stealth bombers.

a

The potential
shift to cruise missiles

The superpowers will seek to enhance

their retaliatory capabilities in order to maintain the
mutual hostage

relationship (assuming BMD works imperfectly).

Hence, deployment of

greater numbers of air-breathing nuclear forces, such as the cruise

missile, may effectively circumscribe

a

BMD system in the forseeable

future.

One option for the U.S. force structure is continued reliance on

ballistic missiles.
a

The increased survivability of U.S.

ICBMs, due to

U.S. BMD system, might be negated by the possible deployment of

a

Soviet BMD system.

A second option might
be to rely more heavily
on

SLBMs because of their mobility,

target characteristics.

sum vabi

a

ity

and shorter flight to

,

Among these options, the
deployment of cruise

missiles and stealth bombers
appears to be

preserving

1

a

highly credible means for

retaliatory capability.

Almost all estimates of the
effectiveness of
that a percentage of attacking
RVs will

the defense.

Even under 'leakage'

a

BMD system agree

penetrate or "leak' through

conditions,

lessen the value of ballistic
missiles for

a

a

BMD system would

retaliatory attack.

Given this condition, it is
important to question the value of

deploying
coordinate

BMD system if strategic forces
are subsequently shifted to

a

a

BMD deployment with an effective
air defense system.

The

calculations for an attacker and defender
will become uncertain as
both will

have to expect that their forces will

have lost much of

their effectiveness.
A ballistic missile defense deployment
also will

raise questions

concerning the value of an overall strategy for
strategic defense if
population defense
element in

a

is

sought.

Should civil defense become

a

a

major

strategic defense posture?

Chapter Five will address the implications of strategic
defenses
for arms control.

Primary among the important issues to be discussed

are the conditions under which

a

U.S.

future prospects for arms control.

breakout would occur and the

The transition to

a

BMD world will

certainly aggravate the asymmetries within the strategic balance and

threaten its stability.

Arms control can undoubtedly provide some

opportunities to manage the transition period as

it

helped foreclose

on

defense transition in 1972 in
hopes of other stabilizing
measures
to follow (namely offensive
arms reductions).
a

The arms control

process has been an integral
part of the

strategic nuclear relationship
between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union
for twenty years.
Arms control has helped preserve
the offensive
nuclear balance within certain bounds
(i.e. number of launchers),
but
has been unable to halt the
generalized offensive arms buildup
in the

quantity and quality (i.e. accuracy
and lethality) of weapons
systems.
The uneven record of the arms control
regime in promoting stability
and in stopping the arms race has
led many strategic analysts to

question its continued value.

Yet, despite the mixed results of
arms

control, it is likely to be an important
part of

a

defense era.

The most important arms control treaties
for BMD are the 1963
Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
and the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The 1967 Treaty bans all weapons of 'mass
destruction'

space.

from outer

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the
offspring of the

orginial ABM debate, is one of the most important
elements in the

current defense debate.

The Treaty does not explicitly restrict the

development of space-based lasers.

Yet, the general

that large-scale testing or deployment of

a

interpretation is

space-based BMD would

require major revisions of the Treaty or its abrogation.
One argument in favor of the ABM Treaty in 1972 was that it would
help restrain the offensive arms race.

The U.S. government stated in

conjunction with the ratification debates

in the

Senate that should

offensive arms control negotiations prove unsuccessful following the
ABM Treaty, the U.S. would reserve the right to withdraw from the

Treaty.

Both the U.S. and the Soviet
Union have the night to
withdraw
from the ABM Treaty if they
believe that their 'national
interestsare jeopardized by certain
activities of the other party
or other

unspecified developments.
of successful

Proponents of BMD today point
to the lack

offensive arms control as one
reason for the need to

abrogate the Treaty and get on with
strategic defense development
and
deployment.
It is more likely that
the U.S. will achieve a
technological

level

from which it could deploy

system before the Soviet Union.
U.S. or the Soviet Union will

deploy

a

It

a

space-based BMD

also seems likely that either the

eventually breakout of the Treaty and

nationwide defense system.

There are several options which the
U.S. can consider should
achieve an adequate technological level to
deploy

it

defense system.

a

The U.S. could delay its own BMD deployment
until the Soviets were

capable of deploying

a

breakout the political
easily managed.

In

system of their own.

simultaneous

particular, the Soviets might not perceive

their nuclear forces.

a

U.S.

a

strategic challenge to

This scenario is likely to require arms control

agreements on the timing and terms of
a

a

implications for each nation could be more

BMD deployment under these conditions as

preserve

Under

stable transition.

a

As well,

mutual breakout in order to
it might provide the impetus

for broader agreements to include offensive weapons systems.
In

the case of

a

unilateral breakout by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.,

the other superpower will
political
control

view the breakout as

a

sign of great

importance and evidence of its military inferiority.

agreements are likely to be very difficult to arrange

Arms
in this

.

environment as little could be
done to alter the
political
consequences of a unilateral breakout
for the other nation.

destabilizing implications of

The

unilateral breakout could
increase the

a

possibility of enemy preemption
during

a

crisis in order to forestall

inferiority
From the perspective of arms
control, the transition period
to
defensive balance is likely to be
extremely sensitive. This period

a

may provide an opportunity for
arms control as the inferior
nation

(assuming

a

unilateral

strategic inferiority.

breakout) would have great incentive
to prevent
The superior nation also will

stabilize the strategic balance through
arms control

decrease the risk of

a

feel

pressure to

in order to

preemptive attack.

The value of arms control, to date,
has been its ability to limit

defensive and offensive nuclear forces.
superpowers'

strategic force postures,

The predictability of the
a

treaties to some extent, has been seen as

nuclear balance.

result of arms control
a

stabilizing factor in the

The development of defense technology has been

viewed as an anachronism to the deterrence school
that places great
faith in arms control and hence, arms control
up easily during the debate over

advocates will

not give

BMD deployment that would require

a

the abrogation of current treaties.

Ballistic missile defense

is

a

direct refutation of the

philosophical bases underlying the ABM Treaty, the cornerstone of the
arms control process to date.
it may be less

Yet, it may be unwise to limit BMD as

threatening by itself than offensive nuclear forces and

may enhance U.S. security.

If

this interpretation is correct, the

.

deployment of BMD may result
in an accelerating arms
control process
in the future, exactly
the opposite
of the view held in the
original

ABM debate that saw an emphasis
on limiting ABMs in order
to promote
arms control.
The time near the deployment
of BMD may have the
greatest incentive for negotiations.
One can imagine
control

agreements.

a

number of likely prospects for
future arms

A

reduction in offensive forces may
prove the

most stabilizing path to seek.

As

such, agreements might be reached

before, during, or after BMD
deployment.

An agreement to reduce

counterforce weapons (the MX ICBM for
the U.S. and the SS-18 for the
Soviet Union) might be

a

promising means of preserving

balance during the transition period.

a

stable

For the defense, arms control

might address limits on countermeasures
to BMD, such as penetration
aids, decoys, and ASAT weapons (an
active countermeasure to the BMD

system)

NOTE:

Much of the confusion surrounding the current
debate about the

strategic defense initiative is
involved.

function of the terminology

While the strategic defense initiative, strictly speaking,

is a technology

research program concerned with assessing and

developing the technological
represent

a

a

formal

requirements for

BMD,

it does not

U.S. policy shift toward defense.

The Reagan

a

Administration has stated repeatedly that the SDI is aimed at making
an informed decision possible by the early 1990s as to whether or not

to begin full

scale development of

a

missile defense.

Critics of the

SDI very often are more concerned with possible shifts in U.S. nuclear

policy than with the technology
being researched.

Hence, it is

possible to think of this debate as
concerned with various levels.
the doctrinal level it is a debate
between offensive and defensive

deterrence theory.

At the strategic level

and type of defense to support

a

At

are questions of the nature

U.S. deterrence posture.

That is,

the U.S. may entertain area versus
point defenses in support of

countervalue or counterforce defense
missions, respectively.

Lastly,

the current debate is engulfed by
the various defense technologies.
The strategic defense initiative is
directed primarily against the

threat of ballistic missiles.

However, defense against the nuclear

threat also encompasses strategic air
defenses, civil defense, silo
and military facility hardening programs,
anti-submarine defense

weaponry, and the like.

While opponents and proponents of the SDI

spar, they often do so at these different
levels.

An understanding of

the SDI's implications necessitates that each
level be examined.

The formal strategic defense initiative

major technological arenas.

a

divided into five

First is surveillance, acquisition,

tracking, and kill assessment (SATK).
to allow

is

These technologies are required

ballistic missile defense system to detect, identify,

locate and track an enemy's attacking missiles.

These systems

generally are dedicated for space-based platforms in

defense scheme.

a

boost phase

The major problems associated with these technologies

are their ability to perform their missions throughout the ballistic

missile's trajectory from boost to reentry.

The second program

encompasses the exotic weapons more formally called directed energy
weapons (DEW), namely lasers (chemical, free electron, and x-ray) as
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well

as particle beam weapons.

Both ground-based and
space-based

employment of these weapons are
envisioned.

Third, the SDIO is

charged with exploring kenetic
energy weapons to include
'smart
weapons' (i.e. systems similar
to the Homing Overlay
Experiment) and
traditional ABM type interceptors.
Fourth, overall system design
and
battle management technologies
are being researched to
identify the

command-control-commumcation requirements
for

strategic defense.
This area may emerge as the
most critical and potentially
the most
difficult to develop. Lastly, the
program has been directed to
a

explore survivability, lethality, and
key technologies to assure the
system's ability to operate in
As

a

hostile environment.

such, the program directors have
been charged with exploring

potentially promising technologies and
defense concepts during

all

five-to-ten year research and development
phase.

a

A part of the

program's premise is to expand the number
of defense options available
to

a

president in order to prevent the Soviets from
countering

defense too quickly.

Whatever the outcomes of the SDI program,

unlikely that strategic nuclear deterrence theory
will
in the

United States.

U.S.

a

it

is

remain the same

The SDI program has questioned the basis of

U.S. deterrence thought for the past twenty five
years.

The original

ABM program in the 1960s, while important to the future
direction of
U.S. nuclear policy, was not proposed as

re-writing the post-World War

believe has prevented
central

a

II

a

possible means of

strategic foundation which many

nuclear war between the superpowers.

objective of the strategic defense initiative

this past history and help construct

a

is

The

to re-write

new strategic world.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ABM REVISITED

In

it

approaching

a

subject as complex as ballistic
missile defense,

is

important to look at the past to
help decipher the future.
This
chapter will address several major
themes.
First, a review of the

strategic issues associated with the
ABM debate of the 1960s will
be
presented.
Second, implications of the
original ABM debate will be
reviewed in order to understand some
of the possible implications of
the strategic defense initiative.
And finally, U.S. deterrence policy
will

be analyzed in order to understand
strategic patterns that may

have an impact on the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI).
The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) was
conceived of as

a

means of

combating the tremendous offensive threat
posed by ballistic missiles
to the security of the United States.

As

in the case of the emergence

of the long-range bomber threat in the
1950s, the U.S. defense

community set out to develop an effective countermeasure.

In

this

regard, the task of destroying ballistic missiles
was thought of as

the logical extension of the capability of surface-to-air
missile

defenses (SAMs), which
bombers.

in the 1950s were

designed to shoot down

These ideas eventually resulted in the U.S. ABM program

called Nike-Zeus.
The ABM and strategic defenses in general have been held in

constant fascination by the military since the 1940s.

Yet, after
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having deployed an ABM defense
system

in

the early 1970s, the
U.S.

decided to set these weapons
aside in favor of and in
conjunct, or/with
a different approach
to maintaining U.S. security.
While a number of
factors
both technological and
political
have led to a
vacillation in support by policy
leaders for a U.S. strategic
defense,
the Department of Defense has
maintained a ballistic missile
defense
technology research program.
Until President Reagan's call
for the

-

development of

-

a

comprehensive and effective strategic
defense

March 1983, ballistic missile
defenses had played

in

short-lived and

a

minor role in U.S. deterrence policy
at the strategic level.
Defenses, however, have played

a

central

role in U.S. deterrence

policy in the past and ballistic
missile defenses may come to play
very important role in U.S. deterrence
policy as

a

a

result of the

strategic defense initiative.
The post-World War

II

era can be divided into two distinct
phases

with regard to the importance placed upon
strategic defenses.
first phase corresponds roughly with the
period 1945

-

The

1972 during

which strategic defenses were considered essential
to the U.S.

deterrent capabilities.

The U.S. developed and deployed

surface-to-air missile defenses against the predominant
strategic
threat posed during the 1940s and 1950s, Soviet strategic
bombers.
The U.S., much like the Soviet Union, also prepared
extensive civil

defense plans to help limit the level of damage the U.S. might
receive

during

a

war.

Once ballistic missiles proved to be effective delivery

systems for the superpowers'
to work on ant i -bal

1 i

nuclear weapons, both superpowers began

sti c missile defenses.

The second phase,

,972-1983, began as

the ABM Treaty between the
superpowers.

a

result of the signing of

This period represents
the

formal

acceptance of the theory that
offensive nuclear weapons
hold
tremendous advantage over defenses.
A third phase

in the

the Strategic Defense

post-war era may have started
as

Initiative in 1983.

a

a

result of

While it is too soon to

draw any definite conclusions
about this new period, defenses
against
nuclear forces again may enter
the U.S. strategic calculus.
The strategic objective envisioned
by weapons designers for
the

ABM was effective protection for
the nation from
carried by ballistic missiles.

nuclear attack

A defense of this capability
is

unquestionably desirable from both
perspective.

a

a

military and political

The ABM was conceived of as

a

means by which the U.S.

might reduce, if not altogether escape,
the tremendous potential

damage that could result from

a

nuclear attack.

This vision still

captivates many in the political and military
community as

demonstrated by President Reagan's call to the
scientific community to
"render nuclear weapons obsolete." 1

Research on possible defenses against ballistic
missiles began
shortly after Nazi Germany used the first guided
missile
and V2 rockets

-

against England during World War II.

-

Buzz Bombs

The rapid

development of radar detection and tracking technologies,
command and
control equipment, as well as nuclear weapons enhanced
the feasibility
and desirability of full

scale ABM research and development.

Bell

Laboratories, under contract to the Department of Defense, concluded
study in

i%6

on various components that were necessary for the

a
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development of an ABM system.
level

Bell

labonator.es

indited that some
of destruction against
ballistic miss.les was
poss.ble. By

1962, the U.S. had developed an ABM
system with which it believed
national defense might be built.
During the same year, a U.S.

a

Nike-Zeus ABM interceptor was
fired over the Kwajalein
Atoll at an
incoming missile reentry vehicle
launched from Vandenberg Air
Force
Base.
While the Nike-Zeus did not
intercept the reentry vehicle
directly, the Army reported that
it came close enough to
destroy the
target had

a

nuclear warhead been employed. 2

This event formally

entered the ABM into the strategic
nuclear debate.
The tremendous potential

for national destruction that
the

offensive nuclear forces of the U.S.
and Soviet Union could unleash
provided

a

military and political

development.

In

impetus for ABM research and

addition, there was

a

solid moral

imperative for an

ABM defense as it was difficult to
rationalize the 'balance of terror'
that threatens the superpowers.

Three major identifiable reasons led

to the emergence of ABM defense.

The first reason for the development

of the ABM was the military's desire for
effective defenses against

the ballistic missile.

Second, the U.S. government saw its

responsibility to protect the nation and prevent the
type of

destruction that would result from

a

nuclear attack.

morally repugnant for the nation to be vulnerable to
that might cause millions of deaths.

Lastly, it is
a

nuclear attack

These more general

justifications for the ABM held sway until the mid to late 1960s.
The strategic nuclear balance of the early 1960s closely

resembled

a

David vs. Goliath equation, where the U.S. was clearly the

Goliath in nu.bers of nuclear
forces as well as related
employment
capabilities. The 'missile
gap' scare of the early
1960s had spurred
the Department of Defense
to begin procuring a
large number of
deliverable warheads and an array
of delivery vehicles
which by the
early 1970s deluded roughly
1,000 ICBMs, 41 strategic
nuclear
submarines, and a fleet of B-52
strategic bombers. These
strategic
forces afforoed the U.S. a
certain level of freedom in
its foreign
affairs and some strategic and
political leverage in international
crises.
For instance, U.S. strategic
nuclear superiority relative to
the Soviet Union among other
factors clearly influenced the
Soviet
Union's decision to withdraw its
intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs)

from Cuba in 1962.

However, the Cuban missile crisis
taught

the two superpowers the necessity
of stabilizing their nuclear

relationship.

The mutual

national

vulnerability that each superpower

recognized more clearly after the Cuban
incident further prompted

strategists to question the danger of the
threat of nuclear war to
U.S. security.

The ABM was portrayed in this context
as

effective means of reducing the U.S.'s
vulnerability to

a

a

potentially
nuclear

attack, thereby enhancing U.S. security.

The reality that the nation is vulnerable to

a

nuclear attack is

as compelling a reason for deploying defenses
today as it was in the

early 1960s.

Various projections of the numbers of fatalities with

and without an ABM defense were made.

from an all

The number of American deaths

out nuclear exchange between the two superpowers was

estimated by the late 1960s at around 100 to 120 million without
the

protection of an ABM system.

Studies also projected that at least 75
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Percent of the U.S.'s industrial
capacity would lie in ruin
after a
nuclear exchange. Clearly,
these figures are tantamount
to complete
national destruction.
An ABM defense capable
of lessening these
levels of destruction was
seen as militarily valuable
to ABM
proponents.

However, anti-ballistic
.issile opponents pointed out,
in
response, that an ABM defense
was unlikely to lower the
level of

damage significantly as an
attacker could simply increase
the size of
an attack in order to achieve
sirmlar
results.

The ABM debate of the 1960s
stirred the U.S. military planning
and policy community to consider
significant changes to U.S.

deterrence policy and force structure.

The character of the arguments

for and against the ABM was
indicative of the larger debate over
the

future direction of U.S. nuclear policy.
into

a

That policy, having evolved

policy for massive retaliation during
the 1950s, was

increasingly less credible in the eyes of
U.S. strategists by the
early 1960s.

In

addition, the U.S.'s shift in favor of

flexible nuclear policy was influenced by
the growth

in

a

more

Soviet nuclear

capabilities, the birth of an arms control theory
in the early 1960s,
and the changing perspective on U.S. security
requirements which

included the concept of ABM defenses.

I.

Arguments for the ABM
The success of the ABM development program, highlighted
by the

successful

Nike-Zeus reentry vehicle intercept, greatly boosted the

hopes of ABM advocates that the U.S. would integrate an ABM system
into its strategic arsenal.

3

Meanwhile, the Kennedy Administration

initiated

general

a

nuclear policy review.

The primary focus of
this

review was to ensure that
U.S. nuclear superiority
remained intact
while allows for generally
greater flexibility. The
first U.S.

system was proposed as
and overall

ABM

means of enhancing U.S.
nuclear superiority

a

strategic defense capabilities.

number of ABM proponents
envisioned

a

During the early 1960s

a

U.S. strategic offensive
and

defensive posture capable of
limiting damage to the United
States in
the event of a nuclear attack.
A strategy for damage
limitation might
be implemented to limit the
potential damage to the U.S. from
a
nuclear attack as well as to help
preserve U.S. political flexibility
in

its

foreign relations.

U.S. could survive

a

was argued that by assuring
that the

It

nuclear attack, few nations would
threaten to use

nuclear weapons against the U.S. for
political or strategic gain.
U.S., defended by an ABM system
as well

as civil

A

and air defenses,

could continue to contain Soviet
aggression and respond to

international

incidents, both militarily and politically,
without

threatening

massive military retaliation as envisioned
during the

1950s.

a

Anti-ballistic missiles were seen as

a

critical

component of

damage limitation strategy.

President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara
concluded that the technical

impediments to defeating even marginally

modified offensive forces were too many and decidied
to drop the idea
of

a

meaningful damage limitation strategy.

establishment quickly sought to define

anti-ballistic missile.

For

a

a

The military

new role for the

short period of time, civil defenses

were advocated in place of the Nike-Zeus ABM as

a

potentially

a
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effective me ans of Uniting
damage to the U.S.
population. However
the civil defense program
was assessed to be only
m arginally effective
without the concurrent
deployment of an effective
ABM system,

samara

concluded that the U.S. could
not hope to maintain
strategic
nuclear superiority through
a damage limitation
strategy as an
effective damage limiting
capability was not technically
feasible. As
a result of McNanara's
assessment, the Department of
Defense shifted
the focus of ABM defense
research toward less comprehensive
and less

demanding defense missions.

Although criticized as only
marginally effective at best,
the ABM
had become an important
program to the military establishment.
The
Department of Defense began to explore
the possibility of using the
Nike system for other than wide
area defense.
While this shift was
effected on paper, the ABM systems
were upgraded by the introduction
of more technologically sophisticated
components.

that the capabilities of the
superpowers'

McNamara concluded

nuclear forces were likely

to continue to expand and improve
but that the trend was toward their

becoming similar in overall capability.

Central to this trend was the

growth of the Soviet offensive nuclear arsenal
and
the number of forces deployed by the United
States.

a

leveling off in
Hence, the U.S.

could not expect to maintain nuclear superiority
through the

deployment of ABM defenses alone.
United States strategic policy, predicated on the
maintenance of

deterrence, had entered
1960s.

a

period of transition in the early to mid

That period, which lasted until the mid 1970s, saw U.S.
policy

reject the strategy of

a

massive retaliation and accept an assured

retaliation or minimum deterrence
mode.

Concurrently, the

U S

concluded that it did not
require strategic forces
ahove those already
scheduled for deployment.
In addit.on, the
Soviet buildup was not
expected to achieve weapons
levels similiar to those
of the
U.S. until

the early to mid ,970s.

This evolution in U.S.
policy and its

corresponding strategies are often
associated with the concept
of
"Mutual Assured Destruction".
As U.S. policy began to
reflect and accept the growing
equality
of strategic force capabilities
between the superpowers and,

correspondingly, reject the notion
of preserving U.S. strategic
nuclear superiority, the debate
over the possible roles for
an ABM

defense was enlivened.

Proponents, fresh from the defeat
of the

Nike-Zeus, continued to promote the
development of the ABM to meet
other defense missions.

Principal

national devastation from

a

among these was the prevention
of

nuclear attack.

The ABM's role might be

to protect certain population
centers or U.S. strategic offensive

nuclear forces.
viewed as

a

The protection of U.S. strategic
nuclear forces was

means of augmenting the U.S. deterrent
and preserving its

credibility.

However, the Nike program was geared primarily
toward

population defense and was not as effective for

a

a

defense of military

instal lations.
As alluded to earlier,

one lesson of the Cuban missile crisis was

the need to promote and preserve

offensive forces reached
ICBMs,

a

a

stable nuclear balance.

As U.S.

relative plateau in the late 1960s (1,000

roughly 500 SLBMs, and nearly 500 strategic bombers; and

approximately 1,000 ICBMs, 125 SLBMs, and 150 long range bombers

in

the Soviet arsenal),
many U.S. analysts
argued that proton of
a
stable strategic balance
was not only essential,
but would require

protection against the threat
of counterforce weapons.

The Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations
had concluded that the
U.S. possessed

sufficient force to preserve
U.S. security and promote
a stable
balance without deploying an
ABM defense. However,
uncertainty over
the future posture and size
of Soviet counterforce
systems convinced
the Nixon Administration to
support the redirecting of
the ABM program
toward development of a more
dedicated counterforce ABM
defense.

Proponents began to argue that
the ABM was essential to
the

survivability of the U.S. retaliatory
nuclear forces as the U.S. had
already decided not to match the
Soviet buildup in offensive
forces.
New offensive deployments by the
U.S. were assessed as

unnecessary and potentially destabilizing
to the strategic balance.
That is, the U.S. concluded that
an increase in U.S. offensive

capabilities might precipitate

a

weakening of strategic stability in

crisis situation or lead to an arms race.

In

addition, another crisis

similiar to the Cuban incident could pit
the U.S. against
capable Soviet Union.

As such,

an ABMs

successful Soviet counterforce attack.

1

a

more

role could be to prevent

Analysts feared that

a

a

counterforce attack might degrade U.S. nuclear forces
as to deny the
U.S. the ability to carry out an effective
retaliatory strike on the

Soviet Union.

a

An ABM defense also might provide the U.S.
sufficient

time to analyze the size and kind of attack the U.S.
was facing and
the appropriate U.S. response.

Proponents of the ABM argued that the U.S. had few alternatives

.

to an increasingly
vulnerable offensive force
under the then current

conditions.

However, U.S. forces deployed

to have become vulnerable
to

a

true

in

dinning

the Triad were unlikely

counterforce attack.

Strategic analysts who favored
the Safeguard ABM system
argued that
Soviet nuclear weapons like
the SS-9 ICBM were designed
for
counterforce attacks and could
seriously damage U.S. nuclear
forces.
The warhead carried by the
Soviet SS-9 ICBM (10 to 15
megatons in the
single warhead version and
5 megatons in a three
warhead MIRVed
version) and its improved accuracy
(.5 nautical miles) over
older
Soviet ICBMs worried Pentagon
strategists that the U.S. Minuteman
ICBM
force would become vulnerable
to a counterforce attack in
the early to
mid-1970s
One option for countering
to institute

a

a

counterforce threat might have been

Launch-on-Warni ng policy.

Under this kind of policy

the U.S. could launch its missiles
once incoming Soviet nuclear

missiles have been positively detected
and identified.

However, this

policy is fraught with potential
disaster should the U.S. launch as
result of

a

false detection.

escalation process (whereby

Secondly, in the event of war, the
a

nuclear war might be limited, if it can

be controlled at all) would have been
precluded.

Launch-on-Warning policy would place
'hair trigger'

basis.

Launch-on-Warning or

a

U.S.

sum,

In

a

nuclear response on

The options for implementing
1

a

a

a

aunch-under-attack policy (LOW and LUA,

respectively) reappeared

in

the late 1970s as the U.S. strategic

community began to debate the so-called 'window of
vulnerability'.
While these options illustrate the feasibility of adjusting
policy to
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.eet new threats, they also
demonstrate the ever dynamic
role of
technology. As in the late
1960s, the U.S. has reconsidered
deployment of an ABM defense
to protect its strategic
weapons JU dged
increasingly vulnerable to a
Soviet attack.
A favored alternative of
ABM proponents to a vulnerable

ICBM

force was the deployment of an
ABM defense around missile
silos.
The
objective of such a defense would
be to allow the U.S. time
to ride
out an attack on the assumption
that the ABM system would
degrade an

enemy's attack sufficiently to
preserve U.S. retaliatory forces.
Better use of the time available
for detection and tracking
of
incoming missiles might enable the
U.S. to evaluate which of its
forces it might want to launch
before the attack has hit and which
could be held back for

a

retaliation.

In

this fashion, the U.S. could

attack the Soviet Union's remaining
missiles as well
and political

as other military

targets more effectively by allocating
its nuclear

forces appropriately.

From the proponents' perspective, the
ABM would

help protect the nation and preserve

a

credible deterrent force. That

is, proponents were certain that an
ABM defense could help to deter

a

Soviet nuclear attack and protect the U.S. better
than the maintenance
of

a

military posture without defenses.
The Pentagon and Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), owing
in part to

their air defense experience, were solidly behind the
notion of an
'area defense'

role for the ABM.

An area defense ABM system is

designed to protect major cities, industrial centers, as
well as

nuclear forces.

However, this type of comprehensive nationwide

defense was beyond the U.S.'s technical capability in the late
1960s.

One of the ma JO r obstacles
traditionally associated
with the

develops
level

of

a

defense has heen the definition
of an acceptabfle

of effectiveness.

Sentinal

The ABM technology
associated with the

and Safeguard systems would
not have been able to
achi,eve
i

very high kill

rates against Soviet reentry
vehicles.

Yet, the

systems were judged capable of
degrading an attacking ballistic
missile force by some measure.
The level

of effectiveness required
to deploy an ABM is dependent

on the defense objective
sought by the deployment.

The Sentinel ABM

defense, largely an area defense,
was considered incapable of
handling
a

large Soviet offensive force
modified with penetration aids.

For

example, neither Sentinel or its
predecessors (Nike-Zeus and Nike-X)

were judged to be effective against

a

sophisticated saturation attack

which might include the deployment of
dummy warheads and MIRVs.
A number of ABM advocates,

hopes on

a

deployed.

'thin defense'

such as Herman Kahn, pinned their

similar to the Safeguard system eventually

While Safeguard was essentially

a

redesigned and renamed

Sentinal ABM defense, it was promoted as
an effective means to provide
an ABM infrastructure for the United
States.

The initial deployment

scheme for the Safeguard defense was to include
defenses.

15

to 20 site

The current defense debate often confuses

with the concept of point defenses.

a

'thin defense'

Point defenses, such as the LOADS

system, have been advocated in connection with the
deployment of the
MX ICBM as

a

means of enhancing its survivability.

Point defenses

serve to protect selected important targets such as strategic
weapons

components or related command-control- communication nodes.

The 'thin

defense' was envisioned
as

defense'

at a

a

basis for the deployment
of an 'area

later date and would have
started h y protecting
sites

such as U.S. „,iss„e
silos.

Safeguard's second phase
was to include

system upgrade and additional
deployments to compose

comprehensive nationwide defense
sometime

in

a

a

more

the late 1970s.

ABM advocates also promoted
the idea that

a 'thin defense'
could
increase U.S. security by
protecting the nation against
an accidental
or third country attack.
Although a somewhat lower
threat to U.S.
security at the time, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons
was

expected to continue.

The possession of nuclear
weapons by

number of countries could lead
to
threats.

a

commensurate increase

in

greater

nuclear

Oefense against small third
country attacks could have been

mounted fairly successfully with
the Safeguard system.

The Johnson

Administration, under political pressure
to save the ABM as
of congressional

system as

a

a

a

result

criticism, advocated deployment of
the Sentinel ABM

defense against Chinese nuclear forces.

China's strategic

nuclear forces were assessed to be
developing quickly enough to become
a

significant threat to the U.S. by the mid-1970s.
Finally,

a

number of government officials such as
Secretary

McNamara saw the ABM defense as
political

a

potentially effective strategic and

lever for the arms control talks.

McNamara had argued that

an all-out strategic offensive and defensive
arms race was potentially

the most destabilizing threat to the strategic
nuclear balance.

A

number of analysts, seeking to prevent an arms race,
argued that any

means of gaining leverage in the arms control talks could
be

strategically useful.

The Soviets had begun to deploy an ABM defense

around Moscow In the m id
1960s and

with their growing !CBM
force s as
position and

considered

a

a

saw

^

^

chaUange to the u.S...
nuCear

possihie bid for superiority.

extre^y

perspect,ve.

mny

threatening fro.

a

ABM proponents argued
that

This prospect was

strategic and political

deploys

of an ABM defense

Oy the U.S.

couid strengthen its
strategic position and
provide the
necessary flexibility in
dealing with the Soviets
in the

a™

1

imitation talks.

While the preceeding arguments
greatly influenced the
decision to
90 forward with the Safeguard deployment
as well as the ABM Treaty,
the positions of ABM
opponents were equally compelling
and also

influenced the future

diction

of U.S. deterrence policy
in the

1970s.

II.

Argu ments against the ABM
The flurry of ABM advocacy in
the 1960s created an equally
active

and vocal

opposing constituency.

A number of arguments against
the

ABM defense scheme emerged from
challenges that the abm was

strategically misguided to claims that
it would be entirely cost
ineffective.
"critical

overall

critics'

While some of these arguments pointed
to so-called

flaws'

in the

system's technology, others criticized
the

concept of defense against nuclear weapons,

charges was

a

central to the

belief that nuclear weapons could not be

conceived of in any role other than the
preservation of deterrence.
That is, many believed it was irrational

with the superpowers'

if not dangerous to tamper

strategic offensive forces -- or their ability
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to threaten an enemy

wnicn served
which
sen/Pri as t-h
the *foundation of
deterrence.
The most influential
and persuasTve
persuasive of th«
the arguments against
the
ABM stemmed from a ^iset nf
of c+„,+
strategy assumptions and
principles
concerning the nuclear
balance of the 1960s.
rhe initiation of a
strategic nuclear exchange,
purposefully or
by accident, would
result in an immeasurable
level of human and

"t.rl.1 destruction.

For example, the U.S.
had begun preparations
in

the 1960s for the destruction
of one third of the
Soviet Union's
population and nearly two thirds
of its industrial base,
the scope
•of this destruction clearly
impressed most policy makers
that nuclear
war was simply not w,nable.
Measures of success and failure
might
have been imagined but were
simply unrealistic and
irrelevant for

opponents of the ABM.

Oiven these conditions, the
first principle

concerning nuclear war for ABM
opponents was that
could not be won.

believed that

a

a

nuclear war simply

While this does not imply that
ABM proponents

nuclear war could be won, opponents
could forsee no

use for an ABM as

a

result.

The purpose and roles of warfare
in national policy was
forever

altered by the development of nuclear
weapons.

The major impetus to

this conviction was the force and
credibility that nuclear weapons

provided offensive warfare as compared
to defensive warfare.

In

the

opinion of most analysts, the level and
intensity of violence capable
of being unleashed by a nuclear weapon
is so great as to preclude the

use of nuclear weapons and restrict
the frequency and intensity of

warfare (both conventional and nuclear) for
the superpowers.

Offensive warfare acquired

a

level

of destructive intensity far

super,or to known defenses
no defenses against

a

in

the 1,40s and 195
0s.

There are a,most

nuclear explosion, hence
an attacker simply

requires an effective deliver,
system to obtain an
advantage over an
ene^'s defenses. Opponents of
the ABM took this
ardent one step
further h y charging that
so ,ong as a nuCear
war couid not ho won
and
nat,ons are unable to
effective,, defend aga,nst
a nuclear attack
nations are caught in an
offensive stalemate. That
is, all nations
were effectively vu,nerab,e
to a nuclear attack.
Furthermore,
opponents argued, in order to
ensure that a devastating
nuclear war
would not break out, the U.S.
must turn the argument
on its head and
attempt to preserve the offensive
'balance of terror'.
Hence, it

would be the responsibility
of each nation, having
accepted the
preceding tenets as fact, to remain
attuned to the strategic offensive
balance in order to prevent its
weakening. A weakening of the
balance
could occur as a result of a nation
seeking advantages over other
nations or by the deployment of
defenses against nuclear weapons.
The most secure position in
this regard, one which accounted
for
the condition of an unavoidable
balance of terror, is one which

promotes

a

stable balance.

To opponents of the ABM, this
position is

obtainable only to the extent that each
superpower refrains from
seeking nuclear superiority.

Although strategic nuclear superiority

may be meaningless from a strategic
and political perspective,

attempts to achieve it can destabilize the
strategic balance and lead
to war in

a

severe crisis.

For most strategic analysts the most

effective stabilizing measure was the preservation
of an invulnerable
offensive nuclear force.

ABM opponents were particularly concerned

.

that any

.,„„.

defense might cha|lange

^ .^^.^ ^

strategic forces and thereby
destabilize the strategic
balance
One method of enhancing
stability within the
strategic balance
would have been agreements
toward disarmament.
However, neither
superpower was politicly
or strategically willing
to disarm for fear
of clandestine weapons
deployments as well as third
party threats,
uiven these conditions,
a stable 'balance
of terror' might b*
preserved if the superpowers
see. to maintain a secure
second strike
retaliatory force and avo,d
forces capable of threatening
the other's
nuclear arsenal
Lastly, all measures designed
to escape the balance of
terror
might be seen by an enemy as
an attempt to prepare
for a nuclear
exchange and to limit one's
damage from a war. Since such
efforts,
according to ABM opponents, are
clearly irrational and dangerous,
these preparations can only be
regarded as provocative and

'

destabilizing to the strategic balance.
While these more abstract arguments
were considered important by
decision makers, the most concrete
and salient arguments against
the
ABM appear to have focused on
the technical merits of the
system's
structure.

The structural

the 1960s, the Sentinel

design of the most advanced ABM
systems of

and Safeguard programs, were

a

result of the

dissatisfaction with the technology of the
original ABM program, the
Nike-Zeus.

The Nike program depended on relatively
unsophisticated

technology including rotating tracking radars,
high altitude
interceptors of marginal maneuverability, and
very large nuclear kill

mechanisms.

The assessment that the Soviet Union's
offensive forces

could saturate or confuse
these systens resulted
in their
cancellation. The follow-on
ABM system
«»h
system'ss ztn
*
structure
was designed to
overcome the major flaws
of the Nike program.
Both Sentinel and
Safeguard were structured
around two
interceptor missiles and
a network of phased
array radars.
The
Spartan AB M was a direct
follow-on to the N ike
program. Like the Ni ke
interceptor. Spartan was a
high altitude interceptor
which carried a
Urge megaton yield nuclear
warhead designed to kill by
x-ray
emissions ahove the atmosphere. 4
That is, the warhead was
designed to
create large areas of debris
and x-ray disturbances
that would cover
the path of an attacking
reentry vehicle thereby
destroying it. This
area is generally referred
to as the kill radius of
the defense
interceptor.
The Spartan system's terminal
defense interceptor, the
Spent missile, was designed to
destroy warheads that had
penetrated
Spartan exoatmospheric defenses.
The Sprint was capable of

intercepting within 40 miles of
the defended target and carried
kiloton range warhead.

Although the dual

a

interceptor defense system

was considered a significant
improvement over the modest N,ke
program,

advances in sophisticated penaids
and saturation tactics further
hampered the Department of Defense's
effort to deploy the ABM from
technical perspective.

a

5

The ABM system's major strategic flaw
was its focus on area
defense.

Area defense demands an extremely high
level of

effectiveness if not perfection.

A single penetrating warhead over
a

major urban area can cause thousands and
possibly millions of deaths
and tremendous material destruction.

The ABM systems were unable to

the original

delimiting

marginally useful
"-any

o6jectjve and

^

from this perspective.

critics charge, the system
with techn1cal

others merely referred
to probable Soviet
measures to degrade the
ABM's effectiveness as
a sufficient
reason not to deploy.
"Most
critics of the ABM technology
were really referring
to the fact that a
modified Soviet nuclear
force could outwit and
overwhelm an ABM
system. That is. although
Safeguard could have handled
a smal, Soviet
attack quite effectively,
it would be relativeiy
cheap and easy to
nul ify an ABM defense" 6
1

.

Two major categories of
offensive counte™easures
were already
envisioned in the
cne early
earlv iyeus.
lufiiic
The efirst category is
generally

labelled 'passive' measures
where improvements are made
to the
ballistic missile.
The Sentinel and Safeguard
systems would have had
to adjust to a profusion
of offensive enhancing
hardware. These
countermeasures included technical
improvements to the ballistic

missile as well as measures designed
to confuse an ABM's tracking
and
designation system. Metal sheets
or chaff, dummy warheads,
and
balloons could confuse the ABM
system's discrimination capabilities
and proliferate the number of
targets the system would be required
to
handle, thus improving the chances
that the real warheads would

penetrate and destroy their targets.
Among the most important active
countermeasures developed by the
U.S. was the MIRVed warhead.

The basing of multiple warheads
on

a

single ballistic missile greatly
complicates the job of an ABM defense
by expanding the number of targets
it is required to kill

in

order to

maintain its original

level

of ei
ef fecti
recti veness.
vene^

ABM effectiveness can
be judged
it

is

capable of destroying.

generally

by

Th
The
measurable level of

the percentage of
reentry vehicles

This level can be
degraded and is

function of the number of
warheads deployed on each
missile and the difficulty
of detecting and
tracking them.
a

Another deadly countermeasure

is

the designation of
certain

warheads to detonate on impact
with an ABM defense
interceptor.
Th 1S
kind of tactic allows the
attacker to achieve some
measure of
destruction against a target
and also can blind the
ABM radars
allowing other reentry vehicles
to penetrate the defense.
Generally,
a measurable level
of target destruction
can be achieved only by

detonating the nuclear weapon
within the atmosphere.

Therefore,

detonation of the warhead upon
impact with the ABM inteceptor
can
achieve only some offensive success
when engaged by endoatmospheric
interceptors.

Detonation outside the atmosphere
may clear

a

path

through which other reentry vehicles
can penetrate.
The second category of countermeasures
includes efforts that

might be called tactical.

ABM's kill

The Soviets could reduce the impact
of the

radius by employing special angles
of attack, either low,

high, or varied and staggered
trajectories, thereby escaping
an ABM's effective range.

a

part of

The Soviets also might attempt salvo
and

successive attacks to challenge the ABM's
radar and missile launch
timing capabilities.

Although the technical arguments were sometimes
inaccurate on
both sides of the debate, the more important
issues were only so to
the extent that the technical

arguments remained unresolved.

The
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strategic implications of

depioyab,e ABM nested,
in pant, on the
'eve, of k 11,sac n , e v
ab ,e by the defense.
Proponents
a

had

conceded

that an ABM would enhance
U.S. security by
degrading the level of

the other hand, addressed
this point oy charging
that such a
degradation in Soviet offensive
offpnsivp r»n»k4T*
capabilities would quickly
lead to an
action-reaction cycle and a renewed
and vigorous arms race.
The
deployment of an ABM defense
that might reduce the
retaliatory
capabilities of Soviet nuclear
forces could lead to the
proliferation
of greater numbers of
offensive nuclear weapons as
the Soviets seek to
regain any lost capability.
This proliferation, they
charged, would
result in an increase in the
destructive power of the
superpower's
nuclear arsenals.
In addition, an
increase in offensive nuclear
force
would not enhance U.S. security,
but only decrease it by
making the
balance of nuclear forces more
precarious and less stable.
A principal

assumption of this argument is the
belief that only

"offensive nuclear forces can be
relied upon to preserve the
nuclear
balance" and assure that the Soviet
Union is deterred from attacking
the U.S. or its allies.

7

That is, any lessening of the
credibility of

the U.S.'s or Soviet Union's
second strike retaliatory forces by
the

deployment of an ABM
capability.

is

sure to be seen as

a

weakening of deterrent

As neither superpower could accept
this condition, the

development of measures to reenforce offensive
retaliatory capability
are likely to be required.

Under these conditions, the balance of

power might begin to tilt in favor of one
or the other superpower
thereby potentially destabilizing

a

crisis to the point where one

superpower attacks.

The ,1st of technica,
and tactica, measures

™entioned ahove, have heen
presented as so me of
the maj on avenuei
for
redressing a loss of
deterrent credibility.
Critics of the ABM

-*»1»d
to an ABM

that one of the qu ,c k
est and

decent

wou.d involve the

fractionation of offensive
VG rorces
fnrrpc

-

ffl

ost effective

si mp ,e

counte™eas ur es

expansion or

These countermeasures
could be

achieved by MIRVing ballistic
missis
a
missiles nr
or kby deploying
greater numbers
of missiles, launch
vehicles, and/or reload
capabilities.
The most dangerous threat
to the nation's security
that could
result from an ABM deployment
is the possibility
that nuclear weapons
could be used in a severe
crisis.
Assured destruction theorists
charged that the deployment
of an ABM system would
be perceived as an
attempt to limit damage and
achieve some measure of nuclear
i

superiority and that this goal

is

highly destabilizing.

ABM system might be ineffective
against

a

system concurrently with

a

a

Hence, deployment of

a

a

U.S. attack.

have the choice between

a

U.S. ABM

a

a

U.S. attack.

crisis to preclude

a

As

'all

or nothing'

response in

That is, the Soviets might expect to

greatly degraded and potentially poorly

coordinated retaliatory attack or an all-out
attack on U.S. cities
after an initial U.S. strike.

Hence, the incentive to launch

a

a

defeat.

first strike in order to limit
damage to

the Soviet Union and prevent an

anticipation of

a

counterforce capability could lead
the

result, the Soviets might attack
during
launch

U.S.

degraded and

Soviets to feel threatened with
decapitation from

The Soviets could

a

concerted and large scale

Soviet attack, it might be
effective against

interrupted retaliatory attack.

While
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-prise

first

crisis might be
heightened by a U.S. ABM
deployment. These
conditions are characterize,
as 1nstabil1ty
genera, concept is
xnown as 'crisis
stablHty' as oppose, to
strategic stabi ity

m]e

1

1

.

proceeding arguments, both
pro and con, concerni„
g the ABM in
the 1960s raised a
number of qu est,o„s
about U.S. deterrence
theory
These guestions ,ed to
a number of
decisions with which the
current
BMD deoate is contending
the U.S. decided to
forgo an area defense
to see* „m1ts on
defensive systems with
the Soviet Union, and
to
reenforce offensive deterrence
hy a policy of assured
destruction.
Given these decisions, it
1s instructive to explore
the

-

and differences between
the current defense debate
and the

l

9 60s

debate to understand the
decis,ons that may follow the
current debate.

HI. Implication s of the Early
ABM Debate
The preceding analysis
provided

a

basis for discussing the

implications of the original ABM
debate for U.S. strategic nuclear
policy. As the events and
decisions surrounding the ABM in the
196Us
and early 1970s influenced
profoundly the substance of U.S.
policy for
the past fifteen years, so
too will the defense debate
today influence

the course of U.S. policy for
the next fifteen years.

The

implications of the original debate
for U.S. policy during the
1970s
can be helpful to understanding
how the SDI might affect U.S. policy
in the

late 1980s and 1990s.

U.S. strategic nuclear policy is
composed of four major

substantive divisions.

Each policy division addresses

a

different but

"

-l^d
^Pes

set of

of

,

SS ues concerning
tht

Wy

stra t e 9 ic „ uclea r
weapons the

,

n

,

whjch

^

^

requires>ns

^^

^

^

Positions, a„ d> f1nally>
the manner fn whjch
enemy in a nuclear
exchange should deterrence
fail.
Of the four substantive
policy components,
"the most public and

™ostw,de,y discussed...

»

comprised of

a

set of

is

a

,.3. strategic dec,
aratory pel cy

[t

princples and arguments
about our nuCear

posturing and our position
vis
«ords, it is

^

a

vis other

nuCear powers."*

set of 'first principles'
which state how the

,„
U

other

s

looks at deterrence, the
strategic balance with the
Soviet Union, and
force postures that
preserve the nuCear balance.
For example, "the
U.S. has always argued
that a nuCear war will
re su,t in unimaginable
damage to the parties
involved" and, "therefore,
seeks a policy that
assures that a nuclear war
will not be fought. S
During the 195US,
this notion was affixed
to U.S. policy through
declarations that the
U.S. government would respond
to a nuclear attack with
a swift and

massive nuCear retaliation.

Such statements provide an
understanding

of U.S. declaratory policy
as a public means for
deterring

attack.

a

nuclear

The policy for massive retaliation
and its operational

strategies were backed by

a

comparatively large nuclear force

comprised of long-range strategic
bombers, intermediate-range

ballistic missiles, and

a

small

number of ICBMs.

Illustrative of this

declaratory dimension of U.S. policy
were periodic nuclear exercises,
designed to demonstrate U.S. deterrence
resolve and capability.
A debate over the appropriate
nuclear policy for preserving U.S.
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security emerged in the
early
US and lac*
y 1960s
ldsteda until the late
1960s
This period was filled
with doctrinal as
well as
,s „
strategic options for
altering U.S. deterrence
policy
one of whi.w
y
whlch appeared as
the ABM
defense came to prominence.
•

'

United states strategic
nuclear superiority
was
during m uch of the
1960s at levels of tnree
an. f0U r times the
S12e of
Soviet nuceer forces.
That 1s, the U.S. could
Inflict between three

inflict on the U.S.

result of

«h!le the ,eve,s sound

missive,

a

^^^^

larger U.S. nuclear
arsenal.

the Sov|et

^^

of causing extremely
high 1e ve,s of damage
tQ

economic Oase.

^

The U.S. was free to
explore new policies witnout

having to fear that these
actions might weaken the
Soviet Union's
perception of the U.S. deterrent.
Vet, the Soviet Union's
effort to
catch up with the U.S. in
numbers of weapons after the
Cuban missile
crisis implied that the U.S.
!ead would not last without
U.S.

countering actions.

One option would have entailed
efforts to

preserve U.S. nuclear superiority.

Yet, such an effort would
have

been extremely expensive and
fraught with political hazards,
as the
O.S. was then becoming more
deeply involved in the Vietnam
war.
The
U.S. was faced with deciding
whether to match

a

greatly accelerated

Soviet nuclear Buildup subsequent
to the Cuban missile crisis, in

order to maintain its margin of
superiority, or to do something else
to prevent the Soviets from catching
up.

One of the proposed alternatives
for maintaining U.S. nuclear

superiority was

a

'damage limitation'

strategy.

In

this case, U.S.

-le, rpolicywould

—

focus on

0ff8nSiVe nUC,ear

-M.

P

herring
but

Soviet aggress1on

*

assuring that the

lm

,

the Soviets could
infl ,ct on the U.S.
could not surpass
the
level of daraage with
wMch the u.3. could
retal1ate> This strategy
was designed to
<;
preserve
„.,,i
P eserve n
U.S.
nuclear superiority by
procuring a

of

manage ,„Hict1„ capacity
g
far greater than any
potential aggressor
<n the early
l960s> the Kennedy
Administration briefly
entertained a
damage limitation'
poncy, but decided
policv
,w,'h„h against
it for a number of
Political and strategic
reasons.

Schilling has argued that
"a damage limitation
strategy would
required the U.S. to develop
and deploy coonterforce
weapons an
active defense component
comprised of ABMs , air
defenses, and
sophisticated anti-submarine
weapons, and passive civil
"
defenses." 1
The arguments in favor
of a 'damage limitation'
strategy were
compelling to some analysts
in view of the Soviet
nuclear buildup.
Vet, U.S. technical

prowess

inadequate for achieving

a

in

each of these areas was
judged

true counterforce damage
limiting

capability.

Schilling concluded that, "by
the mid to late 1960s, the
ability of the U.S. to add
significantly to its damage
limitation
capability by adding only to
its offensive forces was
judged limited.
As well, there was no
certain way to destroy Soviet
submarine-launched
ballistic missiles. Through
the deployment of MIRVs, the
U.S. would
have achieved some capability
against Soviet IUBM forces and
strategic
bomber bases, yet this capability
could only be exercised through
the
use of a first strike''. 11
It Is not hard to understand
why "there was
little support for proceeding to
this type of posture". 12

.

^ ^ toadamagelimitat1on
«
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po ,

icyand stra

tensive system,

^^

particular, an effective
ABM was
considered critical to
the success of this
strategy.
tne „ s
.
decided against the
deployment of a comprehensive
ABM defense, because
of the nu.erous technical
reservations, as well as

w

-vll defense and air defense

progran,.

verses

The value of civil
and air

was assessed to Pe
direct, y related to the
scope and
effectiveness of an ABM defense.
Since the U.S. decided
against

a

comprehensive ABM defense,
hoth civil and air
defenses appeared to
«a*e little sense by
themselves. Schilling has
stated that

"by not

deplo y i„g damage
„-1t.t1,n defensive

s y stems,

rather than fa,,ing to
ma.ntain some ratio or margin
of offensive force,
the U.S. lost the

opportune

to maintain nuclear
superiority.'^

,t

1s ques tionab,e

whether the U.S. real.y lost
the opportunity to
maintain superiority
or whether superiority
s,mply could not be maintained
in the nuclear
environment once the Soviets
had decided to procure
a .nature nuclear
arsenal

Meanwhile,

a

policy for preserving offensively
based deterrence

became increasingly persuasive.

The theoretical

focus behind this

doctrine was the theory of mutual
assured destruction.

According to
Donald Brennan, this theory
argues that "since we could not

effectively defend against each
other, the threat of societal

destruction was unav 01 dable, and
each

S1 de

had to deter the other with

large offensive nuclear forces". 14
The central precepts of U.S.
strategic nuclear policy which

resulted from this period of debate
were codified by the 1969 National

Secure

—

-is,on

-ategic sufficiency,

—
~

^

to christen a
deterrence p0 „ cy of
-

The central e ements „
Qf
,

,

declaratory policy was
the maintenance
of
gic forces capable
of assured
destruction," The
princjpa
for assured
destruction strategy
fn the context
sufficiency were the
following:

,

„

Soviet Union believes
it win
will k«
be destroyed by
retaliation to such an
attack.

a

determined U.S.

the point of direct
confrontation with the
Soviet Union.
It should reduce
3the reasons for an
arms race". 16
The critical component
of this policy rested
on the ma,ntenance
of
a secure second
strike capab„ity to
f „f„ct
massive destruction on
the
Soviet Union's urban and
industrial target sets.
During the 1960s
Secretary of Uefense HcNamara
identified assured destruction
with the
ability to destroy
35 percent of the Soviet
Union's population and 66
percent of its industrial
resources. 17

Effectively, this policy
focused on the reality
that the
superpowers were vu,nerab,e
to a nuclear attack and
that this fact might
act as the means of deterring
an attack by either
superpower.
It also
owes much to the recognition
that an assured retaliation
posture is
composed of easily procured
and maintained deterrent
forces. The theory
stipulates that the "naked
vulnerability" of the superpowers
"makes the
use of nuclear weapons less
likely and will tend to
foster mutual

understanding". 1 "

The theory further suggests,
that so long as mutual
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-'---my

™~ ™
reminsthe

balance> there are
few
de truction

b
-

;
-s

Up

th eposst bi

f

-

Ht yf o r

t ta ,

a d ,sto rt e

itilK tomutual assured
mutual assured
destruction

dformofdeterrence

.

^

deployments to maintain
MAD." 19
The ABM decision, in
the context of the
strategic policy debate
that ended in the
dominance of a theory
of strategic
sufficiency
effective!, meant that the
Soviet Union would be
free to develop'*
-anage inflicting
capability e q ua, to that
of the U.S. by the
!g 7 0s
The U.S., in other words,
de ci ded against efforts
to maintain its
nuciear superiority because
an effective ABM
system an d other measures
to achieve that en d
were unavailable an d
po tent,al,y d angerous.
The
U.S. reso,ve d Us d
eclaratory policy de hate
hy settling on a
policy for
'strategic sufficiency' that
rested on the tenets of
the concept of
mutual assured destruction
which, in turn, suggested
that the U.S. forgo

meaningful ABM defenses.

However, the theory a!so
suggested that any

ban on ABMs must be
mutual.

Whi1e the

,

anguage Qf

policy has changed somewhat
since the early ,g 7Us
this policy has remained
intact.

the basic focus of

The U.S. continues to
emphasize the

unwinable nature of nuclear war
and project
deter Soviet aggress, on.

,

^ dec]my

a

capable U.S. willing to

The Reagan Administration
appeared to alter

U.S. declaratory policy in
the early lg 8 0s by discussing
the possibility

of nuclear war in Europe, but
has returned to the more
sensible public
stance.
The second policy division concerns
the types of strategic weapons,

—
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ap ab1 mies, and raission
requjrements

United States force
development policy
policv has
h., hbeen guided
by the policy
of

essentially

r e qu

i

red the U.S. to
maintain

capabilities to those of
the Soviet union,
Union

;™
f ° rCeS

'

a

strategic force

m

fk
in „
other

the Soviets to
achieve parity lB
bUt

inflict considerably

allow the Soviets to

^

words, "the

9 ain an

U

S

ability to

reater damage on the
U.S. than the U.S.
could
inflict on the Soviet
20
Union."
9

^

The focus of decision
makinga in the
tne policy
nolicv area subsequent
k
and in
conjunction with the dprkinn *~ a ,
daeifion to deploy a limited
Safeguard ABM defense
-cerned the issue of whether
or not the U.S. would
attempt to match
the Soviet offensive
buildup.
The ABM decision
,mp,ied that the U S
would continue to rely
primarily on its offensive
forces to deter a

to be sufficiently
capable of carry out an
assured destruction strategy
well into the la7 Us.
Hence, an increase in the
size of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal was considered
unnecessary and viewed as
potentially

destabilizing to the strategic
balance and an impetus to
the arms race.
Vet, the requirements
for enhancing U.S. flexible
options in its force
employment policy meant that
the U.S. had to continue
to modernize and
upgrade the capabilities of
its offensive forces.
One of the most important
issues in the U.S.'s debate
of whether to
upgrade its nuclear forces revolved
around the decision of whether
to
MIRV its offensive forces.
The potential effectiveness
of ABM defenses
against a limited retaliatory
attack and Soviet efforts in the
ABM area
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e<U.S. strategists to
conCude that

"

6nhanCement

Us

to their deployment.

as consistent with
U.S

effnrtc
f ° rtS t„
t0

an- a,so would increase
the

National

valuabU strategic

-

—'P.' -P-

^e

M , RVs were a

fl

B

effect , MIRVs

_

i

,mplement "sured
destruction policy
exi ble opti 0n
retirements as outlined
fB

Security Oounci, m

strategic sufficiency

,

„

dum which

^

1

.

United States systems
involved in the MIRV
program were the
deployment of the ninuteman
,„ ICBM wit h three warheads
and the
Poseidon SLBM with up to
14 warheads.
The
ine u.o.
U S
arsenal h

began to rereive

MIRVed

Minuter

starting in 19 72.

Ills start lng in 19 7o
and M1RVed PoseidQn
,n addition,

^

the U.S. strategic
bomber force was

scheduled for United
modernization with the
introduction of the FB-111
Bomber, a smaller, penetration
capable weapon system as
well as the
incorporation of advanced
technology to the B-52s in
the early ,970s
The maturity of U.S.
nuclear forces were reaffirmed
after the ABM

decision,

united States forces would
remain fairly evenly d,vided

within the strategic triad
of ICBMs, SLBMs

,

and strategic bombers.

However, the number of deliverable
warheads per force has shifted
in
favor of the sea-based component
and less in favor of the
strategic
bombers.
The forces were fully redundant
and sufficiently reliable
as
secure and credible assured
destruction deterrent. The major

characteristics of the U.S. nuclear arsenal
as of 1970 are displayed
Table 1.
The third policy component is
comprised of 'action policies' and

a

in

is
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gflpjQy^^ policies.

encompass the group of
strategles and
of U.S.

Tab1e

I-

U.S. STRATEGIC

Niir.

Fnp

^^^

^J^

JF jIp£

Wa_rheads

ICBMs:

1.

2.
3.

SLBMs

Bombers:

1.

1.

54 Titan

n
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500 Minuteman

I

500

500 Minuteman II

500

16 Polaris Submari nes

646 B-52s

nuclear forces during wartime.

900

(est.)

5000 (est.)

The U.S. has always taken
precautions to

prepare its nuclear forces for
use

in

the event of war even though
it

publicly declares that the primary
purpose of its force

is

to deter

nuclear war and present the threat
of retaliation to the Soviet
Union
should it attack. For example,
the maintenance of forces capable
of

inflicting some level of damage on
Soviet urban centers and economic
assets has not meant that the U.S.
has ignored the requirements for

wartime targeting of other Soviet
strategic assets.

That is, "the U.S.

has not defined its requirements
for second strike targets solely or

even mainly in terms of values such
as population centers or Soviet
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industry". 21

The concensus is that
the UU.S.
tne
S
h*c
has always targeted
Soviet
assets and, as reported
since 1974, the U.S.
has not targeted
,

-mar,

Soviet population centens
or industry, per
resources' with

S e,

o ut

Soviet 'recover,

requirement to destroy 70
percent of these
targets."
The set of employment
policies gu.ding the use
of U.S. nuclear
weapons in wartime are
collectively known as the
S10P. or 'Single
integrated Operational P,an'.
The S,UP conta,ns a
numher of preplanned
attack options which the
U.S. can exercise in the
event of a nuclear
attack on the U.S. or its
allies.
Each option contains a
a

set of targets and attack
sequences for carrying out
a U.S. retaliation
or pre-emptive attack.
The SI0P is divided into
several employment

options which are defined hy
their target sets and the
size and scope of
the retaliation the U.S.
would undertake. 23
1.

The first group of attack
options could entail

a

U.S.

retaliation on "Soviet strategic
nuclear forces of all types

-

strategic
ICBMs

and their silos, strategic
SSBNs and their bases, strategic
bomber

bases, and IRBMs.

Included in this target set would
be Soviet nuclear

weapons storage sites and airfields
sufficient to support nJ clear
capable aircraft". 24

The objective of this k,nd of
attack would be to

cripple Soviet strategic forces and limit
the damage Soviet forces
could, in turn, inflict on the U.S. and
its allies.

The majority of

Soviet strategic nuclear delivery systems
are located outside Soviet

population centers thereby holding down the
civilian casualties from the
prompt effects of

a

U.S. attack.

However, the radioactive fallout from

an attack, while its fallout patterns are
unpredictable,

is

likely to be

greater from ground bursts required to destroy
nardened ICBM silos and
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their command bunkers.

Therefore, the level
el ot
of ^lateral
collut
damage from a
selective nuclear attack
on Soviet strata
strategy weapons could
be high such
^at the attack would not be
viewed b y the Soviet
leadersh.p ds
3
1m 1 ted.
i

1

a 9 amst

other soviet

mUtuy

taryets (0HTs)

fro, Soviet population
centers.

^

^

These targets wou.d i„
c ude ndJor
,

,

weapons storage sites and
air defense components,
such as their
launchers, missiles and
26
supporting
radar sites.

The third set of options
would allow the U.S. to
attack Soviet
military forces and resources
located near population
centers such as
3-

notary

oases and

concentrates

of major weapons
systems,

ie.

fighter

aircraft.
4.

A fourth category of
targets would ,nclude the
Soviet

command-control-communication network.

The purpose of attacking
these

targets would be to interrupt
Soviet battle and war management
efforts.
5.

An additional

employment option set would entail

massive U.S.
retaliation on any or all Soviet
assets including urban centers
as a
result of or precusor to spasm
29
nuclear war.
included in this
a

set

would be the option for
pre-empting

a

Soviet attack if U.S.

leaders felt

sufficiently provoked and sure that
the Soviets were about to launch
an
attack on the United States.
This option recognizes the argument
that
under nearly any wartime condition,
offensive surprise may prove to be

a

meaningful advantage.
As with any weapons system,
offensive or defensive,

"its usefulness

.
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-only*

, hin

; udged W1

--'"^

the critepion

^ectlves designed

^

c]eap

to promote U.S.

Sentinel ABM was
considered insufficient
cient, as »„
an

"**
U

P-l'tld

~—

^

djscpete

security.^
area defense,'

and mil1tary obJect1ve
of preserving u>s
_
nuc]e

7'° nty WUh ° Ut

^

-

Jhe
inn view

^

-

and civil defenses
and
of offensive
counterforce nuclear
weapons.
In addition,
the
technological obstacles
to a high,, effective
area defense were
;
-Payment

Safeguard

asa,i m ited

S

i,o defense was

madein,i g ht

of the

technological obstacles to
an area defense
as we,, as the
domestic
political, and economic
constraints on the President
and Congress
The ABM deployment
decision was made in the
context of the shift to
the doctrine for
'strategic sufficiency' and
its ideations
for u S

strategic nuclear policy.

Centra,

to the doctrine for

'strategic
sufficiency' was the preservation
of f,exib,e options as
wel, as an
assured destruction capacity.
That is. U.S. political
and military
-eaders decided that the
political and strategic costs
in attesting to
maintain nuclear superiority
were too great. The
moratorium on
widespread ABM deployments
incorporated into the ABM Treaty
and emerging
Soviet nuclear parity in the
early 1970s increased U.S.
interests in
preserving its flexibility in
the event of war.
The demise of an 'area'
ABM defense prompted U.S.
Interest in providing itself
a wider set of
choices in responding to a
Soviet attack.
That is, the Pentagon feared
a

condition where

a

President had to choose between
launching an all out

massive retaliation against the
Soviet Union or launching no
retaliation
at all
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With the advent
of parity

the

II

<;

^
k

„

,

,SSS creaib, e
choices

for
adding to the range
of choices with
respect to both
oth t„
the timing and
,
scale
nf
of nuclear
exchanges with the
3
>
Soviet Union
n, 6 Purp0se
of ^ding to
th.
the preplanned
options in the SIOP i* t „
St0preVentth
.

—

,

'

3

"

ma

'

mer

*needtorushto

the .i, it ar
y retirements nor

atall.

This set of ideas,
original,, introduced
by
^retar y of De fense McN amara,
came to he known
as Limited Nuclear
Options (UO, under the
N i xon Administration.
Wh i, e it is in
the U S .3
as It is in the
interest of the Soviet
Union to limit in
atUck

—st

superpowers to li.it such

-Pact of

a

war

is

guestionahle.

In

addition, the

jm1 ted

nuclear options on the
credipi,it y of the
deterrent is unknown.
Wh „ e LNO theorists
daim that a
,

u

S

range of options
limited to massive
retaliation is .ore credible,
the theory is
dependent on assumptions
of what is most Hkely
to deter an e„em and
y

«"attheenemy is,ike, y todoina„ar.

The U.S. has developed
and

further refined options
for selective!, striding
non-urban targets and
holding the .agent, of
U.S. offensive forces
in reserve as a
deterrent
against .ore .assive Soviet
attacks on U.S. population
centers.
These emplo y .ent options
and the associated
upgrades to U.S.
nuclear forces have been
designed with the following
major purposes in
mind according to Werner
Schilling:
1.

To improve the U.S.'s
ability to respond to limited
attacks

the Soviet Union.
2.

To improve the U.S.'s ability
to initiate limited attacks

by

6U

against the Soviet Union
in the event of
war.
designed to:

F,e*,b,e options are

A. Make the Soviet
Union think about the
risks they would be
running by attacking the
U.S. or its allies;
B.

C

oeter the Soviets by
attacking to destroy
certain valued
targets, and,
Make the Soviet Un,on lose
by destroying their
military
3?
forces".

The final

component of U.S. strategic
nuclear policy is its an,s
control negotiating policy.
The purpose of these
policies "is to
provide objectives with respect
to the character and
composition, in so
far as it can be controlled,
of the strategic balance
and capabilities
of U.S. forces in the
balanced 0ne „ f
majop

^

on U.S. strategic nuclear
policy by the policy of 'strategic

sufficiency' was the objective of
strategic and crisis stability.
is,

it called for the U.S. to
seek to maintain

provides for crisis stability,

a

''a

That

strategic balance that

balance in which neither side has
any

incentive to strike first in time
of

a

crisis.

In

effect, this balance

would require that both sides
perceive no difference between striking
first or striking second either in
terns of destruction it could cause
or destruction it would receive''. 34
a

A primary U.S. method for achieving

stable balance included efforts in the
arms control arena, having

judged an offensive arms buildup to otherwise
be unnecessary and ABM

defenses technologically immature and potentially
destabilizing.
There were three major reasons that the
U.S. focused on seeking
limits to ABM defenses.

Each of these arguments hinged on the
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acceptance of

a

po„c y

for mutua

,

assured destruct , on

_

locates

a«

-

U

^

argued thet a cyciica,
act, on- .action model
dominated the
race an. as sucn,
Senses wouid only lead to
an ,„crease in

n

fr0fflanuclearwaralsowouldincreas6i

dangerous and threatening
to each nation's
retaiiatory capability as
neither could judge precisely
the effectiveness of
the other's
constant,, changing offensive
and defensive forces.
Second,,, an irls
race cou,d he highly
destabilize to the strategic
balance and create a
dangerous environment during
a crisis in wh,cn
the incentive to strike
.ay be increased. Fina„
y it W as suggested that the U.S.
couid move to
Hating offensive nuclear forces
and thereb y provide greater
security
for each nation b
y limiting ABM defenses. This,
argued arms contro,
advocates, could be achieved
only if defenses were limited.
In such a
,

balance, there would be no
need for more offensive
forces if the
superpowers accepted the tenets
of mutual assured destruction.
The central questions with
respect to the ABM Treaty were:
1.

How could the U.S. prevent the
arms race from getting out of

control, one that might be simulated
by imperfect defenses?
2.

How could the U.S. prevent the
destabi

1

i

zation of the strategic

bal ance?
3.

How could the U.S. prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons
that might result from an intensified
arms race?

Each of these questions was resolved
temporarily by the 1972 ABM

Treaty.

As the defense debate rages today,
the arms control

issues of
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the late 1,60s and early
197Us have reappeared.

restricted the deployment
of ABM components

Punchers, radars, and mobile
elements

-search.

-

~

The ABM Treat, severe,,

interceptor missiles

and on.y left room for

It

provided for an Indefinite
ti.e for enforcement and
a five
year review schedule as
well as a consultative
coatee for handling
questions of violation and
re-negotiation. The Treaty
was regarded as
the single most significant
step toward preventing
a dangerous and

a

stable balance and provide an
incentive for reductions

nuclear arms.

in

offensive

The Treaty sought to preclude
the nullifying impact ABMs

may have had on the superpowers'

retaliatory forces.

Arms control advocates argued
in the U.S. Congress that
the ABM
Treaty was a necessary step
in order to bring about
offensive arms
control.

J.

Coffey stated that the costs of
proceeding with an ABM

deployment "as judged by proponents
of limits on ABMs, was an
erosion of
possibilities of reaching an agreement
on further arms control measures
which could promote security." 35

Advocates believed that "deterrence

would be enhanced through the ABM Treaty
because it would help preclude
any incentive to preempt through

blackmail during

a

a

first strike or attempt nuclear

crisis". 36

The ABM debate of the late 1960s was
hard fought and indicative of

the state of flux in U.S. strategic
nuclear policy during that decade.

Faced with the issue of deciding whether to
preserve its nuclear

superiority as well as

a

determined Soviet effort to upgrade its nuclear

capabilities, the ABM was promoted both as
threat.

a

panacea and

a

harbinger of

An ABM defense may have enhanced the deterrent
value of U.S.
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nuclear forces to some
extent.

However it was evident
"owever,
that

a

questions existed with
respect to the potential
for degrading U
security as a result of
possible Soviet responses
to a U.S. ABM

number of
s

depl oyment.
In

sum, the ABM debate
led to

a

number of alterations
in

strategic deterrence po,icy
but did not lead to
U.S. deterrence thought.

a

y

s

fundamental shift in

The U.S. decided not
to match the Soviet

buildup in nuciear weapons
in the late
,960s and the relative Soviet
ability to inflict damage
on the U.S. was greatly
increased. The

decision to see k Hmits on ABMs
also contributed to the
decision to dd
little to change the basic
posture of U.S. offensive
nuclear forces or
their strategic roles as
prescribed by assured destruction
policy.
This
decision implied that the U.S.
would accept strategic nuclear
parity
with the Soviet Un,on.
United States nuclear policy,
as codified in the
doctrine for 'strategic sufficiency',
meant the U.S. would not challenge
the Soviet Union's efforts to
achieve strategic nuclear parity
should
they choose.

Secondly, the U.S. sought to
emphasize its assured retaliation

posture while enhancing its flexible
attack options in the event of
nuclear war.

This policy led, in part, to

nuclear forces.

a

number of upgrades in U.S.

As part of the nuclear modernization
of U.S.

forces,

the U.S. began MIRVing its ICBMs and
SLBMs in order to prevent

degradation to U.S. retaliatory capabilities

a

in the event of a sudden

upgrade in Soviet defenses at some later
date and provide added

capability to U.S. flexible options.

Lastly, the U.S. decision not to

deploy significant numbers of ABM defenses
directly influenced and was
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influenced by the role and
SCOpe
scone of

IP - <:
U
s-

,
arms
control efforts.

Clearly
and Safeguard ABM
systems were promoted,
in part
as
harga,ning chips to achieve
arms control agreements
with the Soviets
The arms control process
was perceived as one
of the major avenues
if
not the most important
path, for securing a
stable nuclear balance
for
the 19 70s and a means
of noting the
potential of the Soviet
the Sentinel

'

-Uinto

nuclear threat.
The ABM debate highlighted
the overwhelming
advantages of offensive
forces over the defense
and accelerated the
dismantling of U.S.
defensive forces. As the
U.S. moved convincingly
to implement

offensively based deterrence
theory
constrained defensive policy

-

technology had on U.S. policy.

it

-

assured destruction poMcy
and

appreciated the influence that

Offensive and defensive weapons

development in the ,96Us pressed
against the credibility of
U.S. nuclear
policies, namely massive
retaliation.
The ballistic missile
revolutionized the nuclear threat
and demanded that the U.S.
respond
to

its

increasing vulnerability to
Soviet weapons.

Additionally, defenses
were increasingly less capable
of keeping pace with the
offensive
threat.
The U.S. decided to shift in
favor of offensive deterrence,

convinced that it was the only credible
and secure policy from which
U.S. national

security could be enhanced.

The current defense debate

is

once again dependent on the

technological developments of the offensive
and defensive fields.
Reagan Administration has taken the
initiative to push for

position prior to proven technological
support.

a

The

policy

Should technology bring

the offensive/defensive scales back
into equilibrium or in favor of
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defenSe

'

the reV1S1 ° nS t0

U

-

S
'

Pol-,, weapons
control

policy

procured policy

-

deterrence Policy

-

declaratory

nuclear employment
policy>

could be dramatic.

^_

The ballistic missile
defense
erense dPhat-P
debate th„
that uhas emerged today
has
-ch i„ common „Uh the earlier
ABM debates.
Vet, - th . new arguments
for BMD are critically
and f undamentally
different

^^

debate at the same time as
they are similar"."

^

^

As 1n the |96Us
issue of strategic defenses
in the 1970s and
,980s has emerged while
the
U.S. government and the
community of strategic
nuclear ana, y sts have
become embroiled in a debate
over 0.3. deterrence
policy. The advocacy
of strategic defenses
today is seen by many
as a means to completely
re-write O.S. deterrence theory
and policy.
An appreciation of these
differences and the implications
for O.S. strategic nuclear
policy
begins in Chapter 2, with an
examination of the various defense
models

envisioned as products for the
strategic defense initiative.

66

Endnotes Chapter

1

Jluoe"^^^? ^Lrb^9 ^ 0 ;;""^,.!" ^
weapons. A number of
P ° rS and

,% ° S

to

these oriliL
candidates for a U.S. bmd
l%0s^and far too expensive Ztler
to

h!

°"

«„

systems
laser
consider* possible
-«Mn, the
vel

9 r <»-">d-based

tltZl^
-^^^^^^1

H

1969)!

1

T"

Kahn

^

'

2

Sh ° U,d

^

*>

;orce^^l?e^t^^Tof^^:
e
been

traditionally associated «i?h
chaff and duny warhllds
genera

W

P-aids can

,

%g)

l

througW^

be used

Kahn,

"

r^e,

with an ABM."

~

at10n did

IIV"'

3

"™

8

(June

f° r

temeasures

n^

7,

-

hard

Penai(J s have

"^

such as

tX^Z^^a^'

W hy we should go ahead
with an ABM."

Fortune, 79

(

Ju „ e

7

Jerome

B.

9_

Weisner. "The Argument
Against ABM," Currept, Apri,
1969,

(Winter"^"]),'
9

S
'

32:

Strate 9 ic Forc «>"

Intej^^aJ^ec^tj,.

7

Ball, "U.S. Strategic
Forces," 33.

Mer^/l^ l',^^^ ™™
1U 1(

incepts

in the 1970s,"

Ibid.

Ibid.
13

Ibid, 54.

Brennan,
15
S

hlll

n

a1

G

The Argument for ABM,
"

?'

"

Current, April 1969

'

U,S - strat eyic Nuclear Concepts
in the i^/us,
1970s
.
6 (Fall 1981), 59.

Tn^.n ^
i
international
Security
D

Ant/!
17

??

2-

Brennan
\.

12

'

Johnson Leon W., and George

S.

"

McGovern

These figures were arrived at
essentially arbitrarily.

However, they

?
67

owe much of their
definition to t ho
C
beyond these points
of diminishing
to iowlatloS 11d °T
returns
1ndustr y density
Soviet Union. Brennan
patterns
Donald

(1 ^

£^11^^

uetnocratic Institut
ions. 1969.
18 D

Brennan, "The

iy

n^

Argent

anASorSlT McGovern
Barb ara, The Center
for Study of

L'

C™,

for ABM,"

Schilling, "U.S. Strategic
Nuclear rnnr
6 (Fall 1981)? 64?

22

,

]9g9

^

Ibid.

Jj}tej^Uoj^
21

Apri

P

*

ln

the 1970s

'"

T u
Ibid,
60.

r

' r '" 11

«

"

" """" «'»"

Slit.

(«~ >0«,

.,:

....

,„„„

Ball, "U.S. Strategic
Forces," 34.
2b

Ibid,

37.

Ibid.
27

Ibid.

28 T
Ibid.
.

29

.

,

Ibid.

30

Schilling, "U.S. Strategic
Nuclear Concepts in the 1970,
irr
International
Secu rity, 6 (Fall 1981), 61.
3l

'

Ibid. 62.

32
J

Mbid.

33

Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces,"
33.

34

International"!,;,:^

45

(ApMl

H«K

e
4l'3"

^j^l^ ""^
0

The Ant1 - Ba,,iStic Mfss
"«

^Michael Nacht, "ABM ABC's,"

Foundation,!^

™imT

°"

F oreign

<" th. 1970s,"

^te,"

F^ei^Affairs,

^ ^^

Policy . 46 (Spring 1982), 158.

*

*

the

* rit »««

68

CHAPTER TWO

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The political, strategic,
and

:

MODELS AND

technical

hurdles to the
deployment of the ABM in
the 1960s eventual,,
were resolved by the
decision to deploy the
Safeguard ABM system in
conjunction with the

siting

-

of the ABM Treat,.

This course was
promoted as a result of
the

U erness

of the Uohnson and Nixon
Administrations to ach,eve s^e
k ,nd
of arms control agreement
with the Soviet Union
that would derate the
Soviet offensive nuclear
buildup and help prevent
a destabilizing
defensive arms race, dust
as important was the
assessment that ABM
defense technology was not
as effective as originally
hoped.
Finally,
political pressure had mounted
in the Senate to
finalize U.S. ABM plans.
The Nixon Administration
choose to build a limited
terminal defense of
U.S. ICBM's even though
the system had been originally
designed as an
area defense.
The Nixon Administration had
concluded as a result of the
'Packard Study' that the Johnson
Administration's proposed Sentinal
'area' defense did not really
serve U.S. security and that
the

a™

appropriate objective was to defend
U.S. missile fields. 1

The signing
of the ABM Treaty, in turn,
restricted the superpowers to 2UU
ABM

missiles and eventually led the Ford
Administration to dismantle the
deployed Safeguard ABM system having
concluded that it was cost

ineffective in an offensive dominated
strategic nuclear balance.

These

hurdles are illustrative of the wide
differences that exist between the
original debate over ABMs and the current
flirtation with BMD.

Although

tHere were

a

number of equally

^
^^^
^

Treat,, it was recognized
implic1tly that
would have limited
value for U.S. security.
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^

Having reviewed the
centra, features of
the strategic
defense
<e°ate, it is important
to descrihe the
missions of the miss„e
defense
systems being considered.
Unl1ke the ABM debate
Qf
focused on the capabilities
and implicates
of 'traditional'
anti- ra ,ss1,e technologies,
the current BMD debate
centers around a
-ber of radical,, new defense
technologies and a proposed
fundamenta,
shift in U.S. deterrence
doctrine and nuCear policy.
National Security
Decision D,rective <NSDM
85) was issued subseguent
to President Reagan's
Strategic Defense speech
and stipulated a
,ong-term goa, of seeking
to
eliminate the threat of
ballistic m,ssi,es.
"A second Directs
(NSDM

^

^^

6-83, ordered the Department
of Defense to submit two
reports by October
1983 - one to evaluate the
strategic and policy implications
of the
defense proposal and the
other to define a research
and deve,opment

program."

2

These reports

-

from the Fletcher and
Hoffman Commissions

-

concluded that strategic
ballistic missile defenses
were feasible and
both militarily and politically
desirable.
The Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization (SDIO)
has been
instructed to explore radically
new defense technologies to
determine
how they can perform a range
of defense missions:
counterforce,

countervailing, and countervalue
defense.

Vet, the SDI as

research
effort addresses only the first
half of the Reagan Administration

proposals.

a

Of potentially more lasting
importance is the strategic

objectives acclaimed for the potential
technological products of the

P
*

— «-n
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has

ca„ed upon

the scentific

comity

to

render nuclear missiles
obsolete', however,
the extent to which
this
objective 1. advisee
much less achievable
,s yet to be decided
The Fletcher Commission
concluded that emerging
technologies could
m*e an effective BMD possible
and that the key
to such a system
centered on a tiered
defense. As such, a
U.S. strategic defense
could
Possess great leverage
aga,nst Soviet ballistic
missiles by attacking
^e .issues 1n each of three
distinct phases of their
f,i ght: boost
Phase, mid-course, and
reentry.3 The BMD debate
is likely to intensify
once the SD,0 determines,
if possible, that
a promising
technology has
been developed sufficient,,
to move to a deployable
system and its
strategic missions are
defined. Not unlike the
first ABM debate, the
various defense models
from counterforce defense
to countervalue
defense
have generated their own
set of political,
strategic, and
technological hurdles.

-

-

Currently, the political
atmosphere appears more open
to the idea
that 'strategic defenses'
are a viable option for
the future of U.S.
security. For example, the
technological and political
critiques of a
'countervalue defense', in the
1960s, more widely known as an
'area
defense', were more focused than
they are today.
The ABM systems of the
1960s were dependent on fixed
site deployment, carried nuclear
warheads
as

a

kill mechanism, and did not
enjoy complete political advocacy
from

the Administrations in the White
House at the time.

Hence, the roles

that an ABM could have played in
U.S. strategic deterrence policy
were
limited by Doth technology and

a

lack of political

support.

Proponents of ballistic missile defenses
today not only envision

a
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number of different
defensive systems
S
7
'

, ec h

,

9

'

es,but

——

integrated miss,ons.

56

"

"'J
"

P-t

S

of

*

variety of BMD

a,s ° foresee

—
—
—-—

;
^hly

mm
*
C ° mp0Sed

-

A major impetus
to ballistic
missile

made ,„ defense
relate. technology,
5uch

-terns,

nisms.

c^

nd . contro

, comnun1cat1on! aM

second stimulus is
the political
support

Administration as well as
the assessment,
on the
'

Of the

given BMD

-ear

Ministration, that the
strategic balance

has been moving

solid military and
„
political purpose
y ana oolitic
in U.S. strategic
policy as never before.
The cntica,
a

Administrations' politica,
support for an alteration
of U.S. strategic
deterrence policy in the
direction of defense.
The original ABM debate
in the :960s revolved
around

a

set of

strategic and political
conditions that no longer
exist in the 198Us
The U.S. offensive nuclear
arsenal was vast,, superior
to Soviet nuclear
forces throughout this
period in numbers of launch
vehicles, missile
throw weights, and their
accuracy. This combination
of capabilities

generally was considered more
than sufficient to deter
Soviet
aggression, dearly, U.S. nuclear
forces were capable of
carrying out
retaliatory strike against
Sov,et military, poiitical,
and population
targets in the event of a war.
Both the Uohnson and Nixon

Administrations concluded,

in

turn, that

a

U.S. deployment of greater

numbers of offensive nuclear
weapons at that time was unnecessary
to
maintain a confident deterrent
posture. Addit.onal Minuteman
ICBMs and
Polaris SLBMs would not have
increased U.S. deterrent capabilities

a

72

significantly.

,960s. the U.S.

U.S. already possessed
an adequate number
of

has ,ost

Us

advantage in

„

umbers relat1ve tQ the

Soviet Union.
A second concern of
Secretary McNamara and
President Johnson was
the impact of a U.S. ABM
on Soviet offensive
forces.
Both feared that
U.S. ABM dep.oy.ent m i
ght create incentives
for the Soviet Union
to

accelerate their efforts to
achieve strategic
States.

e q ua,ity

a

with the United

anticipation of these possible
outco.es, the Johnson
Administration sought arms control
talks with the Soviets.
Thirdly, technical drawbacks
to an effective ABM defense
in the
1960s
large vulnerable radar
installations and the potential
ease
with which the Safeguard
system could be saturated or
confused by dummy
warheads
firmly convinced most analysts
that offensive nuclear
weapons would retain their
strategic leverage over defenses.
The
probability that an enemy's ballistic
missile reentry vehicles could
In

-

-

penetrate the Sentinel and Safeguard
systems was considered high thereby
lowering the overall value of
these ABM systems for U.S. security.

Another factor that influenced the
final ABM decision was the
essentially invulnerability of U.S.
nuclear forces to a Soviet surprise
attack.

While there were some concerns over
the Soviet SS-9 ICBM as

possible counterforce threat to U.S.
forces, the U.S. was reasonably
confident that its strategic nuclear
arsenal could execute

retaliatory blow after any initial

Soviet attack.

a

crushing

a

73

These factors were
critic,
to ,o forward on the
ABM.

in the 1960s

debate of whether or
not

The interaction
hetween offensive and

defensive forces was
considered crucial to
maintaining a stable
nuclear
balance. A stable balance
for the U.S.
q
»
tor
entailed
restraint on the growth
of Soviet nuclear forces
as mil
*c «.u
well as
their international
11

ambitions
Equally compelling for
U.S. policy makers
was the threat of a
vigorous
nuclear anms race in both
the offensive and
defensive arenas. Concern
that defense deployments
might ignite such a race
led a number of arms
control advocates to
suggest that a treaty
restricting defenses might
preclude an offensive arms
race and thereby enhance
strategic stability.
That is, the U.S. sought
to bind the Soviets to
the concept of a stable
balance of offensive nuclear
power in which mutually
vulnerable
populations would temper the need
to expand offensive forces.

Offensive nuclear forces, as
suggested by the concept, could
be
lowered to a level where each
superpower still retained an
assured

destruction capability.

The ABM Treaty specified
that each nation

agreed not to deploy ABMs above
the prescribed number while
seeking
offensive arms control negotiations.
This would preclude the need,
it
was thought, to continue an arms
race.
The linkage postulated by arms
control advocates figured strongly
in the Senate ratification
debates

over the ABM Treaty.

A principle argument was that
the Soviet offensive

deployment might be restrained by restraining
defense deployments,
namely ABMs.
The prospects of an active defensive
component to U.S. strategic

nuclear policy greatly diminished upon
ratification of the ABM Treaty.
A decade and

a

half of research and testing various
defense concepts and

74

system

—

-

fr OT C 1vi, defense
to ABMs

-

ended

conviction in ma1ntaining
an offensjve
is

seen by

Us

advocates as

a

^

means to degrade

a

much more

thereby strengthen
deterrence.

J, The Strategic Nuclear Ra

w..

thr

m

„.

The strategic nuclear
balance has undergone

a

number of

conditions described above
no longer prevail.

Both nations have
con tl nued either to
deploy new and more deadly
offensive nuclear forces
or upgrade their existing
forces in a similar manner.
Both superpowers
have attempted to exp!oit
their relative strategic
advantages. The u.S
has maintained its advantage
in m issile accuracy,
although recent
reports suggest that the
Soviets have matched U.S.
missile accuracy with
their new generation of
mobile ICBMs (SS-25 and
SS-X-24). The Soviets,
for their part, have
continued to exploit their
advantage in missile
throw weight and as a result,
the number of warheads on
their land-based
strategic forces.
In addition, the Soviets
continue to maintain a
greater number of ICBMs and
appear to emphasize war-fighting

capabilities.

The average yield of Soviet
warheads, while falling,

stands at 60U kilotons and is
four times the average 150
kilotons of
4
U.S. warheads.
The relative positions of the
superpowers within the strategic

balance has shifted since the
signing of the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. no

longer holds an overwhelming lead
in most categories of weapons.

The

^

7
tte

——

^—

—
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"SMS

a„ d SLBMs an d
thousands

new classes of ICBMs
and tntroduced

maj0rn, ° dif ' Cati0nS

t0

--I-

l™;

««.
SS- 26 and ss-U(an
experimental
-e operational capahmty,.* The
,

s;

they include the ss
,8"

system potentially
w1th

Soviets also have
deployed seventy
new strategic submarines
and tour new tve,
nf .submarine
k
types of
launched
ballistic missiles s1nce
the , ate 1960s _
The Soviets ape
cont
-pan. their land-based
strateu1c forces wUh
the deve|opment

^ers
is

^

equipped with long

r ,„ ge

^

cruise .issues.

continuing with the
development of two new

,

C BMs,

two SLBMs as we,,

as air, ground, and
sea-based cruise missiles. 6
The U.S.,

for its part, whi.e
it has deployed a
new fleet of SLBMs
(the Poseidon an d Trident),
has deployed no ICBMs,
and has actu a ,,
y
reduced the total number
of warheads ,„ its
strategic arsenal by
reducing the tota, number
of strategic bombers
carrying gravity bombs.
However, the U.S. has upgraded
the Minuteman
warhead accuracy and

m

Us

nuclear yield.

,

n

addition, the U.S.

h as

deployed air-,aunched

cruise missiles on its
fleet of strategic bombers and
has

a number of
strategic weapons either reody
for deployment or under
7
development.
Table 2. displays the rough
number of reentry vehicles
deployed on U.S.
and Soviet ballistic missi.es.
While the Soviet Union has
deployed a
few .ore reentry vehicles
than the U.S. since 1970. the
total number of
deliverable warheads available to
the U.S. is actually greater
as the

U.S. bomber force is larger and
capable of carrying more weapons.

^^ ^_De
2

ICBMs

U.S.

U.S.S.R.
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H loi^d__Reentry

Veh i c es:
es
197U-19HH
•

I

12a

1975

1980

1985

12U0

2100

2100

2050

1900

52oo

6300

1100

SLBMs

U-S
-

U-S

-

S>R
-

1000

3000

5100

5700

20U

850

2100

2600

Source: SjbvietMilitary
Power 1986 nU.S.
i
r
£J2wer_i9B6,
Government Printing Office:
Washington D.C., 1985,
pp. 30 8
33.

The threat posed by
new Soviet weapons to
the credibility of the
U.S. deterrent combined
with ever more sophisticated
command and contro,
elements for mounting
offensive attacks has made
strategic defenses an
appealing option to the Reagan
Administration. AUhough the
popular
description of a 'rough
equivalency' for the nuclear
balance has been
used since the mid 1970s
and neither superpower has
developed the

capacity to truly threaten

a

dis-arming strike, m any U.S.
analysts fear

that the Soviet Union actively
is seeking this capabiiity
,„ an effort
to shift the strategic balance
permanently in its favor.
A de-ca P itating first strike
is theoretically possible.

However,

77

^

-.te 3 1c

analysts bel , eve that
either side

*™

-

„„,

achieve

"Perts do point to the

ap parent

with

™—
-erve fo.es

a

translate Into mil itar
y or po, 1tica , advantages
is

«"

nt on the

forces, their types,
and the attackers'
confidence t h at they had
done
eqU
e dama9e
rea11
This kind of atuck
cou]d
'eave the U.S. with
the choice between
launching a large scale
r-.11.t1on with Us remaking
1CBH s, SLBMs
and st r ate ic bomber
g
forC e
or doing very little
Interns of a
option,
this argument 1 S that
U.S. forces refining
after a Soviet first
strike,
namely SLBMs and bombers
ers, currently are
»n= less
capable of destroying
hardened Soviet military
sites than ICBMs.

"

"

" -

,

warding
i

light of these trends,
the Reagan Administration
has decided to
explore the possibility
of using strategic
defenses to redress some of
'n

genera, objective is to
transcend current conditions
by wh,ch deterrence
is maintained,

superpowers.

namely an offensive balance
of nuclear force between
the
Three ma.or concerns have
convinced a number of

strategists that missile defenses
are worth seeking.

One of the more

highly debated issues has
been the argument that the
Soviet Union is
acquiring advantages over U.S.
nuclear capabilities which
threaten to
destabilize the strategic balance.
A second factor has been
a general
review of U.S. deterrence theory
and nuclear strategy since
President

Reagan's election

11

1

77

ia
'

P9ed

;
policy.

A"na,

^

d

in
Iri

^

T
This

IQftn
J-you.

review
ew PnartMi
artl ally was
instigated by
59 which the Reagan
Administration inn,,,

™

factor has

««*

b ee„

*P«"*™

the perceived

with past U.S.
strategic
3

faHure of the arms

^

not achieved
s,gnificant reductions in
offensive nuclear forces
as
ejected after the signing
of the ABM Treaty.
Both superpowers
have
cont,nued to produce
offensive forces almost
unahated, y . From the

Keagan Administration's
perspective, the SALT

a g reements

have restrained

example, the Soviets
generally nave not deployed
belivery vehicles ie
ICBMs. beyond the numbers
the. possessed at the
signing of the SALT ,
accords when they mi ght
have in the absence of
the agreements.
"For
rears the ri ght bad feared
a 'window of
strate 9 ic vulnerability.
More
recently, the left had
come to fear a enera,
g
breakdown of the nuclear
Peace.
In broaching bis idea
of a strategic defense
initiative,

Resident Reagan was responding
to

a

pervasive discontent with
the

viability of the theory of
mutual deterrence."*

However, "a crisis of

arms control, a perceived
erosion of deterrence, and
the march of
technology: this is how we
got where we are today
with" the SOI. 9

II.

Deterrence

Given the march of time and
the changes in the strategic
nuclear
balance ever the past decade,
what are tbe implications for
deterrence
of pursuing a ballistic missile
defense? There are two key features

•

—
—
™—
1
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ChdrdCter,2e

,

on the one hand

,

js

cMposed

When doubt exists
as to the success

which an attack can
achieve

aswe]ias

the impact

froma

t^t

they could execute
a lifted nuclear
strike against specific
-Utary t arge ts with
success. Missiles .ay
fa„ at any stage
their f light , reentryveh1cles

c^ete

-

maynot

theirwapheads

properly, and the missiles
may not achieve
accuracies sufficient to
destroy their targets.
Clearly, it is
<
15 ln
in the
*
tie II
U.S.
s interest
to take
steps which create
uncertainty
'ty in soviet
Soviet r*<r
calculations for an attack
on
the United States.
•

i

The issue of uncertainty
surrounding Soviet attack
calculations has
centered on the problem of
U.S. ICBM vu. nerabi
i ty
since the mid lg 70s
A vulnerable ICBM force
.ay reduce the level of
uncer tainty in Soviet
attack plans thereby
potentially lessening the ability
of the U.S. to
deter the Soviets in a
crisis. The U.S. has debated
a number of means
to enhance the survivability
of its ICBM forces.
The mobile MX ICBM in
various 'race track' schemes
has been proposed.
However, as the MX
,

remains controversial, the
U.S. has considered other
measures such as
moving a larger percentage
of its strategic forces
to sea aboard
submarines and placing ICBMs on
strategic bombers or Boeing 747

aircraft.

While these various schemes
continue to be debated, the U.S.
has hardened its ICBM launch
silos and increased the force's
capability

80

launch

on warning of

a

Soviet attack or
from under attack

The c redibilttyofdet
errence

perta,ns to the
S

ratS9iC

^

^

^^
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aUnCh
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t
the
expected outcome costs
of such

accepting the current
balance.

the status

"

iu

a

quoofthe
e works when

challann
cnallange are greater
than those of

These
mese costs
cost, generally
have been
,

equated with

a

n-lear forces

detection
to cause

of the

capacities

'unacceptable damage'

of

a

superpower's

in response to an
,„,,,.,

attack.
The ,eve,

of damage required
to satisfy an

'unacceptable damage'
was first considered by
Secretary McNamara. As
a„uded to in
Chapter One, he established
the ,eve,s of da,na e
at sixty five percent
9
or Soviet industria,
capacity and roughly thirty
percent of the Soviet

-asure

population.

Today this would represent
roughly seventy-five
miUion
Soviet dead and, for
comparison, would equate to
about one thiro of the
U.S. industrial capacity
destroyed.
,„ re cent years, U.S.
targeting
requirements have shifted in
favor of a less massive
level of

destruction.

However, "deterrence may fai,
if the threat to bring
about
these costs is not credible
or is
direct** in
i„ m„
is directed
the wrong way or at the
wrong values". 11

Further, the credibility of

a

U.S.

retaliation may weaken if the

Soviets are led to believe that
the U.S. will not or can
not retaliate.
The U.S. maintains that it
would retaliate against a Soviet
nuclear
attack and clearly it possesses
the nuclear forces capable of
launching
a

retaliation.

A single U.S. Trident SSBN
could launch attacks on 192

81

Sov,et cities.

deterrent by prepar1ng
damage limitation

-fenses and counterforce
weapon systems.

^^

^

^

Wnereas the U.S. had
some

and an ABM defense
in the early
eany 1970,
,970s, tha
the cSoviets have
always been more
serious ahout defense.
Currently, the Soviets
maintain nearly !
f 19 hter interceptor
aircraft and 10,000
surface-to-air launchers
to protect the Soviet
air space.^ The
Soviets also maintain
a ring of ABMs
around Moscow which are
being u Pg raded to 100
launchers
Permitted b the ABM Treaty.
y
Soviet strate 9 ic offensive
forces today
.

m

heated

possess

a

considerable counterforce
urce capability.
caoabilitv

Th
a
The
deployment
of new
,

mobile ICBMs, the SS-25 and s<; y oa
SS-X-24, may add to the
Soviet's overall
damage limitation capabilities.

^

In

order to prevent

a

significant loss of credibility,
the U.S.

might strengthen or augment
its offensive nuclear
forces with new
offensive weapons such as
mobile ICBMs and advanced
stealth cruise
missiles or by deploying
strategic defenses such as a
ballistic missile
defense.

These conditions traditional
ly have been grounded in the tenets
of
Mutual Assured Destruction
theory.
Although the policy for assured
destruction as well as other policy
dimensions of the U.S. strategic
nuclear policy mix will be discussed
in Chapter 3, a general
overview of
the policy will provide a basis
for discussing individual BMD
models.
Mutual Assured Destruction depends
on the perceptions and their
backing
nuclear forces to maintain a balance
of terror.
Although MAD and

"deterrence appear to present

a

paradox

-

preserve peace through

a

—
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anCe ° f

7

^7—-

^oap pears

intolerab]ej

e-3

Uhas

^

critical problem with
MAD and hence
deterrence in
general, is that while
the terror is certain,
certain so long
as nations possess
nuclear weapons, "the
halance is apt to
disappear depending on
the
erforts of tne contestants
One of the greatest
threats to
deterrence is an unstable
balance between the
two superpowers.
The
,

,^

the last fifteen years

Htlpl.

warheads

strategic balance.
faith in its

-

-

i

have profound,,

1

n f luenced

These changes may lead
to

nudear force

^

ncreased m1ssile

tne stab „
a

^
Uy

gf

^

lessening

to carry out its
missions.

A secono impact
change in the Soviet's
percep tl ons of the U.S.
nuclear
posture's credibility.

-9ht

be

a

The centra, question is:
what wi
the future as acceptable
deterrence?

Teller, an advocate of

a

„

continue to pass today and
into

A question raised by
Edward

strategic defense, is: "Can
the U.S. maintain

an effective deterrence
without a true defense as well
as a retaliatory
policy? Hill the U.S. need
both in the emerging strategic
envi rorment?"

The preceeding comments
illustrate the breadth of issues
in the
current debate over strategic
defenses and highlight the ongoing
debate
over U.S. strategic deterrence
policy. Chapter 3 wi
examine more
closely the impact defenses may
have on U.S. strategic nuclear
policy.
However, it is relevant to the
discussion of defense missions to address
1

the policy context in which BMU
has been proposed.

1

For example, the

U.S. policy community "is certain
to be debating the roles for BMD
while

aebatin9 the
WalteP HCDOU9811

«-.!

assure,

— —
^ ^
—
^
f

;

" "«««"'
destruction „ m
h

»«• —est *„.,.
b6y0nd

^

-, nachana(ng
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strateg1c en

^

16

„
"

=h a condition of

^^

secur1ty if the Soy1ets

^

,eV6,Sat

policy ,„ 5upport
ofmutua]
assured destruction
suggests the, build"."
strateg1c

needs but that their
efforts threaten the
siaDinty
stability of d.t
deterrence within

The stability of the
strategic nuclear balance

maintenance of ueterrence.
less

in

a

„

cruc(a

,

t0

^

destaoHized haiance, deterrence

t0 prevent the Qutbreak
of a nuc)ear

^

is

bQth

I9ht perceive

the nuclear threat to
have heen heightened and
possih ly
launch to prevent being
caught off guard.

What conditions make the
nuclear balance .ess stable?
Both
advocates and critics of BMD
agree that a stable balance
is a more
secure balance and any
measures wh,ch threaten its
stability is
dangerous.
It fs the means for
re-dressing the destabilizing

conditions,

in part,

which separates the two
parties in the debate.

One
of the central points made
by BMD advocates,
particularly advocates of a
limited counterforce defense, is
that the Soviets have attempted
to

develop an extremely threatening
counterforce capability.
question is:
possess

a

"are the Soviets less deterred
because they possess or may

counterforce capability

The Reagan Admin, stration,
the U.S.,

The pertinent

in a

crisis?". 18

in calling for a strategic
defense for

"rejects the idea of continued sole
dependence on the threat

n
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retaliation to deter
the Soviets an.
the idea that

remainstab

,

because deterrence>

»*•«.»
"

r

SMft inU

'

S
-

«l«-Of

Auction

assure,

comment

—
pol1 cy.

ce

_

^ cu
„ defense

-

«*

have come to believe
more firm,,

trans,t,on to

a

»

frM

;

to q uest,on the
in the

that
f or

a

nuclear war

more defined war-fighting
pol1cyand

Peen made possible by
technological

stems

A number of policy
makers

POSS, b ,e, that the Soviets
appear to be preparing

TMs

^

t

,

and

^J

improvements in such areas
as

missile accuracy and
co^and-control-communication battle
management
eiements. These components,
poiicy and weapons hardware,
combine to
produce a bas,c shift in
favor of a counterva,
ng/war-f ight, 9 policy
,

1

for U.S. nuclear forces.

Although

it

appears to have been

a

policy to go from assured
destruction to

policy to maintain

a

logical progression in
U.S.

countervai

a

ng/war-f ighti ng

-

is toward a nuclear
war-fighting policy

ensure deterrence against U.S.
enemies, but

it

is

a

new

Some analysts have

argued that the logic of
nuclear weapons developments

-

i

stable deterrence, there
also appears to be

deterrence in the emerging
strategic env^onment.

improvements

1

C3 and defense
in order to

in the nature of these

capabilities to threaten deterrence
further.
A relevant question is:
Can the U.S. enhance its
security and how

can it reduce the threat of
an attack or the potential
damage that would
result from a Soviet attack?
A logical step would be to
seek

reductions in the numbers and
capabilities of nuclear forces of the

MS

superpowers.

^^
^

Short of t-Mc
u+
th,s. deterrence
may be enhanced thr„
u(Jh tha
contro, process and
po„1 bl , by the ()ep|oyment
,f

capable o, , nhafle1ng
deteprence .

COntr

"

-

°'

"

S
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^

-"lateral

disarmament

ro..1,h, and that strategic
defenses offer

Paving

im

a

is

dangerous

more secure path tor

U.S. security and
mt t flt .1 ff ,n 9

a stab,. ha,ance
than
continuing along the current
offensive deterrence
path.
More

importantly ar S u. the same
advocates,

it

may he more rational

an

in

-creasing,, destabi,i ze d
strategic world to defend
the nation rather
than retaliate and remain
vulnerable to a devastating
attack.

McDougal, states that the
defensive response to the
decline of MAD
due to the changing
strategic environ,„ent
(, that it may provide
a
lower risk of war than in
a MAD world.
Secondly, BMDs do not
necessarily conflict with
ar,„s reductions a,
the end to the balance
of
terror is the primary goal
of each.
Thirdly, according to some
defense
Advocates, there may be better
control of strategic anns
in a BMD world
as new avenues tor anns
control emerge.
Lastly. BMD can augment a
credible deterrent because a
stable balance derives from
the certain
failure of a first strike
rather than the certain success
of retaliation
Which would be precluded by a
successful first Strike. 21

-

-

Assuming that some form of BMD will
be deployed by the U.S. or
the
Soviet Union within the next few
decades, it is important to review
the
alternative models proposed by
advocates Of HMD.

Clearly, "one's

position on HMD depends on the goals
and purposes linked to the system.
And secondly, the proper
question in this context is can the system
work
to achieve a specified strategic
goal?

What is the criteria for

a

BMD
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system?"
Ih
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proton

protection of nuclear
forces.

Ration, u,s

a

peculiar facet of the
mutua

,

current defense

of populations and
the

_m

t^eor, which has dom ,
nated u>s . deterrence
po|Uy
populations is a destabi
izi na effort,
izmg
effort
m addition, it
technical problem for
the defender.
1

^ ^

r

is

an enormous

HI. Ballistic Missile PPfonse
Missis „n,

A. Counterforce
Defense

The focus of the first
and often least contentious
mission for a
U.S. ballistic missile
defense is 'Counterforce
Defense'.
The key
objective of this mission is
defense against a counterforce
attack on
U.S. strategic nuclear forces.
For example, a counterforce
defense
might be deployed to redress
the so-called 'window of
vulnerability',
that period in which U.S.
strategic nuclear forces will
be vulnerable to
a Soviet first strike
as charged by holders of
this concept.
The counterforce defense
tradit,onal ly has been associated
with the
defense of 1CBM silos and/or
their launch control sites.
Theoretically,

perfectly executed counterforce
attack by the Soviet Union on U.S.
ICBMs could destroy a large
portion of

a

the force.

In the event of such

an attack, the U.S. could
retaliate with less accurate
countervalue

~.
hS,dby

————
A U.S.

reta]inion of

C0UnterVa ' Ue

prior to its retaliation.

—

eagan Adm1nistratio
„
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1» «-U.S.

t

„

ng

y
leav1„ g 1t

W

e heav n, damaged
than

^^^^^
m

The Scrowcroftbcrowcroft Commission,
established by the

nuclear arsenal

vulnerability' did not in
fact ex,
exist
st.
Soviets were unlikely
to risk
'on 9

^

^

37

,

•

concluded that the

Th„ rComm,ss,on
The

.

w1ndow Qf

reported that the

a

counterforce strike on
U.S. ICBMs so
as the U.S. possessed
weapons that it could
reta, iate with,

SLBMS and strategic
bombers.

Additionally the

Mission

«*

name ,y

conceded

the U.S.'s assured
destruction capab^ity
could not he radical,,
degraded in the near term
by a Soviet strike.
A

counterforce defense also
could provide protection
for U.S.
Strategic Air Command
bomber bases, Strategic
Ballistic Missile
Submarine bases, and U.S.
command-control-communication assets. 23
essense,

a

in

counterforce defense would
be deployed to preserve
the

that is similar to that
envisioned by the deployed
Safeguard ABM.

A

counterforce ballistic missile
defense today also might
incorporate
defensive weapons very similar
to the Safeguard ABM.
A defense of this
kind could include
exoatmospheri c and endoatmosphenc
interceptors. 24
These defenses would be
deployed to defend specific
sites or targets. A
number of Department of Defense
programs have been exploring
modern
versions of a Sprint-type
interceptor to perform endoatmospheric
defense.

For example, hypersonic missiles,
using on-board

millimeterwave radar seekers to home
in on targets for

a

direct kinetic

.

^^m

energykiU, have been developed.

~---'es

atanaltitudeofl0tol5k1]OTeterSi

D-0.0. has expired

hl9h

^

SUrr ° Und1
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^

number of new weapons
technologies for

a

88

a

targets being defended
as wen as

'shotgun' tyP e systems
employing sma,,
projectiles such as
proposal

^

While the counterforce
defense is somewhat
Petter understood from
techn,ca, perspective
than other defense
missions due to past ABM

Program

it

is

not without its own

a

proofs. The Pasic interceptor
defense has not progressed
much beyond the Safeguard
ABM program.
Current interceptors possess
greater accuracy as demonstrated
by the
Homing Overlay Experiment
and thereby the requirements
for nuclear
warheads as the operative
kill mechanism has diminished.
Conventionai
warheads and direct intercept
is now more feasible.
However, the number
bf interceptors required
to execute effective
counterforce defense may
reach into the thousands as
the problem of offensive
profusion regains
during the terminal phase.
While ballistic missile tracking
and target
prediction technology has improved
and some of these components
may be
made mobile thereby reducing
their vulnerability, effective
battle
management remains a difficult problem.
For example, target prediction
is based on the trajectory
of the ballistic missile,
when in fact an
effective endoatmospheri

c

defense requires knowledge of
warhead

trajectories during the terminal
phase.

Therefore, manueverable or

eluding reentry vehicles can create
tremendous problems for the defense.
Allan Oin characterizes these
problems as one of battle management.
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™ent

have become much more
complex.

of d,sc r ,„ lnat t on
between targets and
decoys

rtt( " 8 aVa,idblet

Sh

—
^
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giyen
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of problems,

as we,,

as the

of interceptor
velocity , the

traditional terminal defense
can not be expected
to be sufficient"
Another problem for a
counterforce oerense
defense is the
th„ possible
deployment of
penaids on Soviet ballistic
.,„„.,. The dep Qyment Qf
Prior to reentry currently
can co „f use trackjng
radars md
targets bein y attached and
shorten the defenders
response time.

"

,

^^

^^

A counterforce threat
exists if both counterforce
weapons are
possessed by one party and
a second party has
a vulnerable target.
Much
of the debate surrounding
U.S. deterrence policy
and its nuclear forces

m

the 1U7Us concerned the
issue of

a

counterforce threat to U.S.
,CB M s.

United States intelligence
analysts concluded in the mid
1970s that
Soviet ,CBMs were approaching
levels of accuracy sufficient
to put a
large portion of the U.S.

ICBM force at risk.

At the same time, the

U.S. began debating how it
might modernize its Minuteman
ICBM force or

replace it with the MX ICBM in
order to reduce the force's

vulnerability.

Secondly,

a

counterforce threat is credible
only if

a

sufficient number of counterforce
weapons exist which can place in
jeopardy a considerable numoer
of the enemy's forces such
that an attack
on them would nullify the
deterrent and military value of
those forces.

An understanding of the
counterforce defense and its associated

technology requires

a

review of the target set to be
defended.

The

-
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aunch
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TR[Ao

_

5trategic synem jn th
;

nofitsc haracteristjcs

make the u>s _
"High aiert
alert rat**
rates ,„h
and supporting
y
communication

systems make ICBMs the
most responsive
element of the TRIAD."*'
Reliability is denned
d^finpH as
jc t-t,~
the operat,ona,
ability to launch the
weapon
the
event
>«
of war, whereas
time-urgency, flexibility,
and
effectiveness relate to the
variety of attack missions
the ICBM is
capable of performing.
An ICBM can be used
to carry very Urge
nuclear
weapons in a tradi tiona,
ly assured destruction mode
or to carry
relatively small and highly
accurate warheads designed
for selective
counterforce stri.es. The
U.S. Minuter III ,CBM,
for instance, is
capable of direct, real-time
attacks on Soviet nuclear
forces. While
the ICBM has been rated
the most effective deterrent
in the U.S.

arsenal, its present mode
of deployment makes it
vulnerable and as
result reduces its overall
deterrent credibility.

a

The Carter Administration
attempted to address the problem
of the
Minuteman's vulnerability by
promoting deployment of a mobile
MX ICBM.
Mobile basing, race track
deceptive basing, and other measures
to
enhance survivability, Including
silo hardening, were criticized
by

advocates of counterforce defenses
as insufficient.

They charge that an

active defense is required to
maintain the credibility of the U.S.
nuclear force in the face of growing
numbers of Soviet counterforce
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-apons.

In that the
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eapons ,s a,a™,ng t0
proponent$ , f

force and counterforce
defend
defense.
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The

^

^

c OU ; t ; rforce

^

vulnerability of U.S.
ICBMs is
documented by Albert
Carnesal and Charles
Glaser
ser Ca.n
Carnesal and Ulaser
estimate that the Soviet's
s current f„
force of 303 SS-18
can destroy better
than 3M of the
Minuteman
,

force if needed. 28

A number of U.S.

serine

strategic air command
and strategic nuclear
bases are vulnerable
to Soviet submarines
patro„i„
g

coasts.

United States strategic
nuclear submarines might
reguire hours
to disperse from
their bases while only
s^e SAC
bombers are on alert

aprons and capable of esraninn ,,nii n
escaping while

a

surprise nuclear attack

is

in

Progress.

A Soviet strike using
SLBMs and cruise missiles
could place
weapons on U.S. coastal
bases within minutes of
launch. A Soviet

U.S. forces on base.

However, the U.S. generally
keeps 50 percent of
its strategic submarines
at sea effectively
precluding the complete
destruction of these forces.
In addition, a number
of SAC bases are
well inland of U.S.
coasts thereby providing
additional warning time for
bombers to escape.
The primary objective of a
U.S. counterforce defense
would be to
assure the survival of an
effective portion of U.S.
strategic nuclear
forces.
While a counterforce defense
might be deployed to protect
bomber and submarine bases,
a defense of these
assets is considerably
more demanding than a defense
of ICBMs.
The critical factor in this
regard is the amount of warning
time till impact of Soviet
warheads. As

nuded
;
b

-s

to above

'

the sovi

-

quickly than

ICBMS

softness of these bases.

While

considerable damage against

-^
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rand submairi
,„ne

A second
consideration is the

.

Soviet
6t SLBM or cr
^se missile might do
submarine or bAC
SAC b*«
base *h
they could not

a

a

>

destroy U.S.

ICBM silos with
WUh

Given these constraints
straints,
to be deployed around
U.S.

continue to serve as

a

Mnh
^
hl
y h d egree of

a

a
a

n
c
U.S.

confidence.

counterforce defense

ICBM fields
Melds.

is

more likely

T ho
The
portion of ICBMs which
the

useful deterrent as
we

„

as carry out wartime

prosecuting Hmited stri.es
aga,nst Soviet ICBHs and
other major Soviet
mil Uary targets such
as command bunkers
and critical

conmand-control-communication nodes.

The U.S. might want
to

preferentially defend these hard
target kill

f orce s

in order to maintain

their unique capability to
destroy Soviet hardened
military targets.
In
a counterforce
defense must be sufficient
to "require the attacker
to expend more weapons
tn hopes of achieving
the destruction of a
29
target."
This raises the notion of
an attack price.
An attack price is the
cost in nuclear weapons
expended to destroy
a

target.

In this case,

the target most likely to
be

defended is an ,C8M silo.

When

a

a

hardened and

silo is not defended by either
pass,ve

or active ballistic missile
defenses, the attacker need only
launch the
fewest number of weapons
usually two deliverable weapons for
each
target
needed to destroy the silo assuming
some margin of error. The

-

-

Soviet Union may perceive that
it has

a

straightforward calculation to

determine the necessary number of
counterforce weapons to target the
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leased
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strategic deterrent. 30

^t1««n
-e.or

^

displa y the
significance that
the sur Viva]

of

,s

.

a

Sov le t attack on U.S.
Minuteman forcesS current!
curren tly would
require 200
HBMs based on a two
warhead per
Per silo attack
atturi,
g lve n that Soviet
SS-18
CBMS CSrry
WartMdS P
™e Soviets presently have
some
;
a

^

U

restricted to

warheads by the salt

u

agreem e n ts.

„

The Oepartment
Defense has assessed the
SS-18
k
18 Mod d
4 to have been designed
specifically
to attack and destroy
tCBMs and other hardened
targets in the U S
while D.O.D. has recently
downgraded its assessment
of the Soviet SS-19
ICBM for hard target
k,l, capability,
(t ha$ conc]uded

^^^

Mod 4 force has the
capability to destroy
between 65 and 80 percent
of
U.S. ICBM silos using
two nuclear warheads
against each. 31 The

deploys

of

a

counterforce defense around
U.S.

Minuter sHos with
the capability to destroy
50 percent of mcoming
warheads would require
the Soviets to double
the number of ICBMs
launched to 400 in this
attack
to achieve similar results.
However, if D.Q.D.'s current
assessment of
the SS-19 is accurate, the
Soviets would be unable to
prosecute a
counterforce attack on O.S. Minuteman
ICBMs where the O.S. had
deployed
this kind of defense.

a

Although hypothetical, this scenario
illustrates the capability of
counterforce defense for degrad,ng
a

Sov,et strike.

A Soviet general

would have to take into account
similar calculations before deciding

whether such an attack could achieve
military objectives adequate to
ending a war in a favorable position
relative to the United States.
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of the other superpower
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of arms control

measures designed to
maintain the balance
within certain definable
boundaries. A counterforce
defense can contribute
to this objective

Priding
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the U.S. another means
of balancing its
forces against those
of the Soviet Union.
,„ th1i fash1on>
,

counterfQrce

contribute to the U.S.
deterrent by assuring
th.t the U.S. would nave
adequate forces surviving
to deter future Soviet
attacks
even after

a

Soviet attack that left the
U.S. heavily damaged.

B.

Countervailing Defense

A second goal

is

"Countervailing Defense" in which
ballistic

missile defense would he employed
to protect strategic assets
including
U.S. nuclear forces as well
as other military targets
(OMTs). These
targets include the U.S.
command-control-communication network which
is
critical to the U.S. deterrent
posture and its war-fighting

capabilities.

The comcnand-control-commun,
cation network is comprised of

systems designed to warn the U.S.
of
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nuclear attack, to provide

prediction of an attack size and probable
target points, and to relay
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nuclear attack

Yet, 1t differs from
counterforce defense In
that
weapons have a hroader
deterrent role than

minimum deterrence

a
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" 1K princina,
.
principal „hobjective
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like that of
counterforce defense
etense

--united states.
H Cairns that nuclear

an
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deems

-

necessary to prosecuting
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^

a

retaliatory force and
assured destruction policy
Proponents of countervai
i„ 9 defense tend
to favor the protection
of
-mt.r, targets against a wider
range of attacks.
That is, increasing
the survivability of
these military targets
is seen as a means
of
reducing an adversary's
ability to achieve his
oojectives, thereby
strengthening deterrence. 32
,

A primary concern of
countervailing defense proponents
is that

minimum deterrence
nuclear wars.

is

not adequate to deter
the range of possible

For the countervailing
school of thought, "the
principal

method of deterrence is to
foster within the Soviet
leadersnip serious
uncertainties regarding their ability
to achieve, by the use or
threat
of force, any political or
military objective that
jeopardizes important
33
U.S. interests."
,„ this context, the U.S. must
be capable of

inflicting substantial damage on
Soviet military forces and strategic
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that end. U.S. C3,
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of which there are
r 0Ugnly
cntKa, fixed sites
an. I CBM torces must
have some endurance.
The
-aor role of
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faculties and ,C3Ms

in

order to preserve the
deterrent value and
war-fi g htin gc apahi,ities
of these assets.

defense could he,p ensure
the survival ity of
these assets which are
ertt,c.l in a countervail
strategy for creating
uncertainty in the
™1nds of Soviet ieaders
about the potentia, success
of a nuclear attack
on the United States.
However, the countering
strategy „ dom,„ated
by offensive forces:
defenses would oe dep,o ed
.
.
y
.
pnmarily
1

t0

strengthen the survivabi

1 i

ty of the deterrent

force and its related C3I

facilities. 36

Secondly,

countervailing defense might be
central to the denial
of Soviet war aims should
war break out.
This objective is closely
a

"
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C3 bunkers, dispersing
SAC

major strateg1c
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A counterva„,ng
defense used to enhance

a war-n hti„g
g
stratetJy
the U.S. extends the
countervailing strategic
policy pronounced by

Pres,dent,a, Directive
,9 during the Carter
broadest interpretation.
to enhance the deterrence

That is. whereas

A«„ 1stration
a

countering

t0

Us

policy seeks

credibi„ty of U.S. nuc.ear
forces first

it

also recognizes the need
to support dedicated
United nuclear options
the form of counterforce
capable weapons. Countervailing
defense

in

advocates, such as Colin
Gray, seek to integrate
defenses with the
countervailing policy in order
to "permit the U.S. to

nuclear conflict in

a

™erge from

relatively favorable power
position." 39

in this context, might
assume a particularly

a

Defenses,

,mportant role in defeating

Soviet nuclear attack against
U.S. military and strategic
assets
considered critical to prosecuting
a

a war.

A countervailing defense
could be expected to exploit
similar BMD
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systems as the
counterforce defenses
orevio,,,,

w

—
i^^ru^^^J
[~ - —
sslons would
and

-

-

-

,

nt ts along
with ;:; e
exot,c weapons such
as the electromagnetic
nailgun
The Defense Advanced
P,eseanch Pnojects
Administnation (DARpA)
U.S. A,n Force have
heen develops
the Va1, gu „.

^-course

defense.

a

Fhe system can
acce,enate pno.ee, ,es
wei ghing only
tew gnams to tnemendous
speed*
i=
*
speeds,
, e
ten kilometers pen
40
.
second.
At
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on neentny vehicles
wou,d eithen destroy
the. on sufficient,,
deflect them fnom thein
course tn
n.
counse
to r=„o.
cause them
to bunn up on reentny
into
the atmosphene on miss
thein tangets. A nail
gun might wonk in
conjunction with a tanget
designaton such as a low
powened iasen
However, the powen genenation
and pointing technology
rema,n major
stumbling blocks to an
effective nailgun.

Although
systems as

demanding.

a

a

countervail ing defense might
use many of the same

countenforce defense, its
objectives would be more
That is, the defense would
be expected to ach,eve
highen

kill

levels (lowen penetnation
levels) against incoming
ballistic
mi ssiles in onden
to preserve the U.S.
capability to continue fighting
war.

Mid-course defenses, while they
may have the longest time
span to
destnoy attacking ballistic
missiles, also might have
tnemendous

a
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Countervalue Defense

Anna,
se-

model

to shift the

is

"Countervalue uefense" in
wh,ch the U.S. m,ght

bas,sof deterrence from
reUance

forces for retaliating
aga.nst

a

on offens,ve nuclear

nuclear attack to defensive
forces

on the hope that
strategic defenses to
include ballistic missile

defenses can dominate the
offense.

The countervalue defense
is most

closely associated with
the romanticized "Star
Wars" defense portrayed
oy the media.
A countervalue defense
is effectively the
gpa, that
President Reagan called for
in his defense speech
of March, 1983.
whi,e
a countervalue defense
has intense political
and military appea,, it
is
clearly the most difficult
defense to achieve.
The countervalue defense
focuses on 'area-wide'
idea of national survivability.

defenses and the

The basic ballistic missile
defense

system envisioned for this mode,
might be
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insignificant.
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second thereby

roughly 15j000
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However, some of the most
promising DEW systems have
serious
technological hurdles to
overcome.
The chemica, laser which
has been
the focus of U.S. OEw
research since the early 19
70s has difficulty
attaining adequate power
output levels, thereby
requiring longer 'dwell'
time on a ballistic missile
in order to achieve a
Ml,. Also, the size
of a space-based laser
station at present would
preclude an effective
system as tons of fuel would
be required to produce
adequate power
levels.
Sydney Drell estimated a
space-based defense system might

USSr
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" t,e
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would require 2bO
space shuttle trips.
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phase defense
the greatest leverage
against
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it might

ng

warheads.

""ratio

A successful

boost phase

of up t0 tenwarheads

against the Soviet SS-18
Mod 4 ICBM.

W

Passes into the post-boost
phase when the „..„..,
(post boost vehicle PBV)
bpninc dispensing
WVJ begins
warheads and penaids on
their
ballistic trajectory.
That is, once the
bus hdeploys its
warheads or
decoys the targeting
task multiplies very
ery ra
rao^dlv
f h
k
P 1d 'y thereby
lowering the
Mil ratio. While DEW techno,og,es
appear to offer tremendous
hope for
a strategic defense,
the, have a number of
hurdles to overcome.
Uin
argues that while no major
obstacles have appeared
which wou,d preclude
a DEW eventual,,
being bu.lt. "the rea,
question . . . 1s whethPr
the
performance levels and system
integration required for
effective nlsslle
oefense can ever be
attained" .« Wh11e the
,.5.
.
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output

levels by increasing the
'dwell'

this avenue has implications
for overall

tine on

a
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ballistic missile,

battle management.

The

tracking and assessment
systems would have to be very
precise in order
to achieve a kill.
However, increased 'dwell'
time may in

turn limit
the number of targets each
HEW platform can handle during
an attack in
turn requiring more platforms.

The only other means to exert
similar destructive leverage
against
ballistic missiles is an attack
on their silos.
However, an 'offensive'
attack of this nature designed
to limit the damage remaining
Soviet

~
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k1ll weapons

The so-caned

numoer of highly
dcce|erated

seeker
ieeKer (optical
(ootid or radar) that
can

to Impact W ,tH a
Panistlc .issue or
warhead. Another User
employment method could
include ground-based
systems. A proposed
design
would he to fire lasers
top stations through
the
atmosphere off ref,ectin
g errors against attacking
naissiles.
While the
basic concept is seemingly
less complex than
deploying an entire defense
system in space, the
combination of ground and
space-based components
could increase the battle
management complexity.
,„ addition
the
probation of lasers through the earth's
atmosphere has been a problem
for scientists.
Lasers tend to dissipate and
lose their concentration
wh„e encountering clouds and
other atmospheric conditions.
Reports in
1984 suggest that scientists at
Lawrence Livennore Laboratory
have been
able to overcome these
problems but only under highly
controlled
conditions.
The ground-based laser
facility might be less vulnerable
than the space-based components
and would not be hindered
in size by

fountain

adequate power sources.

However, the system's dependency
on space-based
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Minuteman ICBM

In

June. 1984.

Ballistic Missile Defense
Systems Command has begun
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the defense employed in
the 'Homing Overlay
Experiment'

successfully detroyed
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number of kinetic energy
weapons including
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The Army

follow-on effort

labeled Exoatmospheric Reentry
Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem

The objective is to demonstrate
the effectiveness of

non-nuclear kinetic kill defense for
the late mid-course. 44

mid-course defense, labeled 'Uraduski
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electrcagnetlc raiigun concept
where small pellets are
accelerated
incredible speeds." The
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Another

has been described as "a

revolutionary new type of rocket
interceptor which combines the best
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t
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These defenses might

projectiles such as the

proposal as we,, as
Sprint-t y pe interceptors.

The basic objective
of a counterva.ue
defense is to exert such
ureat defensive ,everage
over an attaching
nuclear force as to great,
y
degrade its capab,„ty b
y destro y ing ballistic missiles
before the y are
a greater threat
while remaining ,a ers
could destro y remaining
y
warheads. Hence, the
centra, goal of this
defense 1s to alter the
basis
of deterrence and the
conditions of national vu,
nerahi i y b y providing
a means for assured
survivabi ity.
However, assured survivabi„t
y can
not be guaranteed b a
ballistic missile defense
y
alone. A determined
enemy could shift his means
of delivering an attack
to SLBMs, cruise
missiles, and strategic bombers.
In order for the U.S.
to achieve a
truly effective counterva.ue
defense it might not on,
y have to dep,o y a
ballistic missile defense but
a strategic air
defense to protect against
cruise missile and bombers
as well as civil defense
programs to protect
the population from 'leakage'.
1

I

—

——

* 11. the defense
missions o utl1ned
above have

eSUl research program,
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they are faced

wHh
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threat. Offensive
nuclear forces
are growing in size,
which itself presents
present, a problem
for defenses, and
are becoming more
difficult to defend
against
f
against.
For
example, the U.S

~* «Mel«

eXPl0r6d manUeVSrab,e

for its ,C BM and s
L8M forces
and has begun dep,o
ing
y
thousands of ALCMs and
SLC M s.
Both of these
'«er two weapons s ys tems are
capable of penetrate
Soviet air defenses
current,, dep,o ed ano
y
are projected to
penetrate future Soviet
air
defense s y stems. The
Soviets ma y follow ver
y similar offensive nuclear
weapons development
paths, thereh y enhancing
the ir ahi llty to assure
retaliation in the event of
a war.

While the concept of
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defense against offensive
warfare and

nuclear weapons in particular
is

m

new
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as dl scussed

the seeming,, fantastic
defense methods current,,
being explored are
new.
However, this research focus
does not represent a radical

departure from past activities
with respect to the
proposition of
space-based deplo y ments.
The U.S. and Soviet Union
have re„ed on
space-based p,atforms for man,
y ears.

United States ,aunch detection

satellites, communication satellites,
and surveillance satellites
have
been deplo y ed since the
1960s.
Hence the concept of 'Star
Wars' is
somewhat inaccurate.
What the new program does seek
to shift

military operations nor their
place as such.

is

neither the mode of

However, the SDI program

may provide some means of reversing
the U.S.'s dependence on the
threat
of nuclear retaliation.
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CHAPTER THREE
U.S. STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR POLICY

—
—
—
...

preserving the security
of the nation.
nation

0 , 1cy makers
are charged wfth

c
For
more than 40 years

U S
strategy security has
depended on policies
,cies that ha
have emphasized
the
,

•

0Ver

™ ent

t0

C

<

s

ponces

—

serious encroachment
on the nuclear
fh
u
UC ear threSh0,d
,

'

Th

"

f
f°

~

CUSOf thatemrt

the

the respons1b1ljty
of

"•«"»•«

folding option:

-

can the

that

b «ween the

he

help prevent

superpowers.

strategic nuclear policy

,S.

best deter

t s enem,es
a
tt,^
nuclear
attack on the continental
9
U.S. or its allies
today and in the future?
The answer to this
ques tion Hes in u S

from

launchinq

,

a

strategy nuclear 'deterrence'
policy.

the Reagan Administration
has asked if deterrence
can be more
effectively served Oy a
defense position or a combination
of the two,
Vet, these policies
by themselves do not
ensure that deterrence wi
always work.
Rather, deterrence, taken
to mean the prevention
of a
nuclear war or a war that
might lead to the use of
nuclear weapons
depends on a multiplicity
of conditions defined
as a whole as the
nuclear balance between
the superpowers.
Deterrence works as a result
of various interdependent
factors co^only defined
under the rubric of a
nuclear balance. These factors
include the policies and
strategies
which would guide the use or
U.S. nuclear weapons, the
nuclear arsenals
1

Ill

of the superpowers,
and the arms
control

e"ort

r

to bound the
threat of

" —«—est—
The balance of
nuclear power between
°"

-

*

^

-

"

an

0V,etUn,0n S,

appre^on

'

rU c t1V e

weapons and the

U

b
S

's
S
*

;7—

r
"•'«"«

1

1

-

superpowers is

,

.

nuclear
clS ar

to unleash this
puwer if
3 power
it r*
required

can not he measure,

oetween two nations.

stable.

potent,, of

'J

•

^

nUC ' ear b3,anCe
iS

~„y

^ 9ness
wi
Wl11ln

h

rather, ft js

A pr1ncipal

«'«tt«M1p

J.

.

charactensUc

"

„

„

never statu, hut
is

IS

That is, the strategic
relationship hetween
the
such that changes in
po, icy and dep,
oyments of

„„«

weapons often a,ter
perceptions concern,„
g the ha,ance.
However the
ba anCe
C ° nSldered
neither superpower can
guickly
obta,n a preponderance
of power nor is the
ha.ance current,, subject
'

*«

"

condition of strategic
'stability'

deterrence

in the ey.s
eves

is critical

to th»
the preservation of

<;
nf u
of
U.S.
strategic theorists and
policy makers

Strategic stability is

a

condition where the nuclear
balance does

not currently favor
either superpower and is
less

under strain.
is

An important issue that

determining the critica,

events

of strategic stability
and the
I„

the most genera, sense

strategic stability "concerns
the ,eve, of risk of
a

given point in time".

likely to collapse

poHcy makers must contend with

"eans of ensuring that they
are preserved.

occurring at

to

1

a

nuclear war

The basis of that risk
is the

threat of massive national
destruction from

a

nuclear attack.

—
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<">th

The preceding
chapters have
provided an
for and against
defense as we!, as
the

-*

——

,

t

- :::; :::.::::;:~;r;

»

r

m ° re recent

-^ents

in

support as we,, as aaa

-aracter of the new debate
centers around
C
tUUenCy

"

7

^ """"

f
0ff6nS,Ve

* dm 'nistration

«*

-

deterrent against Soviet
aggression
agression.

-rent,,

embod,ed

a

-

powerfu, polUica|

which favors the
notion that

,onger pro.de an
effective

Rp,n
Reagan's defense
proposal
.

in

the strategic
defense initiative,
a,so suggests
threat of a nuclear
war mi ght be
«»|
transcended, ,n practice,
by
-hole arra y of new
defense technologies
that m ,ht place a
defense

-

system in

a

favorable position
reiative to offensive
forces
^is notion of a defense
donated strategic nuclear
balance is not
new.
"Since the advent of
nuclear weapons, presidents
.
.
, ave sought
an alternative to a
strategy of deterrence
hased on the threat of
-ssive retaliation and to a
situation where the U.S.
is vulnerable to
catastrophic destruction." 2
Vet, each president
beginning with
Eisenhower, having considered
substituting defenses, has
rejected them
and has subsequent!,
revised U.S. strategic
nuclear policy, (with)
flexible response, lifted
nuclear options, and the
countervai i ng
strategy being the most
prominent additions. 3
Distinct fro. previous
periods of consideration,
strategic defenses currently
enjoy both
political and policy support
at the highest levels
of the government and
the Department of Defense.
However, not only do defenses
enjoy greater
a

.

,

113

suppo,, but th ,
strategic defense
1nttiatiye

—

—

decades

Theu
-

-

s

i5
-

^H1o„,

-

e

charactepized

^

strate9ic doctr ne
and the strategjc
,

relationship of the
superpowers". 4

«? ^logical

^

results o f the SDI
research program

'-—

tmeg

,

cdefenseweaponrymor :

space could become an
essential sphere

for other than
intelligence gathering and

emotion

,1„ k s.

The new

strategic defense debate
,s three years old
and many agents
Pave Pee„
««<e both p r0 an d con whl
ch wou.d Pave Peen
expected at this point
However, much of the focus
of the debate has Peen
on pantile aspects
of the propose. system
or on the genera,
conceptua, defense sch OT
e
For
e*amp,e, the Reagan Admin
ls tration emphasizes
a strategic defense
for
countervalue purposes while
other officials,
both in and out of

government, discuss the
appeal of
defense.

See

counterforce or countervailing

defense critics focus on
specific technology,

blocks such as the

software for

a

develops

stuping

of sophisticated battle
manag«„ent

a

multi-tiered, space-based,
countervalue defense system.
Other analysts pose a number
of difficult quest,ons to
the overall

conceptual value of

a

strategic defense. 5

while the debate continues
to

rage between opponents and
proponents of strategic defenses,

political and strategic policy
implications of
ignored.

a

a

number of

strategic defense are

Neither the Reagan Administration's
Department of Defense nor

any of the major opposing
organi zatinns

,

such as the Union of Concerned

Scientists or The Coalition to Save the
ABM Treaty, have produced major
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studies addressing the
imp! cati ons °
off a
3

—
i

--ce policy.
N

raPHCati0nS
'

U- S
-

-

U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY TN

Principles,

a

-

,
^rategic
defense for

U

S

pf\/ T FW;

An understanding of
the possible
can beg,n with

*

future of U.S. nuclear

forces, and U.S. arms
control policy.

I.

IM
U S

plications

of strategic defenses

review of U.S. strategic
nuclear policy

Us

Us

evolution over the past
three decades, and its
current
composition.
During this period u,i>
U S
st
strategic nuclear policy
evolved
fro. 'essentia, deterrence'
to a 'sophisticated
deterrence' policy.
United States strategic
nuclear forces have been
progressively charged
with increasingly more
difficult and complex
objectives as defined by
U.S. policy.
This evolutionary process
has been influenced by
two major
trends.
On the one hand, the
conditions about which the
nuclear balance
is defined have changed.
United States nuclear superiority
has been
'

-

overcome by rough strategic
nuclear equality; the superpowers
possess
roughly equal capabilities to
threaten the other with massive
levels of
destruction by executing a nuclear
attack.

The U.S. also has sought to
preserve its national

security in the

face of a changing strategic
balance by adjusting its nuclear
policy and

developing strategic weapons to
support new policies.

However,

for

various political, economic, and
strategic reasons, the U.S. has

emphasized restructuring its nuclear
policy rather than procuring new
weapons.

The Reagan Administration's strategic
defense proposal is

_
d

7

—

--

ed
-

—

——

e ' c rrent u - s

-

;::;;,ng strategy.
;

J'^r«i«

and

fln

tensive
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,3.

« Ml9(fB

^
^
—

10 sn effect1ve
damage

effect1ye

weapons.

^

topt onsa5we „ asnew
,

In addition,

the U.S. might have
to

capabilities to support and
execute a damage

luting strategy
the possible
implications for U.S. nuclear
policy, this
Chapter win e * P ,ore the
components of U.S. strategic
nuclear policy and
the direction in which
it may be headed
as a result of the
current
debate over strategic
defenses
ses. As such,
s„rh the
,k. chapter
u
will outline and
-view the major elements of
current U.S. strategic
nuclear policy and
Gwen

ana!yze whether strategic
defenses conform with each
policy's
objectives. An additional
objective of the chapter is
to describe what
a U.S. strategic
defense policy might look
like should defensive
technoiogies prove useful and
should the U.S. deploy a
defensive system.
Finally, the question of strategic
nuclear stability will be
ra,sed in
the context of a defensive
transition.

In

order to assess possible

implications for U.S. policy,
both U.S. domestic political
and strategic
constraints as well as Soviet
efforts to deny the U.S. an
effective
defense wi
be outl ined.
1

1

U.S. strategic nuclear employment
policy

plans which might guide U.S.
attacks during

a

-

the strategies and

nuclear war

-

is

currently informed by elements from
three distinct strategic nuclear
policies: an assured destruction/retaliation
poiicy,

a

counted

1

i

ng
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PO

^.ndanudeanwar-fi^m.po,^.

The per ods
,

'"dividual poMc.es have

^

Incorporation of

present

a

are

.Strategic Defense'
p 0l1cy may dl(er

nuclear policy „1 X 1n
favor

^nated
Policy

donated

deterrence.

hy a

r he

scope and purpose

„

^

^

^

^^

strategic defense are
dependent on the
technoiogies and
tHe1r m 1,s100S that
maybe proven usefu! foe a
defense.
A second factor
•"fluency changes to U.S.
nuCear policy nay he the
level of

nu.her of uncertainties
involved in answering
these two guestions
the U.S is likely to
retain many

TABLE
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elements of its current
nuclear policy
ru
y~y mix both during
h
transition and dunng the

^ ^
1

1nUia)

Tatis,

the U.S.

isu „,i kely

a

defense

rf §

to d,scard its
offensive

nudear forces,

the prlncpa, objectives
of their employment
strategies for fear that
Soviets m1 gh t develop
effective coonter.eas.es
to a U.S. strategic

defense.

In

action,

the development of

ballistic n-lsslles, one that
would uestroy

mil-

perfect defense against

a

m pm ^ ^.^
Qf

unleashed in an attach does
not preclude the
delivery of
nuciear weapons by other
me ans such as strategic
bombers, cruise
Missiles, or clandestine

placement

lB the

absence Qf an
defense to combat these
delivery options, such
as strategic air
defenses, the U.S. is unlikely
to dismantle its
offensive nuclear
forces.
United States offens,ve
nuclear forces are Mkely
to continue
to act as an effective
deterrent against a possible
Soviet nuclear
attack at least during the
defense transition
phase.

In

conclusion,
policy guidance for offensive
nuclear forces that are retained
by the
U.S. could be informed by
current nuclear policy as well
as by

a

newly

implemented strategic defense
policy.
United States strategic nuclear
policy

derived from U.S.

is

deterrence theory which represents
the way in which U.S. theorists
and
strategists view the nuclear threat
against the U.S. and its allies. A
basic principle of U.S. deterrence
theory since the

l

9 4Us

is that

nuclear weapons only can be used
to deter their use by another
nation.
This principle stems from the
tremendous respect U.S. political and

military leaders have for the destructive
capability of nuclear weapons.
As observed by U.S.

policy makers of the 194Us

,

nuclear weapons were

a

:
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Passive

economic growth and
its

the0nStS

"
n"

CWWrHS

However,

*

attendm benems

—abstract,

«"th1*.M.

.nd

_

^

that the (nU1at1or

unlikely to ever happen

second pri „cip,e re
qu ,res that the
threat to use nuclear
weapons be credible in
P » D nt „f
the event
of an attack on
the United States
maintenance of a credible
threat subsequently
has reared that
war
P'ans be developed to allow
the U.S. to execute
a response to an
attack
These pr1nc1p,es only
speak t „
.

^

^

^

That vis,on isolated
nuclear weapons such that
they are usefu, only
to
deter their use.
The expansion of U.S.
nationa, security
recrements
in the

1,40s ana 1960 s was
supported, in part

wlth the expansjQn , f
role nuclear weapons
might play in assuring U.S.
security.
The
.

^

Eisenhower Administration
drastically reduced conventional
arms
procurement in favor of relying
on U.S. nuclear forces
to deter
aggression below the strategic
nuclear level.

This evolution in
deterrence thought represents
the central tension
in U.S. deterrence
theory for the past four
decades. That tension can be
represented by
the following question;
what is the most effective
way to deter a
nuclear war?
Is it the result of an
ultimate threat to punish an

attacker, to threaten

a

potential attacker with the
possibility of

defeat at any level of warfare,
limited or massive, or the ability
to
defend effectively against a
nuclear attack?

A.__ As sured

Destruction Polic y

The U.S. has depended on

a

policy of assured destruction to
deter

a

—
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wan for m0 st of the
past 25 years .

assure, destruction
p„, icy is that aeterre „
ce (j
t^eat of unacceptaMe'
„at,o„a, destruction
in the event of a
nuclear
war. The threat of
national destruction
on exist*
exlsts hbecause the
superpowers
are vulnerable to a
nuclear art-an.
attack and possess
nuclear forces capable
of
causing tre m endous levels
of destruct,on.
,„ addition> whj
e the „ $
and Soviet Union have
activel, explored strategic
defense against
nuclear weapons neither
nation has yet developed
an effective means
to
defend against a nuclear
attack.
y e t, a condition
of national
vulnerability does not of
itself preclude a nuclear
attack.
,„ fact
traditional military thought
would suggest that
vulnerability to attack
is more of an invitation
to attack than a deterrent
to it.
The critical
component of assured destruction
policy is that the threat of
unacceptable damage can he
maintained hy possession of
an invulnerable
strategic nuclear force.
That is, the deterrent
credibility of assured
destruction policy relies on the
invulnerability of the nuclear
forces
backing the policy.
The label 'mutual' was
attached to assured
destruction, hence the acronym
MAD, in an effort on the part
of the U.S.

^

^

,

to gain recognition by the
Soviet Union that national
'fact'

vulnerability is

a

of the nuclear era that applies
to all nations and one that

cannot be avoided or changed.
The doctrinal basis of the assured
destruction policy school

that nuclear weapons have rendered
traditional

is

ideas about the

relationship between military forces,
national defense, and the politics
of war obsolete and dangerous.

7

Therefore, the most important objective

for assured destruction policy is
to prevent the use of nuclear weapons

—
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nt Or war or

poUtlcal ,nf,uence.

theory suggest, thit
nuclear weapons are
usefuisQ|eiy

«a,

nucl

6arfi „u

^

esu „ HruedthCTOwWdbyasMred

destruction theorists
with respect to
nuclear weapons as the
means to
ensure that nuclear
weapons are not used
by

^

^

Power between the nuclear
superpower, wh,ch rests
on . pQugh
ot risk
known as deterrence, or
the mutual vulnerability
to a nudear
attack".
The risk posed by
each superpower to the
other is the threat of
unimaginable destruction
from a nuclear
retaliation to an aggressor's
attack.
The leve, of destruction
generally has been cloaked
in ter ms of
the number of
deaths/casuaUles and the degree
of econ«»„ic destruct.on
that would be caused by
attacks on cities and
industrial centers.
,„
effect, the two superpowers
possess the capacity to
threaten and punish
the other with massive
urban-industrial destruction such
that recovery
fro. this attack might
only be measured In years
if ,„easured at all.
The central strategic
character of assured destruction
policy can
he described as a threat
to 'punish' an enemy in the
event that an enemy
attacks the U.S. or its allies
with nuclear weapons. An
assured

destruction threat essentially
served as the basis of U.S.
deterrence
policy throughout the 1950s,
the 1960s and early 1970s.
A key element
in U.S.

employment strategy designed to
Implement

a

threat of pun.shment

as alluded to above is
known as countervalue targeting,
or the

deliberate targeting of Soviet population
and industrial centers.
Countervalue targeting
War

II

in U.S.

war plans began shortly after World

when the U.S. began searching for

a

policy to guide the use of

122

new, y found

mimary

power .

-corporate nuclear weapons,
such
on Soviet

.,«..

as FLEETW00D>

^^

The targets of

. , s.
counterva]ue
would have been Soviet
population centers
enters as well as
some portion of the
Sovet union's industrial
hase.

considerable value to the
Soviet ,eadersh,p and
thereby the threat of
follow-on war plan,
,abe,ed DROPSHOT, resulted
from a review of the
FLEETWOOD plan by the Harmon
Committee established in
1949
rt

communist world.

The DROPSHOT war p,an
provided the president
with

a

single attack option and
did not require the
military to withhold any
nuc.ear forces in reserve
for subsequent attacks.
The number of deaths
expected fro m the unleashing
of DROPSHOT was
esti.ated between 360 and
b2b million throughout
the communist world. 10
Together, these war plans
and others came to be
known throughout the
1950s as a policy for massive
retaliation.
The basis for massive
retaliate
the destruction of a
considerable portion of the
Soviet Union's urban-industrial
base

-

-

served to confirm the foundation
upon which U.S. assured
destruction
policy has been based.
An important factor constraining
the targeting complexity of
U.S.

war plans in this period was
the weapons technology available
to the
United States.
The delivery systems of the
1940s and 1950s, namely B-36
and B-52 strategic bombers,
were not very accurate and thus
were not

particularly useful

for targeting specific military
assets.

For

example, the U.S. could not confidently
target and destroy Soviet

123

or nava,

.esse,

s

at bomber or nava,

baS es, respective,,

nuclear weapons that
would likely
<ei y result in
in damage
n
to aircraft and
ships
well as surrounding
areas.
The level °off coll
coll,.
^eral damage that would
have resulted from
the targeting of
military asset
assetss m
<
in the
th P Soviet
Union
with the megaton yield
weapons carried
ed by
bv U ss
c*
strategic bombers in
the
1*0, was essentia,,, just as
great as direct
population targetlng
The Eisenhower Ad m
inistration decjded ,
n

«

,

,

,

-

«"«.

-

^^

-clear war p,ans of

the individua, arm

the S,n g ,e ,ntegrated
Operation,,

P„„,

or SI0P .

^
^
^

^

sem, e
The

^^

^

allocate w ea P ons .ore
effective,, and preclude
the potentia
targeting of a sin ,e
target b, the different
9
.ranches." The
,

Administration furthered the
centralizaUon of the war

P ,ans

Kenned,

under the

erection of Secretar, of Defense
McNamara and also began an
effort to
prov.de the

Present

with attack options other
than

a

sing,e massive

retal iation.

ncNamara's initial public
effort was to reject the
massive
retaliation polic, and develop
counterforce opt,ons such that
the U.S.
cnuld attack Soviet strategic
nuclear forces and other
military assets
if it choose to do so
before resorting to attacks
on Soviet cities.
The
idea behind this effort
was to provide

a

'controlled' me ans for keep,„g

the superpowers from escalating
to all-out nuclear war too
12
quick,,.
Attacks on mi liter, assets
rather than civilian centers
appeared to
McNamara to make more sense for
deterrence; p, limiting the size
of U.S.
retaliator, strikes, civilian
populations might be spared somewhat. 13
The introduction of the
'no-cities' approach resulted in
resounding
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public and allipri rrin^
'"edcnticlsmas

palatible and hence
more likely
y

an attempt to
make a nuclear war
more

cntica, role
destruction

,n

„
'"

p
0 (m
Po,lt

'

|

-

, „
and
economics also played

McNamara's decision to
shift

po„c y

.

The A1

r

Force

,n

favor of assured

jncreas1ng y
had estimated that
it would require
1U ,000 ,CBMs to
imp.ement

counterforce targeting
strategy.
•jy.

,

to perform

a

counterforce

,

n,

^
a

^

"

true

effect
effect,
th„ cost of«
the
U.S. strategic

^

^umement.

-pons

^

,

i„

a

ssjon _

^^

obstacle continued to be
the capabilities of
U.S. nuclear forces
The
-st advanced U.S. weapons of
the early 196U s, carried
on Titan „ and
Mlnuteman I ICBMs, were fairly
inaccurate and of sizeable
yields.
Clearly, these forces were
unsuited for discriminate
surg,ca, strikes

of

the kind required by a
counterforce strategy.

The U.S. would have been
unable to confidently target
Sov,et .CBMs and bomber
bases with its

strategic force without causing
considerable collateral damage.
While
McNamara publicly downplayed
the counterforce and damage
limiting
aspects of U.S. nuclear policy
his annual budget statements
continued to
reflect their roles until iyo/.
1967
Rw 1967,
iqa7
By
assured destruction policy
was
formally and solidly in place. 14
The U.S. continued to develop
the notion of 'flexible
response',

especially in the NATO arena, and
attempted to prov.de
of attack options in the SIOP. 15

A new SIOP,

a

greater number

introduced in 1961,

incorporated the 'flexible response'
concept into U.S. targeting
strategy.

It

provided the President with

a

greater number of attack

options, the final category and option
representing an all-out

attach

on both milit ar
y and urban . jndustna]

„
"

•n

aithough the U.S. began
to prov, de options
,„ the S,0P
notion of d eterr1ng
the Soviets cont,nue
d to ne,
y pri mar i,y on
strategic posture to
unleash raass ive d
estruction.
,„ addition
Soviet heUlstic m
,ss,le fences grew
throughout the 196 0s the

the

'

a

as

ab 1, ity
U.S. to canny out an
effective countenfonce
a„ d damage l1nl1t1ng
Strike began to d windle

t^

„

correspondingly.

I"

suppont of the shift to
assured

d estnuction po,,cy,
McNamara
ar 3 ue d "that the
enemy's certa,n knowledge
that it would he d estno
y e d in
a wan pnevente d one
from breaking out"."
Hence, the
of

donation

assured destruction

P o,ic y

was not strict,, for
public consumption hut

Practice, it was the only
cred,b,e threat the U.S.
was capabie of
carrying out. The targeting
reu.uire.ents for an assure,
destruction

po„cy were defined

b y HcUa.nara

in

1965 as the capabi,it
y to d estnoy one

quarter to one third of the
Soviet Union's population
and two thirds of
Us industria, capacity. la In effect,
McNamara envisioned a policy
to
threaten to punish the Soviet
Union should it attack the
destroying assets of

W

^^^^
U.S by

and concluded

effective and credible deterrent.

19

mt

tMf

The U.S. has retained elements
of its assured destruction
policy
and associated capabilities
since the mid 1960s.
Each succeeding

administration since the Kennedy
Administration has continued to
emphasize a U.S. assured destruction
deterrent.
The policy has been
refined as the focus for targeting
has shifted from populations
to
'economic recovery resources' such
as key economic infrastructures
and
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-lilt-, re,ated production
facilities.

«-,n g

massive

Action

How

_, ^

to the Soviet
Union by a U.S.

retaliation
has already come under
scrutiny
"y by
°y the firct
first *few months of
the Nixon

ministration.

,ts doctrine for
strategic sufficiency,
while

establishing strategic parity
as

a

basis of the nuclear
balance, began

the process of revising
U.S. S,0P employment
options which led to
Lilted Nuclear Options,
Presldentla, Oirective
59, an d the Reagan

Administration's war-fighting
policy.
A variation of the
assured destruction/retaiiation
policy school
often referred to as the
•mini™. deterrence' school,
has become m0 re
vocal in recent years
as the U.S. has moved
away from assured

destruction in favor of more
selective and limited nuclear
options.
,ts
proponents suggest that both
superpowers possess more than
sufficient
strategic forces to 'destroy'
each other's nation and.
therefore,
neither side needs to deploy
greater numhers nor more
capable nuclear
forces.
Minimal deterrence theorists
argue that both sides, in fact,

could unilaterally dismantle
hundreds of weapons without
degrading their
deterrent posture. A popular
proposition with minimum deterrent

advocates is for the U.S. to
dismantle all but

a

few Poseidon or Trident

Submarines, each capable of attacking
an average of 160 and
cities respectively.™
return to

a

President-elect Carter initially favored

minimum deterrent and suggested that

of 2U0 warheads would be
sufficient to deter

Louis Beres,

a

192

a

a

Soviet
a

U.S. submarine fleet

Soviet attack. 21

leading proponent of the minimum
deterrence school,

has suggested the U.S. seek to
implement three general steps to achieve
a

minimum deterrence posture while maintaining
an assured destruction

—
" rescansfortte

—^

""Clear war ,„ or(ler t0
pressure

^
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Soviet

-oving .centres

for states to acq

, re>

^^^
^ ^

^ ^^

buildup; create an agenda
for lnternat , onal
securuy

^

weapons, and finally,
Beres calls for
ror the
tne UU.S.
s
t„
to renunciate the
'first
use' option by
strengthening conventional
deterrence.?? Tne

t^se argents

is

basis of
that assure, destruction
capab, lities, possessed
by

both superpowers, is

a

reality that can not he
avoided.

,„ addit1on
Beres suggests that
possess,on of ever more
capable nuclear weapons
does
not translate into an
effective means for terminating
a nuclear war on

acceptable terms as some
proponents of limited nuCear
options suggest
The assured destruction
schoo. charges that the
centra,

nuclear weapons is to deter
an enemy's attack and

deterrence can he weighed

is

a

function of

measure by which

the stability of the
strategic balance.

That is, deterrence can
work effectively when the
balance is stable and
is susceptib.e to breaking
down when the balance becomes
destabilized.
Harmful to the stability of
the balance are actions wnicb
undermine the
parity of forces between the
superpowers. Principal among these
actions
are attempts to erode the other
superpower's confidence in their
assured

destruction and assured retaliation
capability.

Hence, all counterforce

targeting strategies and weapon
systems are inherently destabilizing
according to assured destruction
theorists.

Among the more destabilizing activities

is

the development and

deployment of defenses against nuclear
weapons, both passive and active.
Passive defenses are destabilizing
because they seek to limit the damage
an enemy can

inflict on

a

particular target, thereby degrading the
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^ or •"•'"pie,

«n1c h ere des1 „ ed
9
t0 proteet el¥ll1i>
popuUtions
tHe

attacks

P-tect some p„ rtion
"tack,

i.e.

,

of

ntended tspg9t .
a

Wh1l9c1v1ldefenm

J

population fro* the
direct effects of

overpressure and thermal
destruction
Cruct,on

n
<,

-

Jn effective defense
by u-i.
offiri^u
y U.S officials.

-Urgeted

elvl] defenses

d„

•

'S not

considered

c

Soviet missiles might
be

to hit areas where
U.S. civi.ians bad
been relocated

Additions,,,, the Soviets
could employ more
weapons or
yields to accomplish
some level of destruction.
"ore important,, for
President

Plan's

defense propose,, assured

destruction policy suggests
that active defenses
are radically

CestSbn,^

for

a

number of reasons.

"A conse q uence of this
view is
that only offensive
forces can directly
contribute to deterrence."^
Finally, for an assured
destruction advocate '•anything
that interferes
any measure with the
other side's ability to
inflict assured

m

destruction

is

destabilizing

premptive attack and,

in

-

in

crises it is supposed to
induce

the long term, military
competition becomes

a

spiral,

ng nuclear arms race with unlimited increases
in the potential
for indiscriminate
destruction on both sides". 24
Therefore, al, efforts
to

incorporate defenses °"u
and ™>ms,
ABMs

in

mrtio.i^
particular,

are opposed by assured

destruction theorists.
While assured destruction
policy suggests that defenses
are
dangerously destabilizing, the
deployment of missile defenses by
the
superpowers my make countervalue
targeting as prescribed by assured
destruction policy the only practical
option for offensive forces.

Missile defenses will degrade the
superpowers' abilities to execute
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P-ise

counterforce attach thereby
lessening the,
-cess. Hence. the requ1rements

^^^

„

P

congee

of

'ess precise,,
defined in terms of
weapons accuracy and
damage

expectancies could serve
useful Iv as fh
userully
the employment
objectives for
offensive nuclear forces
in a defense
dominant world.

«

B.

United wuclwr Option.

r..^ rm111||||

nn

^

American nuclear policy
has evolved over
the past 4 0 years
although some would argue
that what has really
happened

is that a series
shifts have occured ,n
the face of technological
pr0 gress
The foundation of the
assured destruction policy
of the ,g 6 Us and

of radical

l9 70s

has been guestioned
recently by

a

number of nuclear strategists.

These

strategists, such as Paul
Nitze and Colin Gray, do
not view assured
destruction policy or posture
as adequately credible
to preserve U.S.
security in the coming decades.

Nitze,

a

government nuclear policy

advisor for the past thirty
years, has charged that the
U.S. has needed
"ore flexible and 'rational'
nuclear policies for most of
those years.
Gray, an advisor to the
Peagan Administration, has
charged that a
growing Soviet war-fighting
capability could pose a serious
and

dangerous threat to the ability
of the U.S. to deter

a

nuclear war in

the future.

Both Nitze and Gray have argued
that the U.S. needs to promote
U.S.

war-Hghting options and capabilities.

While few

emphasize these conclusions, there
has been

a

Presents

publicly

progression toward more

limited nuclear employment options
since the late 196Us and especially

since the early 1970s.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger for the
Nixon
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options (LNOs,

'-nation

the S ,0P as

,„

deterrence credibi lity and
to

H™n

a

of

se.ea.ea,,,,^

means of enhancing

u

a „ ucl ear war s
h0uld it

S

5^.

The Nixon Administration's
nuclear policy review
,ed to the
promulgation of LNOs in n
i
U.S. war pians.
National Security
Decision
Memorandum 242 s1gned by
<;

Pi-

for

^

(-

H m Hed

^ ..^ ^

^

employment options which
enable the U.S. to conduct
selected nuclear operations
he developed and
formally incorporated
into

"•SI.-"

An additional

focus of the new

P o„cy was target^ of
Soviet post-war recovery
assets to include poiitical.
economic, and
military resources.

The centra, concept of
LNOs was 'escalation
control'.

Desmond Bal,
describes this as provision
of the NCA "with the
ability to execute
selected options in a deliberate
and controlled fashion
thoughout
the

progress of

a

strategic nuclear exchange". 26

The idea was to hold

certain enemy targets at risk
for later destruction in
order to provide
an enemy time to consider
action.
Additionally, certain targets
would
be withheld from destruction
such as populations.

would not be

a

That is, populations

direct target although massive
collateral damage to

Soviet population centers was
still

likely to occur from

a

U.S. attack.

Ultimately, the U.S. was seeking
to impart the notion of intra-war

deterrence into the strategic equation.
Much of the recent policy debate
has been structured by concerns
raised by the LNO development
process.

The decision and enactments

pursuant to Presidential Directive
59, which engraved 'countervailing
nuclear policy'

in U.S.

deterrence theory, marks the formal era
of

a
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^

massive attack plans.

<°

^nst.

soviet ,„1t,„

>—1n

stl

S m0 re traditional

The evolution of
U.S. strategic
nuclear policy toward
T1.1t*
attack options presented
the moSt ,mportant
development in U ,

•Mledbylt,

nan,, a countervailing
P oM cy suggests that the
u s
Prepare to right and fight
a nuclear war to
deny an enemy's wart
1
Objectives ,n order to pursuade
hi, to back down from the
conflict
The
not.on of preparing
for a nuclear wan
fundamentally different
fron,
the traditionally accepted
means of deterrence
espoused by assured

M

destruction theorists and
assured retaliation
policy. W hereas ass
d
destruction theorists argue
that deterrence works
hecause the threat of
overwhelming punishment is cred.ble,
countervailing policy theorists

to deter Soviet ieaders
in all

instances.

Even though the U.S. had

incorporated flexible and limited
nuclear options
1980,

it

in

the SIOP prior to

had not sought to procure
effective., specific weapons
systems

in a

dedicated mannen that would match
U.S. policy, targeting
strategy,
and weapons.
Much of the debate surrounding
Presidential Directive 69 centers
on
the following question:
How will the U.S. use its
nuclear weapons in
the event of a nuclear war?
Although the U.S. has always
maintained
specific employment policies for
using its nuclear forces-traditional

ly
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, P „, CCMtat
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haveheen
.

nucle

forpolit calreasons
,

Plans were drawn up tney
9 e„er al , y sought
targets such as population
centers and ,„ dustr1al
„
plants .
The
tar 9 et,n 9 consideration
that relate to
counterforce strate ies
are
9
different" as
to destroy mi litary
installations or
specific weapons are in
practice mu ch more
difficult." A number of
actors may have begun ca,,i
ng into question
the deterrence
guarantee'
of U.S. strategic
nuclear policy and has
,ed U.S. policy
planners to
yravnate toward more demanding
nuclear strategies.

"

regents

The first of these
factors is the ever
increasing sophistication
and capacities of
both U.S. and Soviet
nuclear forces.
That is
some
truth exists in the
proposition that technology
often ,eads policy.
While the U.S. actually
uusni to restrain fnr+h
j sought
further improvements in the
accuracy of its forces
after the SALT I accords,
the increase in Soviet
capabilities eventually convinced
a numder of U.S.
policy makers that
the U.S. required more
advanced weapons. The most
controversial example
has been the MX ICBM.

Some nuclear weapons today
and ICBMs in particular
can be extremely
effective weapons for attacking
vai ieuy ur
a a variety
aof taryets
taruPt* in
in a, discriminate
manner. The issue of attack
discrimination and its meaning for
U.S.

strategic nuclear policy will
be addressed later in the
chapter.
improvements in the U.S.'s abi.ity
to discriminate

in

an attack

The

^

1

I

i

(generally defined as
the differences
enCes b«t
bet u
ween massive col
lateral
destruction and selective
strikes)
Sun kcs
h»c
has largely been
the result of
technological Improvements
In nuclear
weaponry
P nry
,or example, the
U s
Mlnuteman III ICBM
deployed with the Mdrk
Mark 12A warn
warhead and NS-20
guidance
package has a circular
error probability
,r-y (m>)
ICEI ), equivalent
to l/iuth of
a nautical mile
bO P«««"t
oercpni- of
*.*
n* th.
hi*
««.. If soviet ICBM launch
sllos ere
hlrt
hardened to withstand
2UUU PS1.
.«
osi
>h
as they have been
assessed by some
analysts, the Minuteman
III is fhonno+n
n
theoretically
capable of destroying
roughly 750 Soviet
tCBMs ,n
In * *,
1U5P1S
two warheads per
uer si
In attack
silo
representing
Soviet icbm force,
,

)

,

i

*

'

t

'

,

,

.

(1

•ccurec, and ,.th,Hty

-Pon.1n.

^

the U.S. and Soviet
Un,on to use

^ ^

nuCe.r

m or.tr. d it1on., m iiit,
ryfMh1on> 29

use, to destroy much

an effort

.Uow

„,,„

to prevent an ene,„
y

milltdry

from achieving

than

$

^^

Ms

mil.tary objective,.
A second factor which
potentially weakens the
notion of a

deterrence 'guarantee'

is a

superpower can truly possess

weakening o, the idea that
neither
a

strategic advantage and that

consequently, the superpowers
are destined to re,„ain
under the balance
of terror until both
disarm,.
rh,s notion, wedded to
the assured
destruction theory, suggests
that the balance is an
unavoidable fact of
the nuclear era which can
not be changed and in
which neither superpower
can achieve meaningful
advantages. Presidential
Directive Sg is

predicated on the idea that the
Soviet Union has probably
never accepted
this view and has clearly
never based Us weapons
development on a
strict interpretation of the
assured destruction theory.
fact, PD59
[n
suggests that the Soviets have
not only never espoused this
view of

134

~

and associate,
Infrastructure to f 1ght a
nuclear war<

SSymBtry
'

open to

aP9Ue

^ng

poHc,

,

roponents

,

has ]eft

u s

dangerous weakening of
its deterrent
capability
"1111- Odom and Z b g „ jew Bre
Z 1ns k 1 , major architects
„ f pD5g
argued that assured
destruction theory is not
consistent with Sov.et
strategic nuclear doctrine
which has always seen
nuclear weapons as
weapons in the conventional
sense.
sense
Odnm and
a „d a
Odom
Brezinski also have claimed
that the Soviets were
impressed during the Cuban
missile crisis that
nuclear weapons were
useful to the U.S. and
as good students of
Claus«1tz, the Soviets
believe nuclear weapons are
a too, of power,
albeit a dangerous tool,
in support of their
politics.
a

^

,

Attendant to

a

countervailing poHcy

prepared to fight

a

nuclear war due In part
to the emergence of

passive Soviet effort to
deploy

a

is

the necessity of heing
a

war-fighting capability.

A number of
theorists suggested during
the 1970s that the Soviet
leadership was
composed of a group of 'realists'
and that it would not
base decisions
on initiating or fighting
a nuclear war solely
through Marxism-Leninist
lenses.
However, it is unlikely that
the current Soviet nuclear
force
was procured strictly to
support a policy of deterrence.
Public

statements of policy by Soviet
leaders could !ead U.S. policy
makers to
believe that Soviet nuclear forces
exist only to deter an aggressive
western alliance, dominated by
the United States, and that
these weapons
have no other function. Yet, a
careful review of the size and

capabilities of Soviet nuclear forces provides
Soviet doctrine and strategies.

a

better understanding of

The Soviet SS-18 ICBM, while clearly

ttPl0yed t0

—
————

U" S

f

-

threaten

n

™

«

^
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deterrence"

stnateg.es,

is

Sov,et union. has
the

.s.

;r°
tdr,inStil,JtiMS

-

pure
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rhst othap

once,. . rP a . d
y

wUh

Sovjet

^

ofapoHcy Mother

^

an effort to pnepane
to fight
•*"«•

'win'
win

the,

,„d recover
,
and
from

,

nuclear war with the
United States.
The

-

cognation

of technological

p USh and Soviet

elective nuclear wan-fi,jht
ing capab,,ity have

acquipe

fcfl

led U.S.

a

,i„t„

Policy communities to
question the validity of
basic assumptions
employment policies
ThatThat 1C
Is, in view of the
pneceeding

and

in U.S.

factors',

can

the U.S. continue to
base its secunity on
the thneat of an assuned

destruction nesponse to

a

nuclean attack when that
attack may leave the

U.S. few choices between
losihg the wan and
massive destnuction?
lt
was this dilemma that
dnove HcNamana and Schles.ngen
to propose more
flexible and limited options
fon the SIOP.
The punpose was to
preclude
a

choice between sunnenden and
,„assive destnuct,on.

choose a,„ong

a

number of options to nespond
to

responses can be limited in
size and selective
to preclude widespread
destruction.

a

In

today, the U.S. can

Soviet attack.

These

the target set so as

As such, the U.S.

is

faced with accepting sunnenden
on massive destnuction.

no

longen

However,

a

nu,nben of stnategists
continue to fear that the U.S. may
be faced with a

problem of sel f-detennence.
on cannot retaliate against
a

U.S.

The U.S. might believe that
a

It

should not

Soviet nuclean attack because the
size of

netaliation, being dictated by the
nuclean forces it possesses,

would be so massive as to bring about

a

similar follow-on attack by the
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soviet union.
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while

success^

A«n1str,t1on have reviewed
ns

,d

str.tlons since the
K.„„e*

U.S. nucleer

pcicy

, nd

added more ftex

,

1)|

to thes.OP, the
se effort, d , d „ ot

Which prepared the U.S.
for fighting

a

protracted

„ uc ,ear war.
An important constraint
on the
"is u.5.
U S
»hm.
abilityu fto prepare
itself tor
Protracted war has heen the
U.S.
command-control-communication network
designed primari ly to
warn the U.S. of an
attack andaMowitto

retaliate.

Not until the Carter
Administration had the U.S.
C3 network
been reviewed for anything
approaching a war-fig nt ing
capability.
The basic objective of
Presidentia, Directive 59
was to enhance
deterrence and also to alter
the terms upon which
deterrence is

maintained.

According to the Directive,

it

to use nuclear weapons
In order to maintain

may he necessary to
prepare
a

credible deterrent.

United States nuclear policy
as informed by PD59
stresses the possible
use Of nuclear weapons
In a war between the
superpowers and suggests
that the best means to deter
aggression

is

to prepare to defeat an
enemy

rather than threaten punishment
that may not be credible in
the eyes of
the enemy,
in other words, the
U.S. could be self-deterred
during a
crisis or war and thereby
severely harm U.S. security if
the U.S. does
not maintain options to
assured destruction attacks.

The purpose and structure of
the countervailing policy is
as

follows:

its main objective is to deter
a nuclear war and thereby

further the security of the U.S.
and its allies.

The central question

addressed by the Carter Administration's
review of U.S. nuclear policy
that led to Presidential Directive
bg was whether the U.S. could

continue to deter

a

nuclear war in the face of Soviet challenges
that

,

~
—
^

WePeer0ding
t

W°J -ace,

~
—he
™P,

a
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advocates Cairn that
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-countervailing strategy

».S.,ost nuclear superiority

'

U.S. deterrence
po1icy

1n the e arl
y 1970s>

^ ^ W««
forces would fai

^

^

but had to begin
focusing

in a

nuclear war where
were roughly capab,e
of the same levels
of damage.
r

^

was important to
Carter Administration
theorists to advance U S "
POHC, in a cred,b,e manner
that could deter the
Soviets.
The method
deeded upon was to show the
Soviets that the U.S. was
capable of
Hating a nuclear war and possessed
opt,ons in the S.OP to ma.e
this
capability credihie. United
States assured destruction
policy up to
this pent had not required
an expansion in the
s,ze or sophistication
of U.S. nuclear forces
iurces so
sn innn
ac
long as
they remained invulnerable.
The
deployment of more capable
forces by eitber superpower
was believed only
capable of upsetting the
nuclear balance. The U.S.
choose to upgrade

"

-

its nuclear forces during
the ig7Us and began to
dep,oy new systems only
in the 1980s.
These decisions were influenced
by the technological

advancements in nuclear weaponry.
Soviet strategic efforts, and
domestic
political factors as well as
requirements of PD59.
In

essence, the Carter Admi

ni

strati on began to bring U.S.
nuclear

policy in line with the progress
of technology,

m

addition, the

Administration accepted arguments
that the Soviets never truly
accepted
deterrence theory based on assured
destruction. The assured destruction

c,

mtfdthdtthes

^

~----

: d; cap abl e nucl ear
'^„
-ear ba.ance on,, works
"-lea,

noneedtodeploy

weapons.
If both superpowers
base

f0 rce postures
on a simi,ar
understand1ng of

has pointed out that
the United Stares
St3teS had

the massive retaliation
policy of the

Clawed that once

there
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1%0s

al,

nore

^

on

and

n

^

"^

and

^^

,

been organized under

the U.S. had
organized 1tse,f for a
q u1c k massive

maybe some

truth to this proposition,
U.S. political, ecpnomic
ahd strategic constraints
are H ke ,
y to influence policy makers to
consider other ,ess
apocalyptic avenues.
It is not altogether

P01U1C.1,, appealing to maintain
that
he massive as such an
attack is

strike on the United States.

a

U.S. nuclear retaliation
will

Hkel, to invite

an equally massive

Odom a!so understood that
the military

finds it difficult to change
its view of the strategic
world.

particular strategic perspective
has become embedded
psyche, it may require
implement

a

a

in

Once

a

the military's

number of years to change
those views and

new pol icy.

Presidential Directive 59 formally
codified

a

set of targeting

studies that are at the heart
of the countervailing
policy.

While PD59
was not a new doctrine and
did not alter NSUM 242,
it did contain tnree

new features.

First, U.S. policy would no
longer emphasize targeting
to

prevent Soviet economic recovery
but would focus on war supporting

infrastructure.

Secondly, the preplanned S10P
options were to be

supplemented by the ability to select
new targets and destroy them
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systens to support

a poli c
y of

^

extended nuclear war
fi ght1ng .34
centra, ob Je «ive
of the targeting
stu.es was "to dintlfy
sma] er
sets and reUted
targets that might
be se)ectjve
y
the early stages of a
35
nuclear war".
The
me initial r»
reviews concluded
that Soviet strategic
defense measures
uies such as
a, the
th» hhardening
h
of missile
silos and command
hungers as well as civi,
de fense efforts were

—t

,

,

,

considered more effective

than previously thought.

The Carter
Administration concluded
that the U.S. might
not he able to Oestroy
60
Percent of Soviet 'recovery
asset,'

enshrine. In l91

<*

An addjtional

as

^^^^

preserved

conc]us , on

by

U.S.

nuclear

P o,icy

was that the biggest
U.S. weakness rested
in its

co^and-control-communication and
intelligence (C3I) networks.
deficiencies were seen by the

These

Carter Administration's
analysts as

critical

because of the P erceived
neeo to be able to control
the war and
negotiate while conoucting
a nuclear war in
hopes that the war could
be
ended prior to it reaching
37
spasm attacks on cities.

While U.S. C3 systems were
adequate by most assessments
for
launching a retaliation to a
Soviet nuclear attack, only
f n
the case
where

™ke

P rotracted

sense.

warfare is envisioned does
enduring C3I capabilities

Nitze, Gray, and others also
claim that war-tenmination

requires enduring C3I capaoi 1
ities.

However, C3I of the kind envisioned

by the Carter Administration
review are more closely associated
with

escalation dominance.

The U.S. may require enduring
and redundant C3

capabilities to prosecute
fashion.

a

nuclear war in

Escalation dominance

is

a

so-called 'controlled'

commonly thought of as the ability
to
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controi the course of

a

nuclear war in

a

certain m
manner by raising the

possible level of conflict,

"tensity where hundreds

„

not thousands of
weapons are used in each

strike, escalation has
already

then often tended

controlling

a

pressed

'spas.' warfare.

nuclear war

is

out of contro, and
the wan is

For countervailing
theorists

synods

with escaiation dominance.

The operational strategy
that has emerged from
PD59 has
distinctly traditiona. miiitary
cast to it.
united States

a

countervailing policy p,aces heavy
emphasis on se,ected,
Hexible, and
United nuclear options in the
MOP, counterforce weapons,
and on the
C3I capabilities that would
be needed to fight

a

nuclear war over an

extended period.
The Carter Administration
immediately set out to provide
U.S.
forces with the means for
incorporating PD59 recommendations
into actual

war plans.

War plans were developed and
implemented in the SI0P by way
of the nuclear weapons
employment policy (NUWEP) first
established in
the early 1970s in conjunction
with LNOs
The new NUWEP increased the
.

number of targets the U.S. could
38
attack from 15,000 to roughly
40,000.
Carter also called for full
development of a mobile race track

employable MX ICBM in order to provide
the U.S.

a

target kill capable weapon than
the Minuteman III.

called for

a

less vulnerable hard

Finally, Carter

substantial upgrade to U.S. C3 capabilities.

United States C3 assets were believed
to be incapable of effective

performance beyond the initial phases of

a

nuclear war.

A recent report

written for Congress on the vulnerability
of U.S. C3 assets

in a

crisis
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warns that the U.S.
system could very easilv
easily h«
„
„
be knocked
out in the first
rounds of a "nuclear
u»
a
T
u
UC,earWr
"thor of the report
argued elsewhere
that
.„
th
the "depth of commitment
to C3 remains
remain, in
in „
doubt and the
weaknesses of
6 SyStM C ° U,d
-action ouring a crisis"^
*
That is
r,

^

^<*>

-tra-war strikes

in

addition to

deeded

communication systems could
influence the national
command authorities 10
to retaliafe
re taiiate more ,
heavily in
"opes of |,„,iti„
g further damage tQ

^
"

^

„

n-lear attrition and promised
Soviet headers that the,
would
'« Jeopard, by U.S. missiles if

a

he placed

nuclear war continued
beyond initia,

attacks.

The focus of U.S.
employment strategy would
be to attack the
sources of Soviet strategic
strength, thel r strategic
nuclear
weapons, and, in particular,
counterforce weapons and their
force
control infrastructure
rather than urban-industrial
4
targets. " In
»
effect,
PD5 g proposed a military
campaign in the traditional
sense,
targeting sources of an
enemy's ability to fight,
not an attempt to
cripple him the first day
which would likely result
in an all-out
41
war".

Hit.*

Unlike the assured destruction
school, PD59 authors believed
that a
nuclear war might be limited
and prolonged. While making
these ideas
known, they were careful to
note that it is not the same
as saying that
a

nuclear war will be limited.

A number of critics of the

countervailing policy have suggested
that its supporters have come
to
believe that a nuclear war can
be
kept limited and fought to

rational, military/political end in
which

a

a

victor will emerge.

logical,

—
—
9h

°"

°—
~
«

th,sk,nd

;

«

Kan,

-

y

rule def1njtion
raight be

tH. Carter
Adm1nistration

that the Administration
neither believed

would necessarily start * c
^tart as

-u
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a
a

regain

n
hmted

a

smed

nuclear war

war nor did they
be!, eve that it

^

Critics, such as Beres>
charge

on the assumption
that the Soviets
are more 11ta

deterred by the threat
of limited
6d
•

•

threat of overwheiming
,

total

•

,„
.
«
c
ounterforce

retaliation-

„

pD5g

t0 be

reprisals than the

^

.«

He further argues
and the countervailing
po, icy are clouded
by the pervasive
doubts
Of U.S. theorists and
government strategists
concerning the control
of
PD

W

nuclear conflict.

Secretary

B ro„n

stated ,n h,s fiscal

Vear
Peport to the Conqress
uress that "in
^„
in adopting
and implementing"
the

A „„ ua

..

countervail

policy, the U.S. had
"no more Illusions than
our
predecessors that a nuclear
war could be closely
and surgically
control led". 43

Beres's comments In
Parameters 1981 brought about
from pro-PD5g theorists.
to Beres, charged that

a

quick reaction

Gray, writing in the
same journal

in

reaction

number of ereb
Beres'ss critir
icmc were
criticisms
inaccurate.

oray stated that proponents
of PDb9 only believe
that
».i

a

a

nuclear war

3 ht be limited and that PD59 offers
some possibility for
limitation

whereas assured destruction
policy does not. 44

He a,so asserted that
P059 proponents do not
assume that the Soviets will
be restrained in its
targeting but that the U.S. should
try to provide incentives
for the
Soviets to restrain their targeting
and should these efforts fail,
the

U.S. should enforce restraints. 45

the Soviets will

While the U.S. cannot know whether

restrain their targeting, the
concept of enforcing

a

,
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restraint is much more
uncertain an. might lead
t„
optimism in the U.S.
's war-fighting
capabilities.

,

fa]se

^

Qf

The Beres/Uray deoate
fails to address an
additiona, element
introduced into U.S. strategic
theory by PD69
The ev0)ut1on
.

^

^

^^

Secretary Brown discussed
,„ his unveillng Qf
?059 jp
>n the sense that the
U.S. had heen gradually
adding flexible and
selects options to its poiicies
and strategies.
whereas the Kennedy
and N,xon Administrations
hoth discussed these
kinds of war pians and
pronounced new poiicies
in support of a
flexible SiUP. namely McN
»,ra's
no-cn,es' approach and the
Nixon Administration's
'limited nuclear
options', no adm,nistration
until President Carter's,
radically altered
the U.S. view that a
nuclear war would be short
and massive. The
radical departure pronounced
by PD5g was that a
nuclear war may be

lifted to military or military
related targets

and protracted and that

the U.S. would requ,re the
forces to fight that kind of
war.
The policy
debate should focus not so
much on whether the U.S. desires
a

countervailing policy, as the
development of technology has
seem,ngly
pushed the U.S. in that direction,
but whether and how it should
implement that policy.

The question the U.S. needs
to address is: What

combination of nuclear forces and
C3 assets are required that
can
survive and function for perhaps
as long as six months? 46

United States

nuclear forces in the eyes of
countervailing theorists lacked enduring
and survivable C3I as well as
plans and support infrastructure for

post-war reconstitution. 47

These kinds of assets are only necessary

once the U.S. accepts the view that

prolonged.

a

nuclear war may be limited and

Br ° Wn publ1

-

W r

the goa
y

weapons

Cone S e

0„

„ gust

—

20 , 1980 .

«- co unte „am„ 9 P0l1cy at
„ h1s .peech. B.own state,

ofr PDSm
KUby u,.c
Wds t-~
to convince the
Soviets
0V1ets

the

thit

•

-on

any scale of
attack an, at

lead to victor,,

a

»+h
a+ no
thdt
use of nuclear

ny stage of

however they may Uefine
victory"

D,r9Ct,Ve59 bPM
«"

-one,

<"
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"e

destruction and

HP
a

«

p^,^

between a COUn terva
lue po ,i cy such as

true wer-f,g„t1 ng
pol1cy ,

PoMcy advocates recognized

thet the assured
destruction policy could
only wor, if ooth
superpowers accepted Us
tenets.
superpower perceives that
strategic advantages snort
of decis,ve nuclear
superiority ,s useful (a hi n,y
g
de-stab, Hzing condit,on
g,ven the
Strategic competition between
the U.S. and Soviet
Union,, then the other
superpower ,» ob„g at ed to
prevent the otner from
attending to exploit
such an advantage, real
or illusiory.

Secondly, assured destruction
is not sufficient

massive retaliation against
countervail targets
nor wil!

,nay

in

Itself, as a

not be appropriate

its prospects always be
sufficiently credible to deter the
full

range of action the U.S.
seeks to prevent on the
part of the Soviets. 4 *
Countervailing policy cont.nues
to maintain the 'ultimate'
threat of a
massive countervalue attack as
a final option while
refining U.S.

strategies for limited and selected
attacks des.gned to deny military
victory. A true war-fighting
policy, on the other hand,
advocates
strategies that seek not only to
deny victory to an enemy but
would seek
the preparations to fight and
'win' a nuclear war.
A war-fighting
policy accepts nuclear weapons
as weapons for the purpose of
achieving
selected political as well as military
goals.
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The implications
of countervailing
mg policv
policy fnn
for

are fairly logical.

a

*
strategic
defense

Certain types
ypes of missilp
f
missile hdefenses
are acceptable to
countervailing policy
advocates in that
cnat they
<
thev ran
can kbe deployed
to bolster
the deterrence
credibility of U.S.
nuclear forces an.
related assets
A
counterforce defense of
U.S. nuclear forces
generally „ yarded
consistent with countervailing
policy
These
fo
lhese H„
ydefenses
could be assigned
to augment the
survivability of U.S.
nuclear forces and thereby
enhance
their deterrence va, U e.
A major concern of
the Carter Administrate
While conducting its
policy rev,ew was the
grow.ng war-fighting
capability of the Soviet nuciear
arsenal. Soviet doctrine
has ,ong
emphasized an offensive strategy
to include counterforce
attacks on U S
assests. A potentially
effective and politically
accepts
role for a U.S. defense,
then. cou,d he to thwart
a Soviet attack by
denying the Soviets their
wartime objectives. Hence,
in addition to
coutervailing poiicy, the U.S.
.ay seek to integrate a BMU
to perform a
similar deterrent ro.e as
offensive forces.
In fact, an effective
BMD,
namely preferential defenses
of key military assets
which the Soviets
night seek to destroy as part
of their wartime objectives,
may prove as
useful as present plans to deny
the Soviets victory through
an offensive
strategy conducted with counterforce
weapons and upgraded C31 systems.
Ballistic missile defenses capable
of more advanced defense
,

« If*

missions would be regarded as unnecessary
and potentially provocative to
the Soviets if they threatened
to degrade significantly the
Soviet's
retaliatory capabilities.

For example, an area wide countervail

defense of the boost phase type might
be regarded by the Soviets as an
effort to deploy

a

victory seeking capability rather than

a

victory
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den

'

a

P ° StUre
'

-ear

^ «"t1«l«.

balance.

^

an an»s race
or destabi liz e the

Countervail

theorists make .
between preservation
of retaHatory forC
es by dep,oy,„
g counterforce
"IssHe defenses and defense
portions wh,ch threaten to
decade an
enemy's retaliatory
capability.
in

conclusion, countervailing
policy seeks the
deployment of
Offensive and poss,b,y
tensive weapons that pr^ote
the deterrence
-edibility of U.S. nuclear
forces but that do not
threaten the

-ability

of the strategic
balance.

policy, should provide

a

Such force, in accordance
with the

survivabie counterforce
threat to Soviet

-r-fUhtln, capability.

The purpose of theS e
deployments would be to

pursuade an enemy that the
initiation of
at any

level

and that

in

the event of

back away from more damaging
attacks.

a

a

nuclear war would be futile

nuclear war, the enemy shou,d
A U.S.

ballistic missile defense
could act to enhance U.S.
force survivability such
that the U.S. could
continue to threaten the
Soviets with an effective
counterforce attack

either in

a

countervai

1

C.

trans-attack or post-attack
environment according to
ing pol icy.

War-Fiyhti ng Pol icy
A final

:

component of the current U.S. nuclear
policy mix

so-called nuclear war-fighting policy.
greater prominence as

a

This policy school

is

the

has achieved

result of criticisms leveled
against

Presidential Directive 59 and countervailing
policy.

A basis of that

criticism has been that PD59 did not
go far enough in criticizing
assured destruction policy and did
not adequately address the threats
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a

d es1 9 nea to execute
a nuclear wa

conve« 10 „ a n y fought war

,

ch the same fashjon

snot approached

^

l1ghtly> jn

,

sensenjs

logical step for U.S.
nuclear policy.

War . flghting
suggest that the U.S. not
on,, take seriously
the poss1 b 1,1 ty
of nuclear war, but
that the u>s . should
prepare to

nicies

-us

event.

^^

That ,s, nuclear
war-fighting pol icy suggest$

U.S. augment a 'victor,
denial'

^^

poTicy (as emphasized
in PD5g> with .

Policy for 'prevailing'
with anemphasjson
the restorat on
deterrence at the lowest
level of violence
possible. 50
.

War-fighting theorists argue
that there

is

^

,ess need to he

concerned about tne oercent-innc
n f an
,
perceptions of
enemy who might feel
pressure to
attack as the enemy becomes
inferior a nd are more concerned
with a
nation that might think it
is superior and attack
for these reasons. 51
in

sense, war-fighting theorists
emphasize deterrence perceptions
a bout the military
" luence nf
influence
n ,i„ weapons and
or mrti
particular
strategies rather
than perceptions about the
stability of the nuclear
balance. A
a

war-fighting policy could be
implemented by requiring that
all weapons
be justified on a militarily
useful
basis.

weapons must serve

a

h

other words, all nuclear

rational military function.

has reported that population
targeting,

target,

In

aS always been an

a

However, Desmond Ball

militarily non-traditional

inherent part of our targeting
52
strategy.

This kind of attack executed
against Soviet urban-industrial

recovery

assets would result in millions of
deaths from prompt collateral damage
and radioactive fallout.
'rational'

or necessary in

However, population targeting
a

is

nuclear war-fighting policy.

no longer

United States
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-leerdeHvery

systems have become more
accurate ,11 owing for
a
reduction in the
70
n
f
+t,
me si
size or their nuclear
ear yields
viplHc while
preserving their
destructive potentia,
against a specific target.
As a result
«1scrlm i„ate targeting
of Soviet mi itary
forces and installnions
I

we-

as

as selected economic
assets
D l scr1 IMnat1on

is

Action

cons,dered Increasingly
posslb)e

of the accuracy of
the weapon,

yield, and the hardness
of the target.
tarnot

i

.

ts

u
.
Most
targets are not hardened

against nuclear h,ast
overpressure and, therefore,
a
yield weapon
deployed on an accurate
system can ade uate,y
q
damage or destroy these
of targets.
The level of collateral
damage to surrounding
populations generally decreases
as the yield of a
weapon is reduced
That is, the radius of
damage around the impact
point (ground zero)
decreases as the yield of
a nuclear weapon
decreases.
Hence, the advent
of accurate weapons may
allow the U.S. to use nuclear
weapons in a
fashion that discriminates
between a specific military
target and
population areas. While this
discrimination targeting function
can he
worked out mathematically,
it is impossible to
assess at what level of

kl-

collateral damage and dead

-

lOO.OUO;

Soviets would no longer consider

discrimination

is

a

1

million;

U.S. attack

2

million

limited.

-

the

The goal of

only valid when limited and
selective nuclear strikes

are envisioned as large
attacks are likely to generate
considerable
levels of collateral damage.

Even in a limited attack scenario,
the

scale of destruction is so much
creater than all other types
of warfare
currently known that war-fighting
theorists must question the value of

nuclear weapons for warfare as traditionally
envisioned.

That is, the

scale of destruction and the uncertainties
inherent in nuclear warfare
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ten, to

rebate nud ear weapon
U

-

S
-

"-taint,
retain*

d ° eS

n0t " eed t0 he

t0 the role of

«"«rned

with

,„ai„ta,ni„ 9 the
of p«„, shmeirt prescrlbed
by the assured
destruction po|]
hy the
countervailing P o„ C
y according to „ar-fight,ng

^

^

pol1cy

tneorlsta.

Rather the U.S. needs
to be concerned with
'rationalizing'
the U.S. deterrent if w
ar-fight,ng poMcy „ envis
,

or

oned

„

the nuclear war-fighting
policy's view of deterrence
is Leon

"eiseit.er's characterization
that »,t is not
uncontroHed violence hut
controlled nuclear violence
that the
Soviet Union will

M

real,, ftip .

War-fighting policies seek
to make nuclear weapons
useful tools to

has given war-fig hti
„g p0 jcjes thejr
,

^ ^.^

of Uefense Weinberger,
the Administration's

fod

point for war-fighting
advocacy, has advanced the
notion that the U.S. can
'prevail' in a
nuclear war fought over a
protracted period of time."
Weinberger
suggested that the U.S. emphasize
the decapitation or destruction
of
Soviet military and political
authority in a

counterforce/countermeasures mode. 56

A countermeasures attack
could

encompass the destruction of Soviet
key coinnand and control
installations as well as selected
leadership bunkers.

The focus of

a

'prevailing' war-fighting policy would
he to sever the Soviet Union's

ability to prosecute

a

nuclear war while also avoiding
attacks on

thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons
thereby potentially reducing the
level

of collateral

damage.

Howevnr. the destruction of the Soviet

Union's leadership or critical

lines of communication may only make

negotiated end to the war more difficult to
achieve.

While

a

countervail^ policy

^

has focused Q „

«- -en

^^
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strategic forces directly,
war . f ghtlng theQpy
the destruction of
k ey ,i nks ,„ the
Soviet war-fi gh ting
capablljtyto
nclude the leadership is
essential. While intra-„ar
deterrenc:e
ultimately is the elective
,

of ooth

countervail and war-f, htiing
g
...
policy, neither has address t-h„
addressed the ,mpl,catlons
of destroying the
Soviet
national command authority
for deterrence
ueierrence. For „
j
example, once lines of
communication have been
severed SmH=t
severed,
Soviet i,
launchk posts and submarines
may
still nave the capacity
to individually re.ease
their weapons
Negotiations in this environment
are l, ke ,y to prove
ineffective.
Although both Carter's PD59
and Weinberger emphasize
counterforce
capabilities, the war-fighting
schoo, suggests that the
U.S. respond to
a Soviet attack by
seeking an end to the
conflict on favorable terms.
In effect, Weinberger
and war-fighting theorists
posit that the U.S be
concerned with 'winning' a
nuclear war. James Fallows,
in solarizing
i

the war-fighting policy,
states that "it argues that
nuclear warfare

should be regarded not as
materia) annihilation but rather
as an
exchange from which one side
might emerge with significantly
less damage
57
than the other."
A critical

assumption in the war-fighting
theory

is

that

a

nuclear

war can remain limited and can
be ended before escalation
to

countervalue attacks has begun.

In

effect, war-fighting policy expands

the role of nuclear weapons to
the deterrence of war at all

fashion similar to the countervailing
policy.

between the two policies
on

'winning'

is

levels in

a

The major difference

that the war-fighting theory places
emphasis

the war whereas the countervailing
policy seeks an end to
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^
«

war which prevents a
Sov1et vlctopy<
war-fighting theorjsts

c

,

aim )t mjght

^

u

fQught

rationally an, efforts
must be ma de to keep
destruction at the lowest
Possible level,
indentation of a W a r - fightlng
pol1cy WQu)d
require the deployment
of weapons that
provide a ,«„ ran ge
of
war-fighting options, In
part1cular , hard target
kill capable forces
as the MX ICBM and
Trident U

-h

SUM.

war-fighting posture,

in

A part of such a
rational

accordance with the policy,
would be

war-surviva, capab.lity.

a

That is, "the concept
of war-winning requires

not only effective
offensive counterforce
capabilities, but effective

defenses in order to maintain
military dom nance after
war . teminatjon
and effect post-war recovery." 58
,

A true nuclear war-fighting
policy is

likely to require the
full

integration of ballistic missile
defenses as an effective me ans
of
limiting damage to U.S. nuclear
forces and war prosecuting
and recovery

capabilities to include some
population centers.

The relationship of

offense and defense is such
that defences might be needed
to reduce the
threat of unacceptable damage.
"Vulnerability to unacceptable damage
is
not desirable for political

policy.

59

strategy.

and military stability"

in

a

war-fighting

The war-fighting policy calls
for a true damage limitation

Both offensive and defensive forces
would be expected to

contribute to the success of such

a

strategy.

However, the feasibility

of a truly effective damage limiting
area defense is likely to be too
low to convince war-fighting
theorists that they can depend on defenses

to limit damage to the United States.

As

a

result, the size of

a

war-fighting strike against the Soviet strategic
assets may be increased
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or*r

to

„. 1t

damage by jnitially
denroyjng

^

SQviet

and assets as poss,ble.

^

millions of soviet deaths
and casualties thereby
contradicting the
desire to keep the war
„., t .d. As alluded t „

^^^^

argued at length that
United nuCear war is not
possible and that .ore
passive nuclear attacks are
li kel y to follow
any lifted U.S. strike
Given their proclivity for
this view of nuclear war
and the collateral
damage that would result
fro. a U.S. limited
attack on Soviet forces
the Sov,ets are likely to
respond with a massive
strike on the United
States. The U.S. could suffer
millions of deaths and casualties
in
return even if it was defended
by

a

missile defense capable of

intercepting 50 percent of the
attack, ng reentry vehicles.

Ballistic missile defense from
counterforce to countervalue are
compatible with a war-fighting
policy. Both a silo defense and

mid-course defense designed
specifically to enhance the survi vaoi

1 i

ty of

U.S. counterforce systems and
national command authorities would
be

obvious choices.

A multi-tiered countervalue
defense also could serve

to complement a war-fighting
policy as

a

means of limiting the level of

damage to U.S. cities and industrial
centers thereby enhancing the
chances of

Hi

a

quicker post-war recovery.

IMP LICATIONS OF A U.S. STRATEGIC
DEFENSE

The strategic policies, outlined above,
have
and set of principles.

a

common background

This background is characterized as offensively

based deterrence which has played the dominant
role in U.S. strategic
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"udear th0U9ht sfnee 1945

.

A1though th .

^

defense ,„ the 196 0s,
offensive nudear weapons
have a,ways been relied
maintain U.S. strategic
security.
Of Defense W e,nberger
has prov.ded an
appropriate perspective of
why the
«eagan Adn1n1 strati on
strategic defense Initiative
was started and
where it might lead:

"When the Reagan Administration
entered office in 1981, a
,engthy
debate could have been he,d
on the question: which
was in worse
shape: our military hardware
or our strategic concepts?
indeed, most of the concepts
that shape our thinking
ahout what
forces we need and how they
would be used were formulated
in the

195US and early lg6Us.

This adm,nistration's
boldest departure

fro* the dogma of the past
is the president's
strategic defense
initiative, a radical rejection
of acquiescence in mutual
assured
60
destruction."
The rejection of the past
described by Weinberger is pointedly

concerned with offensively based
deterrence.

Whereas each successive

president from Eisenhower to Carter
had been sure that offensive

deterrence could always prevent
apparently

is

not.

a

The U.S. held

nuclear war, President Reagan
a

wide margin of nuclear superiority

during the ly5Us and 1960s which
eroded during the Nixon to Carter

years.

The U.S. dealt with this erosion
through

a

multifaceted effort

to restrain Soviet strategic efforts
while expanding the capacity and

mission objectives of U.S. nuclear forces.
to enhance deterrence while accepting
it had been used

to.

a

That is, the U.S. attempted

less advantageous position than

The U.S. conducted these efforts by revising
its
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«

nuclear policy,
upgrading its nuclear force
,orCl
inCred5iniJ,y

capability to perform
these missions.

•

-re

ami promoting
«nd
arms control.

sophisticated an,

e

«p,„

Vet. U.S. forces
rare,, have been

capable of meeting the
most demanding
objectives required by
„ S
nuclear policy. For
example, the U.S.
developed poiicies in
the 1970,

•nd discriminate attack,
while failing to procure
weapons of this
capability.
These efforts
from National Security
Decision Memorandum
242 in 1,74 through Presidential
Directive 5g in igao
have attempted
to squeeze the greatest
deterrence value out of an
ear,y L970s era

-

-

strategic arsenal.

The U.S. a,so sought
to hold the Soviet
buildup

within specified limits by
promoting arms control accords.
Overall,
these efforts have come under
increasing criticism for being
unableto

cure the ills of

a

'weakening' strategic balance.

A point often forgotten
by advocates of offensively
based

deterrence

is

that the U.S. did enjoy a
period of nuclear superiority.

Having failed to adjust from
that position to one of rough
equality or
Soviet advantage in a militarily
rational fashion, according to
the
Reagan Administration, the U.S.
now faces

a

decision between building

vast new offensive weapons to
catch up with the Soviets or seeking

means to assure the deterrence of
Soviet aggression.
the essential

new

a

This represents

platform upon which the Reagan
Administration criticized

U.S. nuclear policy and forces in
1980.

The Reagan Administration has
argued that the U.S. should seek

defense dominated deterrence posture and
policy.

a

The central question
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in this context,

however,

strategic nuclear policy?

swift ano certain

is
A

what are the

i

mp

,i

cations

principai e,em ent of
U.S. nuclear

relation.

The com posit,on of
the retaliation in

the S,UP has varied fro
m Passive' countervail
attacks on Sov,et cities
to selective counterforce
strikes on Soviet strategic
weapons.
Retaliation has been considered
essentia, to a credit
policy of
deterrence.
In

a

defense dominated balance,

longer play as critical
will

have

a

a

role
•uie.

In
in

diminished value whereas

a

policy for retaliation may
no

effect
effect, th*
the needa *for retaliation
a

policy for retaliation is

considered essential to deter
an attack in an undefended
balance.
The
Soviets are believed to be
deterred under current strategic
conditions
because the United States
possesses a capability to
retaliate and has
stated its intention to do so in
the event of a Soviet attack.
In a

defensive balance, the logic of
deterrence is as follows: the Soviets
might be deterred because of the
potential failure of an attack
rather
than affecting

a

certain reprisal which could cause

a

war to escalate

and result in severe levels of
damage to both superpowers.

The revisions to U.S. strategic
nuclear policy as

a

result of

a

defense deployment are unlikely to
preclude the maintenance of some form
of an offensive threat.

Yet,

in a world with both offensive
and

defensive forces, U.S. selective limited attack
options become
increasingly less viable.

For example,

a

Soviet preferential defense,

wnich conforms with Soviet strategic doctrine,
might degrade

a

limited

U.S. strike on Soviet C3 installations as
to render such an attack

efenSe <defense

-reasethe

s

—
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'.~

size and sophistication
of

tlyMlthit5 offensi¥e
attack

Us

o

,

counte rae asures attack.
Both avenues are likely
likelv tr,
a -n *
to ffan
to meet the overall
mission objectives
a
crmca,' level of countermeasure
damage, while also
increasing the'
Potential collateral damage
to surrounding areas.
to ^press the Sov,ets
that the U.S. had
not conducted a
„mited strike
as mended, hence
failing to transmit
a message for
restraint
The scenario above
is frought with
speculation but points up
some
Of the policy problems
that could emerge in a
defense dom.nated nuclear
«or,d.
It may be that the
Reagan Administration
already has recognized
these inherent policy
problems. One indication
is Reagan's insistence
that the transition to
a defensive balance
be acc^panied by a
reduction
offensive nuclear forces.
Although some Administration
officials
have tried to portray Reagan's
proposal as <Sum,„,t talk',
Reagan has
emphasized the idea of a reduction
in the sizes of offensive
forces as
well as a scheme on 'technology
61
sharing'.
Both ideas are often
ignored as mere political posturing
efforts to gain support in

m

-

Congress and with the public for
the SDI.
may provide
phase.

a

However, ideas such as these

possible avenue for implementing

a

stable transition

The success of these avenues
may be tied to

a

U.S. and Soviet

arms agreement which could prove
more difficult to accomplish as
the
U.S.

reaches

a

defense deployment stage.

on U.S. nuclear policy,

it

Given the possible pressures

becomes interesting to speculate on
what

U.S. offensive nuclear policy might
look like in

world.

a

defense dominated

a

^—
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level

ness.

While 1t is too ear,y
t0 know
s

model effectiveness.

Tab le 4.

1„ ustrates

the i mpact of
,eve 1S of effectiveness
on the penetration
nates for an
enemy's reentry vehicles.

^^,„ g

F0P PUPP0SeS

n-er

-

°

f

diSCUSSi

».

» «*

assumed that

U.S. defense

a

of reentry vehicles
that would penetnate
a U.S. miS si,e
defense

would be relative,,

»„

g1ven the number Qf Rv$
jn

^

attack.

Under these conditions,
the emphasis might shift
fro.
calculations of the ,evel of
prompt damage the superpowers
could unleash
aua,nst each other to
estimates of the number of
dead prevented.
In
this context, the U.S. may
have a decreased need to
retain a sizable
counterforce arsenal as well
as associated countermeasures
to assure
that its forces can penetrate.
As such, these defenses
could be relied
upon to deter a Soviet attack
on the U.S or its allies.

However, the

U.S may choose to retain
counterforce weapons should it
opt for

war-fighting posture while also
deploying

a

a

true

defense.

The issue of defense
effectiveness is confused as there
are several

possible ways to measure the
effectiveness of

effectless

Table 4.

can include

Rv-

a

defense.

Measures of

penetration levels (leakage), numbers
of

Warhead Penetration Levels.
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Number of

Warheads in

i

pupl

nf

.

-

Attack

1,000
5,000

10 00

6000

656

3280

410

2048

240
1200

130

,48

J^9i_im__«6i _i096_^^

7^6

6

312

~
a

\

~
Q

128

40

8

\

o

256

81

16

1

0

*The numbers of warheads
able to penetrate the
defense is
calculated accordin to the
g
effectiveness of a four-tiered
ballistic
defense. For example,
each of four defense
layers might destroy
percent
of the RVs in an attack
10
thereby reducing an attack
of 1,000
KVs to 656.

targets ki„ed, and the number
of fatalities resulting from
an attack.
While it is well understood
that any nuclear war is likely
to cause

millions of deaths and casualties,
the impact of

missile defense on
the numbers of deaths and
casualt.es has not been fully
addressed.
The
National Academy of Science has
estimated that one percent of either
a

superpowers' nuclear arsenal targeted
against each other's cities would
cause between 35 and 55 million dead
and an additional tens of millions

would die from later events resulting
from the attack. 62

percentages and numbers are accurate
highly subject to debate

-

-

If these

calculations of this nature are

roughly luo Soviet reentry vehicles
exploded

over O.S. cities would be enough to
cause this level of devastation

.
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(given that 100 RVs pnusie
q

PerC6nt 0f

^

rough ly 10,000 reentry
vehTcles in each superpowers'
nuclear aresenal) .«

Senator Wi,,i am Pro X
m,re Pas pointed out
that current,.
inconceivable
miss, ,e defense
could prevent anything
Percent o, an enemy's
warheads from penetrating
that defense."

Hi s

defenses ™ay Intercept

attacking warheads,
benefit the

a

see

^^^ ^^
a

massive nuclear attac k

§

U.S.

,CBMs.

hut on a

The .ore

Hence

lilted sca,e

li raited

as we,,

,

^

particular,, aga,nst

numbers „ f reentpy vehjcles

such an attack may in
turn be more manageable
for a U.S. missile
defense.
Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger estimated that
a Sov,et

^

counterforce attack on U.S.
strategic nuclear delivery
systems wou,d
cause 8UU.0OU fatalities
and an additional 1.6
million casualties from
radiation sickness. 65 These
numbers were crit,cized
as being far too
optimistic and

a

new study by the Department
of Defense estimated 3.4

million prompt deaths in the
least devastating attack on
U.S. 1CBM
66
silos.
A current study has been
completed and is displayed in
Table
5.

While the modeling

is

problematical, the numbers of
casualties are

staggering in any scenario.

The attacks modeled in Table
5. are based

on 100 megatons reaching their
designated targets.

A U.S. missile

defense capable of destroying roughly
96 percent of Soviet reentry
vehicles in

a

limited attack on U.S. strategic
delivery systems (often

estimated around 3000 warheads) still
would not prevent millions of
deaths

'

percentage of an enen/s

very little In the
event of

-ssive scale,

ike 99

,ess than perfect
countervalue defense
appears to

However, „.,. strategic
a

L,
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Attacks.

Model

Casualties

Attack:

Worst-case

25-66

City-centers
Mi

1-industrial

36-71

14-22

32-51

11-29

23-35

3-11

10-16

Strategic-nuclear

Source: William Daugherty,
Barbara Levi, and Frank Von Hippel,
"The Consequences of 'Limited'

States

'"

Nuclear Attacks on the United

IntejviallpjTaJ^

10

(Spring 1986): 5.

That is, four percent of 3,000 Soviet
reentry vehicles (120 warheads)

could cause between 10 and 16 million
total casualties to the U.S.

populate

base according to this modeling. 67

It

would be unthinkable

for the U.S. to abandon its offensive
deterrence policy in favor of

defenses in the face of these estimates.
The U.S may be capable of

under certain circumstances

-

a

meaningful damage limitation strategy

presupposing that the Soviet Union has not

deployed effective countermeasures to

counterforce arsenal

in

damage limitation force.

a

U.S. BMO and

its own effort to develop

a

a

more capable

war-fighting and

However, the U.S. can only implement

meaningful damage limiting strategy today by incorporating

a

a

first

stme

Into its nuclear strategy.

h

^

the event

^^^^

missile defenses, the abilUy
of U.S. offensive
fences to
-age to the U.S. would be correspondingly
reduced
.

IS that a con,p,e*
calculas exists

what

t

fon offensive and
defensive fence

Anothen cnitica, facton
impinging on

natune of

a

a

^

1, m1t

„, $

interactions.

not to maintain
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,

„.,. dec1sjon of

strictly offensive detennent
policy

defense tnansition peniod.

is the

^

^

possible

The

U.S. win be faced with
a
number of issues by the eanly
lya os when the SOI has
achieved a level of
development, with regard to some
defense techno,o 9 ies, from
which a

deployment decision could be
made.

Depending on the level of

development, the U.S. is likely
to go ahead with some kind
of ballistic
miss,le defense. Once the decisions
on the systen structure and

deployment arena are made, the U.S.
will need to consider an important
issue
stability.
That is, can the U.S. assure
that Soviet confidence

-

in

victory will continue to be denied
by posing adequate risks

form of defense denial

in the

or the threat of offensive
retaliation during

a

transition phase?
The issue of stability actually
encompasses three separate problems

which the U.S will be concerned with
during

a

transition period:

strategic stability, crisis stability, and
arms race stability.
stability of the nuclear balance is not

a

The

new issue as strategic

theorists have been concerned with stability since
the late 1940s.
Strategic stability has been defined as the
condition where the

superpowers calculate that the risks outweigh the
potential gains from
initiating

a

nuclear war.

Strategic stabiltiy exists, in practice, when

162

tHe superpowers
,

StrikeCaPabn,>

a

^o ri nS Curingstrateg1cstsb1lu
-

^

-

-

^^

the knQwi6dge

n

e

^
^^ ^

ty

that both are confldent
that their

stMke

a-

capable of threatening
^acceptable damage
Howard, an eminent
historian of the nuclear
age, nas added that
stability is a result of a
suht,e psychological
re,ationsh,p between
forces rather than gross
numbers.

^

In

-tain

any iyaBt>

^

^

u>s „,„ need
an invulnerable
retaliatory force in order
to ma i„tain the threat

of assured destruction
and preclude

a

shift in Sov,et calculations
that

looks favorably about the
possible risks and gains
of

a

nuclear war

Opponents of defense charge
that defense depi
events will
the strategic balance,
whereas proponents claim that
it may help
preserve strategic stability by
increasing the survi vabi i

ty of U.S.

1

retaliatory forces.

In

addition, defense proponents
seek to shift the

onus of stability to the
defense such that stability
is assured when the

superpowers are secure in the
knowledge that each can defend
against
nuclear attack.

a

Crisis stability reasonably could
be said to exist "when neither

superpower has reason to fear

a

preemptive strike during

a

crisis".

69

However, it must be said that crisis
stability ultimately rests on

perceptions about the vulnerability of
one's nuclear forces.

When the

issue of Minuteman vulnerability
began to appear in the mid-1970s as

result of Soviet

ICBM accuracy

stability reappeared.

a

improvements, the issue of crisis

The issue of crisis stability had been
addressed

subsequent to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis
and in conjunction with
arguments against the ABM in the late 1960s.

Si gal

provides an

insightful description
of the conditions
under wh,ch crisis
stability
can be questioned.
"in

crisis in which nuclear
war seems imminent
and unavoidable
the side worried about
its own vulnerability
might see some
advantage in preemptive
attack.
,f either side
sees itself ,„
such a predicament, then
both sides are .ess
secure for fear of
preemption. Moreover, once
nuclear war seems indent
and
unavoidable - and only then each side has some
incentive to
shoot first even if it can
not completely disarm
the other side,
in order to limit the
damage it wi 1, suffer when
the inevitable'
happens." 70
a

Gray and Payne have argued
that

it will

be necessary to protect

against instabilities during the
transition phase when

particulary easy to ignore U.S.
offensive forces. 71

will

it

As the U.S.

land-based deterrent has become
increasingly vulnerable to
first strike, the other legs
of the TRIAD will

be

a

Soviet

require upgrades and

improvements to undertake wartime
missions for which the ICBM force
is
currently responsible. However,
the Scowcroft Commission concluded
that
U.S nuclear forces are not vulnerable
to a Soviet first strike that

would leave the U.S. unable to respond.

The Commission concluded

a

study on the force vulnerability
1S sue by stating that the Soviet
Union
is

unable to disarm the U.S. in

a

first strike and that most U.S. SSBNs

and some strategic bombers and ICBMs
would survive an attack and would

continue to pose an adequate assured
destruction threat.

The Commission

also concluded that this situation would
not change appreciably for most
of the 1980s and

1990s.

While

it

may be appealing to seek an offensive
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arms reduction agreement
duringa the early
nart nf
*
'« eariy part
of a adefense
transition
Phase as President Reagan
has suited, G ray
and Payne argue that
it
will he particuiarly i mp0
rtant to ™a,ntain an
effective offensive

deterrent whiie integrating
Soviet strike during

potential

destahi

i
,

a

m issi,e defense in
order to precede

a

crisis.

2i

ng infiuence that

a

However Grav
Huncver,
uray »nH
and »,
Payne ignore the
a

U.S. defense night have

should the U.S. also maintain
and improve its counterforce
arsena, as
currently planned.
The final category concerns
arms race stability.

Stability prevails when neither
side

is

"Arms race

concerned that its enemy is

trying to build weapons that
endanger either strategic or
crisis

stability." 72

A particularly effective
argument against the ABM defense

the 1960s, as alluded to in
Chapter

in

1,

accelerating the arms race and expanding

defensive arenas.

was the potential
it to both

for

offensive and

The Soviet Union has charged
that the U.S. strategic

defense initiative program has the
potential to instigate

a

dangerous and broader arms race both
on earth and in space.

more
In

addition, the Soviet Union has stated
that among the possible responses
it

could undertake to the SDI is an increase
in offensive systems,

penetration aids for warheads, and
own.

73

The stability of

offensive arsenals expand
constrained or

a

a

a

strategic missile defense of its

defense transition might be hampered as
in

size and capability if the arms race is not

more vigorous race commences.

As a result, the

effectiveness of an initial U.S. missile defense might
be degraded,
especially

a

more limited land-based counterforce defense, thereby

weakening the overall stability of the transition period.
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United States concern for
'stability' has often
stymied its
Vitiating steps to preserve
its security.
Stephen Rosen has explored
the issue of stability
and its impact on U.S.
strategic n U c,ear
doctrine. He concludes that
there is evidence that
nuclear
instabilities, of the ki nd that
would be created by
certain Kinds of
weapons systems, have existed
and have not led inexorably
to war. 7 *
For
example, Rosen concludes that
political factors and not
weapons produced
a peace after World
War „ and it is political
factors that make a war
7i
possible now.
Hence, the propensity to
observe every new weapon as
either destab, izi
ng or stabilizing may over emphasize
the impact they
actually have on the nuclear
balance of power. However, the
perceptions
of 'stability' created as a
result of certain weapons
systems to include
a U.S. defense do influence
the political factors that make
a war
1

possi ble.

Ultimately, the U.S. may shift in
favor of some kind of defensive
posture to deter

a

nuclear war, assuming that the SDI
provides the

technological base to build an effective
defense.

Under these

conditions and dependent on the mission
objectives prescribed for the
defense, the U.S. may begin to downplay
its offensive deterrent.

Offensive nuclear policy

war-fighting policies
in U.S.

-

-

could play an increasingly less important
role

deterrence policy.

in the wake of a

encompass

a

assured destruction, countervailing, and

However,

defense deployment.

a

myriad of new issues will develop
Will

a

strategic defensive policy

true damaged limitation strategy to include civil
defense

and air defense?

How will the U.S. compose its nuclear arsenal during

the transition and once

a

defense

is

fully deployed?

Finally, does the
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shift to the defense
retire a new ar ms contro,
effort to >otecf th
e
trans,t,on f r
a profusion of
offensive weapons ano
can a new an.
control regime emerge?

M

While ft is impossible
to estimate the level
of effectiveness
that
a strategic defense
could achieve there are
a number of other
strategic
and political implicates
of deploying a system
that need to be
addressed.

One of these is the
potential

cost of

a

strategic defense

system and its cost to other
strategic programs.
The strategic defense
initiative program was projected
to cost 25
billion dollars over the first
five years of its research
life.
While
the actual budget expenditures
for research have been
scaled back by the
Congress, the deployment and
maintenance costs of a multi-tiered

space-based ballistic missile
defense could be many times
greater than
the research phase.
Former Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown has

estimated that it could cost 100
billion dollars just to place the
defense systems
weapons, sensors, stations
into space.
In

-

-

addition, Brown estimates the continued
research, development, and

maintenance costs of

a

to 200 billion dollars.

deployed system could require an
additional 100
General James Abrahamson, Director of
the SDI

program, has admitted that these estimates
are probably accurate given
the present costs of satellites,

estimates.
of ail

launch expenses, and maintenance

Abrahamson has stated that

a

dramatic reduction in the cost

associated manufacturing and deployment technologies
will have to

be achieved in order to justify

a

defense beyond the initial

research

phase.

The Council

on Economic Priorities

issued

a

report in 1985 critical
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of t„e strategic defense
Initiative.

The Counci, concluded
that wnl.e

the costs of the defense
systems envisioned by

uncertain, because It is
currently on,y

a

P resldent

Reagan ape

research program,

a strategic
defense program could cost
between 400 and 800
billion dollars 76 The
Department of Defense has not
yet projected the costs
of different
defense systems due. in part,
to the 1,1 defined
nature of a possib,e
deployab,e system. The very
,ac k of a defense
objective concerns most
defense analysts as it leaves
the

total

instance, the cost of deploying

considerable.

a

costs up in the air.

For

space-based defense could be

The O.S. does not currently
have

a

space launch system

capable of placing in orbit mi,
Hons of pounds of weaponry and
support
infrastructure. The development of
a launch vehicle and the
cost of its

operations could mount into the
billions of dollars as demonstrated
by
the relatively small space
shuttle program.
The strategic defense concept
poses vast problems for nuclear

doctrine, strategy, technological
development, and battle management
(namely C3) to include areas such
as computer programming.

resolving each of these problems
However, without

a

could quickly grow.

is

The cost of

truly incalculable at this time.

defined system or even

a

technolgical focus the costs

For example, the SDIO has contracted for
overall

system designs over the past three years predicated
on
battle management concept.

A recent

a

centralized

report by the Eastport Panel

SOIO's computer software study panel), suggested
that

battle management program may be more effective. 77

a

de-centra,

(the
i

zed

However, the R S D

and procurement costs of redundant systems are likely
to increase in
this context.

Congress has made it clear that

it

is

unwilling to simply

168

throw money into the
strategic defense
erense program
nroar™ anda until
a system desig,
is decided upon,
throwing money at widely
different technologies
querent
technnl
makes
strategic or economic
sense,
to operate and to meet
the SOI

Pounos of space

fH9hts.

ardent

regents

each y ear would
require hundreds „,

For example, at
present cost of 3,000
dollars

replace material

in orbit

thp Uu Sk
thS
-

'

'

would

s

a

pound to

Pend 13.2 billion dollars

year just launchinq defenspP>t Q H ~
related
y aerense r^i
equipment.
proposed

^

projected at 4.4 m1U1„n

The SDIO already has

new unmanned reusable
reusablp znxr*
space cargo system to
support

a

a

a

U.S.

ballistic missile defense.
A related issue is the
cost of strategic defense
to other military

programs.

while the SDIO continues
to research missile
defenses, the
U.S. has begun a multi-faceted
modernization program for its
strategic
offensive forces. The costs of
tne MX and Midgetman ICBM
programs, the
Bl and Stealth bombers,
the 600 sh,p Navy and
Trident programs, as well
as conventional

force modernization are just
beginn ln g to be felt.

of these programs will

point when

a

only begin full

Some

funding in five to ten years
at

a

strategic defense might be ready
for initial deployment.

Which other programs might be
cut in order to continue

a

strategic

defense program is likely to be
the subject of intense political
debate.
These decisions will depend on the
level of effectiveness and hence
the

contribution to O.S. deterrence capabilities
that
will possess.

a

strategic defense

While strategic defense advocates,
such as Daniel Graham,

have argued that

a

deployed defense will allow the U.S. to
dismantle

offensive forces and thereby reduce the
costs of some strategic
programs,

a

conservative estimate would suggest that the
U.S. will not
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Mantle

a

proven deterrent too

„„,*„.

to dismantle offensive
nuclear fences until

That is> the

n

is

confjdm

that

handle Soviet defense
counter^easures and has proven
the vaiue of
strategic defense to U.S.
security.

u

_

a

The cost of continuing
>un SDI
a with
sui relate
related research eventually
will be
felt on conventional arms.
The U.S. has begun
undertaking a massive
re-equipping of its conventional
forces,
m addition, the U.S. has tied
Us security interests more closely
to the Middle East,
Far East, and
Central America in the past
few years.
Shifting dollars from
conventional arms purchases,
training, and foreign bases
in order to
fund the SDI program may begin
to hurt the U.S.'s ability
to meet its
conventional security requirements.
However, until a decision to
deploy
a ballistic missile
defense is made, cutbacks in
defense dollars are
unlikely to oe leveled solely on
the SDI or conventional arms
programs.

may be technologically and
economically feasible for the U.S.
to
go forward with some kind of
counterforce defense. While this
type of
It

defense may not buy the U.S.
by

a

defense capability of the kind envisioned

President Reagan, it is not burdened by
insurmountable technological

uncertainties.
that

a

Former Secretary of Defense Brown
recently concluded

near term defense appears technically
cost-effective for some

kinds of retaliatory forces. 78

The Carter Administration's Pentagon

under Brown had been actively researching the
concept of

a

point defense

for the MX ICBM.
In

addition to the possible costs of deploying

a

missile defense is

the issue of addressing U.S. air defense gaps
as the U.S. is vulnerable
to bomber and cruise missile attacks.

As alluded to earlier, an
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effective means of
circumscribing9

a
d

bailie,
Dallls
tic missile defense
might
,

include advanced stealth
bombers, cru,se missiles
and depressed
trajectory
The U.S. may be faced
with 9 requirement for
effective nationa, air
defenses to combat these
threats as a result of
joying a ballistic missile defense.
Another related concern
is the
role of civil defenses
In a defense donated
world.
,„ order to effect
a true nationa,
defense, the U.S. might
have to reassess its civ,,
defenses and begin a
comprehensive nationa, program.
The costs of these
programs are as yet comp,ete,y
unknown.
However, the U.S. does not
now
have a nationa, air defense
system or civil defense
program of the kind
required by a true strategic
defense program and therefore
the costs of
these related programs are
likely to reach billions
of dollars.
While the SDI was originally
billed as a non-nuclear
solution to a
nuclear problem, SDIU program
managers have begun to shift
a

considerable amount of dollars and
research time to the application
of
nuclear power components wh,ch in
turn raise a number of environmental
questions.

The x-ray pumped laser proposal,
designed by Edward Teller,

would rely on

a

small

nuclear explosion to generate its
kill mechanisms.

Deployment of thousands of small nuclear
warheads

in addition to those

already deployed either on submarines,
ships, or on land

increase the chances of

explore small
sensors.

a

nuclear reactors to power

a

However,

vulnerability.

a

it

likely to

The U.S. has begun to

space-based battle station and

The U.S. had explored their use In the
early

abandoned the program when
dangerous.

nuclear accident.

is

1970s but

decided solar power was cheaper and less

principal concern of SUI0 planners is system

Solar panels would be highly susceptible to
damage while
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-"-,e ar

reactor maybemoreresilient
.

the issue of poss lb ,e
hazards in using

scattering of rad,oactive
deoris from

b. .ore

US

,,„.„

if the y . s

.

deplQyed

a

a

nuclear reactor.

The

Soviet satellite's
nuclear

^^^^

Qf

^

^^^^ ^

space defense.

Congressional in qu ir also
y
has stimulated concern
that a ,aunch disaster
- similar to the Shuttle Challenger
explosi on -'f loaded with a nuc.ear
powered defense component
could contaminate
large areas of Florid,
and harm hundreds of
people.
The Department of
defense has stated that all
launches would have the
reactors in a 'cold'
state and only start the.
after deployment in space
and that they would
be placed in high orbits
to prevent a similiar
accident as that of the
Soviet satellite. However,
nuclear industry scientists
agree that
considerable effort is required
to ensure against an accident
that could
poison the atmosphere or land
In addi tion, concern
around launch sites.
has been generated by the
SDI program's focus on
placing hundreds of
defense platforms in space and
around the earth.
While the less dense
'air' of space is advantageous
for the transmission of
laser beams and

other kill mechanisms, it also

is

susceptible to erosion and

contamination more easily than the thick
'air' within the earth's
atmosphere.

Exhaust gases and tons of space junk
from these platforms

could damage the atmosphere, in turn
allowing more damaging cosmic

radiation to filter down through the
atmosphere. 79
The promise of defenses against the
nuclear threat is tremendously

appealing.

However, offensive nuclear forces currently
maintain

preponderant advantage over defenses.

a

United States deterrence policy
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has

record

this fact and has
attested to engender
Soviet
apprec,at,on of the nuclear
balance of terror as
we,, as the U S
deterrent capacity.
«h1,e the Sov,ets c,ear,
y predate the luCear
threat, demonstrated by
their offensive and
defensive programs, the
y do
not necessari,
y accept U.S. deterrence theor
y and have repeated,,
rejected a number of U.S.
deterrence theor revisions.
y
For example, the
U.S. took the initiative
to propose a ban on
ABMs in 1968 and was
initially rebuffed b the
y
Sov,ets who have a,„a s
y considered defenses an
equally ,mportant component
of their strategic
doctrine. The Soviets
eventually signed the ABM Treaty,
i„ part, to preclude
the deplo y ment of
a

more capable ABM defense

by the

United States.

In

the event that

strategic defenses against
ballistic miss,les prove effective,
the U.S.
may be confronted with
altering the basis of its current
nuclear
policies. However, the shape and
extent of changes to these
policies is
dependent en a number of factors
including the level of effectiveness
of
a defense, the state
of the offensive nuclear
balance, Soviet efforts to
counter a U.S. defense, and the
costs and Implications for other
U.S.

strategic programs.
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CHAPTER FOUR

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
FORCES

The development an,
deployment of effective
strategic m 1ss1,e
defenses could have their
mn«t famost
far-reach,ng mpact on
tne composUlQn

-

—

^ective
nUmber
°

f

i

oftheu.s.stnate^cnuceanansena,.

of a U.S. strategic
defense, as stated by
the President and

H*"**™™

offensive nuclear weapons

feasibiHty of

oWclals,

is to foreclose on
the era of

finance.

strategic defense remains
unproven and

a

Us strategic
are not altogether
clear, the Keagan
Administration intends to
explore the composition of
U.S. offensive forces
in a defensive world
To that end, the U.S.
will be faced with choosing
from a range of
options for composing its
nuclear arsenal.
,„ the event that
strateg,
defenses are highly effective
,tLtlve thp
u
tne nU.S. could choose
to dismantle a

-its

<:

>

portion of its offensive forces,
alter the force composition
while
integrating defenses, or further
upgrade the size and
capabilities of
the arsenal.
While the U.S. may see. to
alter its offensive forces
to
some extent once a defensive
system oecomes feasible, the
U.S. win

continue to rely on its offensive
arsenal to deter

a

nuclear war at

least into the 1990s.

During the 1960s, strategic defenses
became one of

a

~

ABMs

,

civil

defense, etc.

number of important factors in the
debate over the

future direction for U.S. deterrence
policy.

The anti-ballistic missil

represented one option among the various
technologies developed
1950s and 1960s to enhance the U.S.
deterrent position.

in the

At the same

180

time, the 1CBM matured
into the principal
P'-mcpal strategy
,tr,t
delivery system for
.
,
ho
the superpowers while
SLBMs hecame more
reliable and therefore

eventually were deployed.
,.

.

deC,dM

overall

t0

^

As
«

~
a

result „f
reSUU
0t

th «e technological

Triad of nuclear
forces.

scope of these
developments was part
of
requirements to fit forces tn n c
U-S
nUC ear
°
'

„
development
,

advances,

a

The

response to

fondly,

to the

of a Soviet ABM
system.

One of the most
important factors in
the ABM debate in
the 1960s
was the tremendous
technology, advance in
offensive nuclear weapons
T^t is, the U.S. decided to
explore strategic defenses
because of the
tremendous threat of
destruction posed Py nuclear
anmed ballistic
".ISSiles as compared to
the strategic bombers
available at the time
«hi!e the threat of a
baUistic missile attacL
,nst,gated ABM research
the ability of an offense
to overcome the ABMs
developed in the 1960s
was relatively great.
However, the development
of the ABM also led the
U.S. to make changes in
the capabilities of its
offensive forces. For
example, the multiple
independently targeted reentry
vehicle (MIRV), was
developed as a means of countering
a Soviet ABM defense.
By 1970 the
U.S. began deploying MIRVed
iCBMs and SLBMs and was
actively researching
the possibility of incorporating
penetration aids for its ballistic

missiles.

While there was

a

number of other equally important
factors,

the ABM greatly influenced
the direction of O.S. offensive
force

development.

Not unlike this past experience,
the development of

strategic defenses in the 1930s and
1990s may influence the composition
of O.S. nuclear forces.

In

addition, current offensive technological

developments could influence the feasibility
of

a

strategic defense

181

against Soviet ballistic
missiles.

Thet ~°^«'Pen.u,

s- 9 nin 9

of the AB M Treaty

um ,

whichperiodicanyshi

.

confirm

^

tht do

ftsfromoffense

^

, nance „

nuclear balance at that
time and was expected
to hinder the
deveiopment o f defenses
which were perceived
to he destabilizing.
it

is

conceivable that

a
a

Mhj1e
t-miw effective
truly
missile defense could
alter the
.

Principal hasis of the U.S.
deterrent, that be,ng
offens,ve nuCear
forces, ,t win have to
overcome a tr^endous
advantage current!, he,d
by offensive forces.
The focus of U.S.
strategic nuclear policy
is to deter a nuclear
attac* on the U.S. and its
allies.
These po,ic1es are effective
to the
extent to which any potential
enemy is dissuaded from
attacking the U.S.
w-th nuclear weapons.
,„ practice
this means
any
aggressor must Oe persuaded
to believe that the U.S.
will use its
nuclear weapons in response
to an attack and has the
capability to back

^

,

up

its policy in the event of
war
war.

of nuclear weapons development.

As U.S.

become ever more refined, in
part as

technological

Herp-in Hoc
Herein
lies fh«
the purpose and dynamic

a

strategic nuclear policy has

result of the ever increasing

sophistication in nuclear weapons,
the U.S. has procured

specific nuclear forces in support
of these policies.
One of the objectives of U.S.
nuclear policy with respect to its

nuclear weapons has been to maintain
both the real and perceived

strengths of these forces.

Secretary of Defense Brown has argued
that

one of "our highest military
priorities includes

perception

...

and the reality that U.S.

.

.

.

maintaining the

forces are as capable as

182

- ««

th ° Se0f

^^"•3.S.R.ca„

there ,s no level
of nuclear confHct
at

ga1nam1l1taryorapolnical

^

^

need forces of size
an, character so
that

Perce.e that we can

.

.

the Sov ,

not he coerce, or
intimidated 6y

capab,e Sov,et forces".!

^tary

.

Th , s

stata „ ent sugaests

^

,

m

arger

„

^

strength can be measured
in some fashion

when compared to the Soviet
strategic strengths wh,ch
help deter a
nuclear war. «hi ,e 1 tis
nearly , mp0 ss1b,e to
measure the perceived
strength of U.S. nuclear
forces, it may be
possihie to measure their
'real' strength.
maxwell

Taylor has stated that rea,
strategic strength refers
to
"that form of military powe r
characterized by our ability
to destroy
"ajor Soviet targets, military
and civilian, with nuclear
weapons at
2
intercontinental ranges".
The oestructive power
of U.S. strategic
forces depends on the performance
and survivability of these
forces and

associated equipment, the character
of U.S. leaders, and the
reliability
and survivability of
command-control-communication
systems linking

national

command authorities to weapons.

3

The simple taoulation of

strategic weapons does not provide
an adequate measure of strategic
strength.

Rather,

a

measure of true strength would
factor

accuracy, reliability, and survivability
of the system.

in

the

The combination

of these factors are considered by
military planners when estimating the

relative strengths of the superpower
forces and will be considered when
a

1.

decision to go forward on

U.S.

Nuclear Forces

a

missile defense can be made.
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An analysis of
the implications of
strateair hdefenses
strategic
f
for the U
nuc ear arsenal must
begin with a description
ipuion or
of the
thp current U

arS6nal

^

-rent,,

S

S

US
»•».

offense nude.

is

composed of weapons
systems primarily
based on technology
from the late 1950s
and 1960s, namely
Lne strateair
strategic hbomber,
h
y the
the ICBM
«»»- reentry ve hic,es. Tne o.S. has
implemented a number
of
programs to inoorporate
newer technology and
has

-

'

Wade

maintain

a

R

program to explore various
*
weapons systems tor
possible future
deployment. For example,
twenty-five year o,d
borers are
D

being fitted

•nth the Utest cruise
missile technology while
a number of U.S.
ICBMs
nave received accuracy
and yield upgrades.
In addition,
the U.S. has

explored advanced technologies
such as the maneuverable
reentry vehicle
(MARV) concept which was
designed to evade Soviet
ABM defenses. The
U.S. decided against the
MARV as the technology
did not appear to add
significantly to U.S. penetration
capabilities.
These forces also are deployed
in support of various
nuclear
policies
assured destruction, countervailing,
and war fighting.
,„
general, the current U.S.
nuclear stockpile is a decade
older than the
latest polices and strategies
it is charged with carrying
out.
This

-

condition is partly the result
of the development and
deployment time
between policy pronouncements
and composition of a supporting
force, but
also is the result of the decision
making process which has sought
to
secure peace by means other than
through the posturing of nuclear

weapons.

The U.S. depends on

a

variety of means other than nuclear

weapons to help deter nuclear war,
namely strategic deterrence policy
and strategy as well as arms
control efforts.

While the U.S. inventory

.

—

nW

has

—

d
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,, s

actual,, restricted

_

nuclear po]icyand

.

control efforts have
d1splayed consjdera6ie

[nfact>theus

Us

weapons ueve,opment
process i„ the la7Us
n
order to encourage
restraint by the Soviet
Union. These efforts
were
of the original
ABM Treaty and SALT
I
accords
The interaction of the
strategic policy
formation process the
ams control process, anu U.S.
Nestle political constraints
has a
tremendous innoence on the
rin.1 composition of
U.S. nuclear forces"•S. .lilt.* pinners
assess the Soviet nuclear
threat to the U S
today and in the future;
based on the results
of these assesses,
the
,

-dement

Department of Defense
attack.

-

While this

records
is

policy and strategy to
deter

a

Soviet

one of the avenues in
which U.S. nuclear policy

Oer,ved, other actors have

c™e

into play in the past.

Congressiona,
influence on U.S. nuclear
policy, while somewhat less
precise on
strategy and tactics, is
generally recognized as important.
For
example, Congress played an
important role in the confirmation
of the
U.S. shift toward limited
nuclear options in the 1970s.

Congress also
has criticized efforts on the
part of some Reagan Administration

officials to move the U.S. more
closely to
policy.

The final outcome of these
deliberations is

which would guide the U.S. in
capabi

I

nuclear war-fighting

a

a

a

set of policies

war and seek to enhance its
deterrent

ity

The focus of these policies, be it
assured destruction or

war-fignting policy, defines the requirements
for the U.S. nuclear
arsenal.

The mutual assured destruction model,
more than any other set

of strategic ideas, has provided
the principal

structural basis for the
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development of U.S.
nuclear forces.
forces
ot a series of
improvements

,

retail,,
retaliatory

in UJ.^.
S

the ability of thp
trie u.b. to
survive
1

tm.
Th 1S a
development

1

a

has taken the form

capabilities

nuclpar attack
^^l. and still
nuciear

^

unacceptable damage on the
Sov1et urban .

^

-

that is

'

inflict

^^

only in the past decade
or so that the
U.S. has serious,,
considered
effective counterforce weaoons
«„i
weapons and only recently
has begun to field
weapons with some counterforce
capabilities. The Carter

Administration's most important
policy pronouncement
was to confirm the
finance of counterforce opt.ons
in its countervailing
poli cy.
Whi,e
the U.S. had explored
limited and selective
options for the SIOP in
the
past, Presidential U,rective
,9 made them the focus
of U.S. policy.
The
result of this shift was a
concerted effort hy the
Department of Defense
to procure counterforce
capable weapons, namely the
MX 1CBM, as we., as

improvements for the U.S. C3
system.

Congress also holds the power
of the purse.

As such. Congress

greatly influences the actual
composition of U.S. forces.
the MX ICBM versus the Trident

been

a

widely debated issue.

Trident system

is

The cost of

SLBM, both counterforce weapons,
had

il

While the MX is not yet deployed,
the

going forward on schedule.

Congress has questioned

the survivability of the MX and
while a viable deployment mode has
not
been agreed upon, it refuses to
authorize procurement of all the MX

missiles asked for by the Department of
Defense.
The arms control process clearly
is an important influence on the

composition of U.S. nuclear forces.

The various treaties wh,ch the U.S.

has become a party to constrain the
size and capabilities of U.S.

nuclear forces.

The SALT

1

and

1

1

accords are the most important
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treaties to date in this reaarri
,s re 9ard.

c
For

example
M

thp
tne
»

are allowed to deploy
n0 more than

n
u

-

<;
b

2m

an(j s t ra tegic bombers,

-

^

c
and Soviet
Union

.„ addition, there
are
various sublimits on
the number of MIRVed
systems as well as the
number
°f strategic bombers
allowed to carry cruis e
missiles. Whi,e treat,
imitations clearly constrain
U.S. force developments,
domestic arms
control pressures a,so
impact the U.S. force
composition. c™ et,ng
P
political groups debate tne
the iimpact
,,t „
f
of various weapons
programs on the
arms control regime.
For example, MX critics
have charged that the
system will provoke the
Soviets to move toward
mobile ICBMs and thereby
preclude effective control of
these systems. The Reagan
Administration
has criticized past arms
control accords and has
favored a new approach
incorporating proposals to cut
deep ly into the superpowers'
strategic
arsenals. These efforts weigh
heavily on the types of
systems the U.S.
deploys as well as its research
programs for future weapons
systems, Un
the defense side, the arms
control debate is likely to
have profound

m

influence on the possible role and
composition of

a

U.S. strategic

defense.
A

considerable portion of the most capable
weapons

inventory today was developed, in
part, as
the 1960s.

a

in the U.S

result of the ABM debate of

For example, the initial versions of
the Minuteman III and

Poseidon/C-3 systems were specifically
designed to incorporate MIRV
technology.

Similarly, the current defense debate is
likely to have

profound implications for the role, composition,
and size of the U.S.

strategic nuclear offensive arsenal.
A brief

review of the major weapons systems in the
current U.S.
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—oryandad, scussion

them

of

roles and capabi

,

ities as presentiy

configured follows.

A^^JJ^JCBJ^c^ces
The current

-posed

land-based ,eg of the Triad

of two ma JO r weapons
systems:

CBMs

I

small

.

current!, being deactivated
at

a

-

Us

the Minuteman

number of Titan

„

ZCBM forces

-

is

and M , nuteman
ICBMs that are

II

rate of one per month.

This system is
essentia,,, twenty-five
y ears old and re,ies on dated
technology such as
liquid fue,ed boosters.
For economic, maintenance,
and safet
all

Titan lis wi

,
,

y reasons
be comp,ete,
y removed from the active inventor,
by

1987/
The Minuteman

weapon.

II

ICBM is the U.S.", main
prompt assured destruction

The Minuteman

the Minuteman

I

ICBM.

II

became operational

in

1966 as

a

follow-on to

The principal mission of the
Minuteman

II

bas

been to pose a credible
assured destruction threat to
the Soviet Union.
It carries a single
1.2 megaton y ie,d nuclear warhead
and is capable of
destro y ing very wide-area targets.
That is, the Minuteman II is
capable
of destroying moderately hard
targets and soft large-area military
or

industrial

installations requiring high yields
and less than pinpoint

accuracy.

Once the remaining Titan lis have been
removed from the

active arsenal, the Minuteman

II

will

have the largest deliverable

warhead in the U.S. strategic arsenal
other than
del

i

few very large bomber

vered gravity bombs.
The majority of the U.S.

III

a

ICBMs,

a

Minuteman II.

ICBM force is composed of 55U Minuteman

MIRVed solid fueled weapon essentially similar
to the
The latest of two Minuteman III versions
represents

a

138

Phased upgrade to

portion of the t0rCe
forep adnd
„n Wds
^dertaken to provide
the U.S. with a more
credible hard target
taraet kill weapon
as a result of
Soviet efforts to harden
their launch silos
,iinc and
command bunkers.
Three
hundred Minuteman III
have received thee
Mark ~12A
nark
12A warhead
h
„
package which
increased their yield from
170 kilotons (kt)
to 33^t
Jjbkt per warhead.
These weapons are the only
Urrent nU S - wea Pon
y current
capable of directly
threatening Soviet hardened
ardened ICBM
ithm c-m
silos and command
bunkers in a timely
fashion.
a

i

<;

'

The U.S. will
kill

not add to

Us

arsenal of time-urgent
hard target

forces until the MX
ICBM is deployed in

SLBMs are deployed in the
late 1980s.

development

a

single warhead small

,

ate l986 and Tr , dent

The U.S. also has under

1CBM (SICBM)

which is scheduled for
deployment in the iggUs.
and Midgetman

„

,

des,gnated Midgetman
However. Poth the MX

ICBM program have run
into a number of political

obstacles.

The number of MX ICBMs
to be deployed has been
reduced from
an original deployment
projection of 200 missiles to
a current 100.

Additionally, congress has
legislated
Minuteman silos until
other 50 MX ICBMs.

a

a

limit of bo MX ICBMs in

survivable basing mode can be
developed for the

The dedate over

a

bas.ng scheme for both the
MX and

the Midgetman has hampered the
U.S.'s effort to field

a

new ICBM since

the late 1970s.
The Midgetman is now facing
greater scrutiny concerning its

strategic purpose and make-up.

A number of Congressmen have
suggested

that the Midgetman carry three
warheads rather than one and that its

size be increased to provide for the
inclusion of penaids in the event
of a Soviet nationwide BMD deployment
in the 1990s.

These efforts, if

189

™u,,wino b

on,,,

v1 a te the

purpose for

^

The missile is being
designed and was promoted
by the Scrowcroft
Co-ssion as a small, mobile
system and hence
reUt,ve, y 1nvulnerable
weapon.
,„ addition, the
M1dgetman

land-based deterrent.

Mk.l, to pose
MIRVed MX ICBH.

a

^^^^

As

a

^

^

single warhead weapon
the Midgetman is

.ore „mited threat to
Soviet strategic forces
than the
while Congress has deeded
to bec«e more erUlc.,,,

-nvolved in the future
exposition of the U.S. ICBM
force, it has been
more favorabie toward the
Navy's modern, zation
program.
Bj_. U .S.

SLBM Force s

The U.S. sea-based deterrent
is currently composed
of 43 strategic
nuclear submarines (SSBNs).
including 18 Poseidon submarines
each

carrying 16 Poseidon/C-3 missiles
and 12 Pose,don submarines
each
carrying !6 Trident I/C-4 missiles
each.
Seven Trident submarines also
have entered the U.S. strategic
force since the late 1970s, each

carrying 24 Trident I/C-4 missiles. 9
The SLBM force is generally
considered the U.S.'s most secure

assured destruction force as

a

portion of the force is always out
to sea

and these submarines are difficult
to locate and track for Soviet

anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces.

The ability of strategic

submarines to move quickly and quietly and
at times lie still enhances
their prospects for higher rates of
survivability than either land-based

missiles or bombers.

A number of additional

factors help prevent

successful destruction of SSBNs by Soviet ASW
forces.

Soviet attack

submarines and surface vessels must successfully
track U.S. submarines
as they

leave their ports in order to quickly attack
them in a war.

In

190

addition, Soviet attack

sublines

must manuever to
attack

U

S

strategic submarines
thereby providing „.,.
shlps and
°f the,r location,
united States strategic
submarines can rana1n
Passive and thereby
compete the attacking
submarine's job. SSBNs
also havealarge
percentage of the oceans
1„ which they can
patro,
effectively stretching and
hampering ASW detection
and destruction
efforts.
Fmany, for strategic anti-submarine
warfare to be effective
•t

».t

destroy

be ab,e to undertake
an effective and
coord.nated attack to
a

large portion of the
enemy's SSBN f,eet in

a very short period
These constraints make it
neariy impossible for the
Soviets to
destroy the U.S. strategic
submarine forces
10

of time.

in

Poseidon/C-3 SLBHs are fitted
with
I/C-4 is

fitted with

a

a

first strike.

a

40kt warhead whiie the Trident

lOOkt warhead and was
provided with greater range

capability over the Poseidon
allow,ng U.S. submarines
carrying Tridents
to expand their areas of
patroi. thereby adding to
their survivability.
As

the number of Trident

I

missiles are increased

-

as new Trident

submarines come on line subsequently
requiring the ret.rement of
Poseidon Submarines - Poseidon
SLBMs have been select.vely
refitted with
greater numbers of warheads to
compensate for the fewer number of

warheads on average deployed on the
Trident

I

missiles. 11

begin deploying the Trident II/D-5
SLBM in the late ig 8 Us.
will

The U.S. will

Trident

II

be the first submarine launched
strategic system with substant,al

hard target kill capability.
the U.S. with

a

This deployment will effectively
provide

credible counterforce strategic arsenal
and greatly

reduce concern over the U.S.'s ability
to pose

deterrent

in

a

the event of a Soviet first strike.

credible and flexible

191

™e

U.S. also is increasing
its sea-based
offensive nuclear fence
-1th the introduction of
the Tomahawk subman
ne- aunched and
1

strategic cruise missile
(SLCM).

While the U.S. envisions
deployment of thousands
of the Tomahawk cruise
missile, all of the.
are
not siated for a strategic
role.
Among the m, ssl ons
envisioned for
these weapons are ant,-ship
„ arfare and

^

suppopt

-dude

tactical

^

land targeting as
we!l as strategic
targeting.

Navy began deploying
SLCMs in 1984 and
projects

a

The

total deployment of

194 strategic cruise missiles on
74 attack submarines
as well as 190

strategic versions on 30
surface ships by the ,ate
1980s.
"The main
advantage - and at the same
time the main disadvantage of the Tomahawk
the fact that it is not
possible to distinguish it
externally from
12
the tactical versions."
The U.S. will be able to
effectively saturate
the Soviet Union's ocean
surveillance and targeting systems.
In the
event of increased tensions
between the superpowers, the
U.S. also could
is

deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles
onboard non-naval vessels thereby
9reatly expanding the Soviet
Union's targeting problem.

Tomahawk can carry

a

200kt warhead and has

numbers and yield of these weapons
will
of the U.S.'s hard target kill

force.

13

a

Each strategic

range of ISUOnm.

The

increase the overall capability

Another significant strategic

advantage of the cruise missile is its
ability to hug the ground below
radar coverage and thereby penetrate
Soviet air defenses

in

addition to

its ability to strike within 2UU feet
of its target.
C.

U.S. Strateg ic Bombers

The U.S.
of the Triad.

long-range bomber force is one of the most flexible
legs

Strategic bombers can carry

a

more diverse nuclear

.
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-pons

,o

-calied

W>

can perform

.

after being launcned
.

of contention for a
a

^^^

number of

manned penetration bomber

„ umber
is

no

of years .
,

onge r „ecessar due
y
to the

development of cru.se m,ss,,es
and because Soviet
air defenses
potentially make this for.
of attack extremely
ineffective.
,„
addition, the last of tho
a
*+
the B-62 strategy
bombers, which represent
the
bulk of the U.S. bomber
deterrent, were built in
the ear,,
,.

1960s.

The active bomber inventory
consists of 167 B-S2GS, 96
8-52HS and
an additional
60 FB-llls.
The bomber force is no
longer as capab.e of
penetrate Sov,et airspace and is,
therefore, responsible for
fewer
targets within the Sov le t
Union, where twenty-five
years ago the bomber
force carried g7 percent
of the U.S. nuclear
weapons inventory, it
currently carries roughly 23
percent while still half of
the

megatonnage.'

4

The bomber force has been
modernized on

number of
occasions, most recently to begin
carrying air-launched cruise
missiles
(ALCMs)
The first squadron of 16 B-528
.
bombers equipped with the ALCM
became operational in December,
1982.
The U.S. may eventually outfit
a

20U B-b2s to carry ALCMs with
remaining bombers designated for

a

combination of gravity bombs and
short-range attack missiles (SRAMs
In order to further modernize
the bomber leg of the Triad, the
U.S.

)

has

begun to deploy the B-lb strategic
bomber as the principal U.S. manned

penetrating bomber for the late 1980s and
early 1990s when the advanced
technology bomber (AT8)

-

the so-called Stealth bomber

begin to come on line and assume the
penetration role. 15

-

also will
In

with the introduction of the Bl-b bomber,
the U.S. will begin

conjunction
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r

ant,,n9o,derB ~ 52Bbombers

B ° th

-

*

*•

be deployed w1th
crulse m1ss1les>
presumabiy

of the cruise, ana
gravity bombs.

jl. Implications of a

xtr.*^

*

^

- *"*«c
stMith

^

w1

„

rfrniL

The U.S. current,,
seeks to deter Soviet
aggression, in part by
the threat to use an,
of the forces
describe, above to retaliate
against
a Soviet attack.
Both opponents and
Qf

have praised and criticized
the 'deterrent value'
of the U.S. strategic
nuciear arsena,. Defense
advocates such as Secretary
of Defense
Weinberger, perceive a need
to continue strengthening
U.S. strategic
forces while BMD are deveioped
and possibly ,ater
deployed. President
Reagan has continued President
Carter's progra,,, to procure
counterfort
weapons for the U.S. inventory
and has made additions
to the program.
For example, President Reagan
has resurrected the Bl
bomber, pushed
ahead the Trident II SLBM, and
asked for the development of
the
Mndgetman ICBM. While President
Reagan has supported and
initiated a
number of the current strategic
force modernization programs,
he has
alluded to the need for offensive
arms reductions for a stable

implementation of

a

strategic defense system.

Former Secretary of

Defense Brown, an opponent of the
SDI in its current form, has
charged
that the current U.S. nuclear arsenal

counterforce missions.
ICBM as well

is

inadequate to carrying out its

Brown has advocated the deployment of
the MX

as the Trident

II

SLBM.

Finally, the Union of Concerned

Scientists has charged that the current
U.S. arsenal

adequate to deter

a

is

more than

Soviet nuclear attack today and in the
future and

194

does not perce,ve a need
to upgrade or expand

Judgment

,

t

.

However, the

uU.ate

as to

"the capability of these
forces depends on
the m SS ion
against which U.S. forces
are measured"." That
is, while the u s
can
confident,, carry out an
assured destruction
retaliation against the
i

Soviet Union.

U

is

prohahiy not well suited
to protracted counterforce

warfare.
United States strategic
forces are generally viewed
by military
analysts as highly capable of
carrying out a devastating
retaliatory
strike against the Soviet
Union after enduring an
initial Soviet strike.
The office of Technology
Assessment has estimated that
141 large (one
megaton) U.S. weapons could
destroy over 50 percent of the
total Soviet
17
industrial capacity.
However, "the overall U.S.
counterforce

capability

-

the ability to destroy

retaliatory forces

-

is

minimal". 18

significant portion of Soviet

a

The Carter and Reagan

Administrations have pushed to acquire
counterforce capable strategic
weapons in an effort to support U.S.
counterforce nuclear policy, namely
embodied in Presidential Directive
59.

If the U.S.

begins to shift its

nuclear deterrence policy to incorporate
strategic defenses,

it may

alter the composition and mission of its
offensive nuclear forces.
An important consideration for U.S.
policy planners in

a

defensive

world will be the mission which U.S. offensive
forces will be charged
with executing.

Clearly, U.S. policy will continue to emphasize
the

deterrence of Soviet aggression and U.S. strategic
offensive forces will
be responsible for posing a credible deterrent
to the Soviet leadership

along with defense forces that are deployed.

However, the actual

wartime role of U.S. offensive forces will be dependent on

a

number of
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'actors.

The most ,mportant
factor in this regard
is the inters
on or
balance of missions between
the offensive and
defensive forces in the
U.S. arsenal.
U.S. pursues a robust
strategic defense policy
offensive nuCear forces
might relinguish their
current ro,e of
deterring nuclear war by
threatenlng to den the
y
Soviets a successfu,
attack,
in effect, U.S.
policy mi ght shift to
emphasize 'defense' as a
deterrent.
In this environment,
the role of U.S. offensive
nuclear
forces could he def,ned in
a more traditional
assured destruct.on mode
However, the currently
promoted IWtl on a missile
defense
Soviet
countermeasures, C3 problems, and
the difficulties and
costs of

-

maintaining the system

-will

influence the extent to „h,ch
the U.S.

revises its offensive force
missions.

The U.S would have the
option of

continuing to rely on its offensive
forces for limited counterforce
missions or to seek more demanding
war-fighting roles for its offensive
forces.

These options are displayed in
the following tables.

Table #6 displays the projected
gains

capabilities

in the

IC8M and Trident

II

early 1990s as
SLBM.

a

in U.S.

counterforce

result of the deployment of the
MX

The mission capab,lities of U.S.
offensive

forces may then remain constant as

a

Midgetman ICBM and deployment of

strategic defense.

a

result of

a

cancellation of the
The mission

capabilities of remaining U.S. offensive nuclear
forces also will be
influenced by Soviet defensive deployments and
in time might decline.
Table #7 displays an increase in U.S.
counterforce capabilities
from MX and Trident

deployments.

II

deployments as well as possible Midgetman

The offensive mission might then be expected
to fall off

and an assured destruction posture to prevail

as an effective missile

^ense

was dep,oyeo and U.S.
offensive forces were
dlsm ant,eo
Table #8 portrays the
option to Increase
constantly the u
counterforce capabilities
in an effort to
achieve an effective
--fitting posture.

could oe expected to p,ay
an integra,

ballistic missile defense.

ro,e in addition to

a

s

robust
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TABLE #6

MAINTAIN LIMITED COUNTERFORCE
ROLE

WAR -FIGHTING
ROLE

COUNTERFORCE
ROLE

ASSURED DESTRUCTION ROLE

NO OFFENSIVE ROLE

1985

1990

1995

Time Line

2000

TABLE #7 PROVIDE ASSURED
DESTRUCTION ROLE
WAR-

FIGHTING
ROLE

COUNTERFORCE
ROLE

ASSURED DESTRUCTION ROLE

NO OFFENSIVE ROLE

1985

1990

T9"95

Time Line

2000

LE

#8

ENHANCE TO WAR-FIGHTING

WAR-FIGHTING
ROLE

COUNTERFORCE
ROLE

ASSURED DESTRUCTION ROLE

NO OFFENSIVE ROLE

1985

1990

Time Line

Powers,

other factors will
Influence the direction
of
U.S. offensive force
capebilltles and ro,es.
The prospects for
anns
control w,th the Soviet
Union with respect
to hoth offensive
and
defensive forces could
change the
<e roies
roles that nff
offensive forces would
be
expected to play if ,
strate9 , c

Ww|

HkeHhood

of

^

^

Soviet missile defense
and its corresponding
leve, of
effectiveness w1„ great,,
i„f,uence the future ro,e
of U.S. offensive
forces.
,n addition, the
costs and operationa,
effectiveness of a U.S
strategic defense will
nfluen ce the requirements
for offensive
deterrent forces as we,, as
the size and composition
of these forces
For e*a mp ,e, U.S. offensive
forces could continue to
have a counterforce
warti,„e ro,e as a threat
to deny the Soviets a
victory by placing their
military forces at risk. As
such, U.S. offensive forces
could play a
co-equal deterrent role with a
deployed strategic missile
defense.
a

i

It

is

unlikely that the U.S. will
completely dismantle its

offensive forces or seek to deploy
them in
if ballistic missile defenses
become

a

a

true war-„ghting role even

reality.

There are

a

number of

strategic reasons for maintaining
an offensive nuclear arsenal
and
preserving their current deterrent
role, namely a limited counterforce
strategy as displayed in Table 6.

The procurement of additional

counterforce weapons while also procuring
an effective missile defense
might appear to the Soviets to be

capability.

That is,

a

a

U.S. effort to create

condition might arise where

a

a

first strike

defense protected

U.S. could strike against Soviet nuclear
forces with near impunity,

sufficient to deny the Soviets

a

meaningful second strike retaliatory
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capability.

Hence, offensive forces
,n th , s mode dlong
wU „ , dep|oyed
defense could appear to
he provocative and
potential

-1M11.
destabi

1

i

zi ng.

There are indications
that the Reagan
Administration and, more
specifically, the Department
of Defense have begun
to address the issue
of offensive and defensive
integration and the role for
offensive
forces.
A nuclear strategy
review was initiated in
19«5 that focuses

on

the integration of a U.S.
strategic defense with its
offensive forces.
The intent of the review
is to "uDdat-P
<;
„.„o
update nU.S.
nuclear employment plans and
provide guidance for the
transition from offense to
defense in the
1990s" should defenses prove
19
feasible.
According to press reports,
the review envisions the
integration of offensive and
defensive forces
under a new nuclear war-fighting
command structure.
G 1V en the Reagan

Administration's plans to procure
counterforce capable strategic
weapons
-- Plans established prior
to the initiation
of the SOI

~

and their

associated C3I elements, it is not
surprising that the Department of
Defense will proceed with its
original modernization plans while
studying the integration of defenses.
The Soviets have repeatedly charged
the Reagan Administration with

seeking offensive superiority and that
as an offensive weapon system.

a

U.S. missile defense would act

Although the technological focus of the

SDI as described by President Reagan is
clearly defensive, there are

number of ways in which

a

a

U.S. missile defense could be used to
augment

U.S. offensive forces and an offensive
nuclear strategy.

First,

a

missile defense might be deployed to preserve an
offense dominant force
and deterrent.

That is, the U.S. would continue to rely on its
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offense

nuclear forces to deter
Soviet agression and
a , s . ba| jsUc
™1«11e defense ecu,, augme „t
the ,n role . A point
defense of U.S. ,CBH
SilOS WOUId fit Well
thic role,
™i
in this
as previously
described in Chapter 2
Second, as alluded to
above, a U.S. offensive
strate
desi
,

"me
^

gy

ned to

the da M a 9e Soviet
forces could cause
to the u
g reatly enhanced by mjss
le defenses
,

Sov,et forces left

undated

current plans to deploy
.,

,„ore

chapged

^

by a U.S. counterforce
attack.

el.1- that the SDI in
conjunction with the

Trident

9

to,i mi t

f.rst

R ea g an

a

'

The Soviets

Administrates

capaole counterforce weapons

-

the MX

1CBM

^

SLBM, and the Bl- b and
advanced techno]ogy

Provide the U.S.

s

first strike offensive force
and therehy some d ama
ge

limitation capability.

These efforts, charge the
Sov,ets, represent

a

clear attempt to regain nuclear
superiority and render the
Soviet
nuclear force inferior.

Another issue largely ignored by
the Reagan Administration
to date
is

the potential

system.

While

a

anti-satellite capability of

a

U.S. missile defense

laser defense against Soviet
ballistic missiles may be

impossible, satellites are relatively
passive targets that might be
easily destroyed by laser weapons.
As such, these weapons could
perform
an offensive role by destroying
Soviet satellites prior to

a

U.S. attack

thereby degrading the Soviet Union's
space-based surveillance and

communication capabilities.
A second

reason why the U.S. is unlikely to
dismantle its offensive

deterrent completely
agreement or mutual

is

the fear that in the absence of an arms
control

reductions the U.S. could be caught by surprise

without an offensive force sufficient to deter
an attack

in a crisis.

.

action,

the U.S. wou.d want
t0

reraai „

Qf

^

capability ,„ the event
that the Soviets
developed effective
counter-measures to a U.S.
missile defense.

^e

U.S.

wi„

maintain, at the very,
east, an assured
destruction
retaliatory force as a means
of protecting
against countermeasure
advances against a U.S.
defense and as a means
of deterring third
part,

of Its forces, dismantle
some of its counterforce
weapons, completely

nuclear arsenal.

A number of defense
advocates, such as Keith
Payne

have argued against these
options, at least during the
initial phases of
a defense deployment.
Payne has argued that the
U.S. must remain

offensively prepared for war until
an effective BMO could
accept the
Hon's share of U.S. deterrence
responsi bi 1 ity 2U However,
Payne fails
to appreciate the potentially
destab,

I

i

z, ng

influence that dual

offensive improvements and defensive
deployments may pose,

in

the

absence of some offensive arms
reductions agreements, particularly

concerning counterforce weapons,
the U.S. is likely to maintain
some

counterforce capabilities as

a

means of threaten, ng Soviet strategic

assets and Soviet national command
authorities (NCA).

Ultimately, the key factor concerning
the future role and

composition of U.S. nuclear forces will be
their expected wartime role.
In

this regard, the U.S. may go beyond the
current force modernization

programs described above which are being
implemented to develop
capable counterforce strategic arsenal.

21

a

more

Among the forces likely to

exist by the mid-iggUs or the turn of the century
when

a

decision to
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deploy missile defenses could ho
be made are

C8MS with some remaining
Minuteman „,

a

^^

nomber of MX and
Midgetman

^

_

^

SLBMs, numerous oruise
missiles on B-!b bombers
as well as cruise
-ssiles and new gravity bombs
on the ATB, and
,,„.,„ , number of
submarine- and ship-launched
strategic cruise missiles
now being
deployed. The combination
of accuracy and
lethality of these forces
will pose a credible
hard target
taraet kill
kill capability to the
Soviet Union's
strategic forces and their
command and control
infrastructure as
presently configured.

^kt

Each of these preceeding
descriptions assumes to varying
degrees
that ballistic missiles
will continue to be a major,
if not the most
important, component

in

the U.S. offensive arsenal.

Assuming that seme
kind of strategic nuclear
force is maintained oy the
U.S., the mix

between ballistic missiles, namely
ICBMs, SLBMs, and air breathing
forces, is likely to be widely
debated in policy circles.
Ballistic
missiles are likely to be increasingly
less capable of performing
their
current missions in

defensive balance.

a

That is, ballistic missiles

may have less utility for specific
counterforce and other war-fighting
roles.

For example,

a

missile defense capable of

a

high percent kill

ratio could severely restrict, if not
altogether preclude, the

attacker's ability to predict which targets
were destroyed.

However,

defenses will not completely degrade the
ballistic missile's deterrent
value as these weapons could still pose

a

residual

assured destruction

threat.
In

order to execute

a

successful attack, many thousands more

ballistic missiles may be required in

a

defense dominated world.

The
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expansion of nuclear forces
is likelv
nKe 'y tn
to -in,
increase the level of
collateral damage. The
defense in turn win
lower the attacker's
confidence for a successful
attack. As a result,
result
u
an *t*
attacker
may seek
to destroy or degrade
the defender's .issile
defense as another means
of
securing a successful attack.
Under these conditions
the U.S. may seek
to transfer some, if not
the ma JO r portion, of
its offensive forces
to
SLBMs, although they may be
vulnerable to some degradation
in utility
from a Soviet missile defense.
The advantage of using
SLBMs is the
height of their tra.ectory and
tta. from launch to target,
which can be
significantly less than ICBMs and
which can make the task of
.racking
and destruction for a missile
defense more difficult. On
the other
hand, depressed trajectories
also lead to a degradation
of missile
accuracy and thereby lessen the
confidence of target destruction
and
i

'

»

potentially increase the levels of
collateral damage. 22
A potentially more effective
option than SLBMs would be to shift

U.S. offensive forces to strategic
bombers and cruise missiles (ALCM
and

SLCM).

The strategic advantages of

a

manned penetration bomber lie in

their ability to be retargeted at any
time during their attack sequence
as well

as their ability to attack multiple
targets.

may prove very useful

Strategic bombers

against the new generation of Soviet mobile

nuclear systems which can relocate to hide
from U.S. targeteers.
Strategic bombers can act as surveillance
platforms to locate mobile
weapons and subsequently destroy them.

However, U.S. strategic bombers

also must contend with an extremely dense Soviet air
defense network and
as a result are less

flight routes.

likely to survive once they deviate from planned
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The U.S. had begun

Sfter aCqUiHn9 Germa

ims

explore
t6Ch " 01

"

the use of cruise
missiles shortly

^

*rl-

these weapons were
abandoned i„

f

War

a

nu.oer of strategic
advantages as

stewing

frora

„ owever

^

,

avor of the

they prove, cumbersome
for ships and aircraft.

Offers

„.

^
^

Today the cruise miss„e

spared

to the ballistic

the miniaturl2atfon
Qf nuc]ear wapheads

^

efficient engines.

compelling disadvantages

-the missiles

are relatively slow

-

the

cruise missile Is relatively
small and can fly gre
at distances at
extremely low altitudes.
The range of the ALCM
and SLC M designated
strategic missions is roughly
isoonm.

,„

the case of the

^^

for

range allows the U.S. to
attack roughly 85 percent
of strategic targets
in the Soviet Union
without bombers entering
Soviet airspace. 23 The
missiles' guidance packages, called
Tercom ass,sted inertial
navigation
system (TAINS), allows the
missiles to achieve great
accuracy thus
making them potential hard-target
kill weapons when equipped
with
sizeable nuclear warheads. A final
advantage of the cruise missile
is
its procurement and maintenance
cost.

be deployed at the cost of

a

Thousands of cruise missiles can

few new ballistic missiles.

requires minimal support facilities
and

a

The missile

relatively simple launcher.

The cruise missile may be able to
act as an insurance against the

deployment of

a

Soviet ballistic missile defense that
degrades the

penetration advantages ballistic missiles
currently have over
OA

aerodynamic forces.

Given the potential for the cruise missile
to

reach its target even in

a

highly defended environment, the U.S. will

need to be concerned with the expected
deployment of Soviet sea-launched
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-ise

missHes

deploy.

in the late

1980s, well before

U.S. BMD can be
such, the U.S. will
either have to reconsider
Its

>anist,c™iss,,e defense program

a

or begin a strategic
a,

r defense
initiative to ha„d,e Soviet
air breathing threats,
forward with
ballistic missile defense
and/or an a,r defense
system „i„ be dependent
not on, y on their
corresponding ,eve,s of

effectless

against the threat but
also the dollar expenses
to develop
and deplo, these defenses
at the same time and
the relative costs to
the
Soviets to circumscribe the
defenses.
The U.S.

currently exploring an
advanced cruise missile
(ACM)
that might add to the overall
effectiveness of these weapons.
The ACM
will be carried by the Bl-b
and ATB and will have
greater range,
accuracy, and targeting
flexibility than current cruise
missiles and be
able to perform evasive
maneuvers.
In addition, the ACM
will
is

incorporate stealth technology
reducing its radar cross-section
while
new engine will lower its infrared
25
signature.
The combination of
these improvements to the cruise
missile will make it

a

a

more difficult

threat for the Soviet air defense
focus to contend with and

a

potentially more useful weapon for the
U.S. to employ.
One major disadvantage of the cruise
missile
target.

is

its flight time to

Most cruise missiles will be carried on
U.S. strategic bombers

which would fly up to the Soviet coasts
and then release their missiles
for the second leg of the attack.

One option for reducing the total

attack time could encompass the deployment
of SLCMs on submarines that

would patrol close to the Soviet Union's coast.

In

addition, the TAINS

guidance system which depends on geographic height
variations currently
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restricts the cruise
missiU to certain penetration
2
routes. "
-ise missile a,so Is s ubj ect to
direct
Sov,et air defense
weapons

1

,

„c,

The

udi ng a, r defense
Interceptor al rcraft

and strategic
surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs).

While these weapons
systems can not provide
the time urgent

-re

survivab.e and ma, he able
to penetrate Sov,et
defenses .ore eas„y
than ballistic missiles
shou,d the Soviet Un,on
a,so deploy a ballistic
defense,
in fact, the addition
of significant numbers
of SLCHs
could provide the U.S.
with an effective hard-target
weapon thereby
proving an important redundancy
in this weapon category.
However,

M„

their introduction on

a

wide scale by the Soviets
also could pose

significant problem for the
United States.

a

Soviet submarines and ships

deployed just off the U.S.
coast could destroy

a

portion of U.S.

military and economic assets
within minutes of launching
their cruise
missiles. A U.S. ballistic
missile defense of the kind
currently
envisioned might have almost no
capability against these forces.
The
U.S. would have to consider
rebuilding a nationwide air
defense net of

surface-to-air missiles and

a

fleet of fighter interceptor
27
aircraft.

The U.S. also could seek to
increase the numbers of its

intermediate range ballistic miss,les

(

IRBMs) with strategic roles

stationed in Europe, namely the Pershing

currently total

108,

II.

These weapons, which

are extremely accurate due to
terminal guidance and

have hard-target kill capabilities.

The Pershing

II

can arrive bn

Soviet targets within eight minutes from
West Uerman launch points.

From another perspective, the U.S. may no
longer require the capability
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sHould

.anutic ^ssne

defense effective,,
preclude counterforce
attack options .. dn
effectjve BMB cQu]d
preyent
W,,h ,CBMS
SLBMS

" «

"*

would

me^prevan.

attacks is

,i k ely

—

Action

^^

The success of
counterforce and war- fighting

t0 be severely degraded
by

,

requiring either gre ater
recces 1„ an attack on
precluding these kinds
of attacks altogether.
,„ ad d,tion,
„.
reta

^^^^

atjon

execution of an attack within
m i„ ut es of an
Initial strike.

Therefore

ICBMs and SLBMs may not
be perceived as required
any longer.

Finally, ballistic missile
defenses are likely to lead
to a
concerted effort by the U.S.
and Soviet Union to
develop and deploy

countermeasures to ballistic miss^e
defenses.

Although

a number of
countermeasures have been previously
developed, i.e. chaff and balloons
deployed by the ICBM 'bus' to
confuse the defense's identification
and
tracking subsystems, there may
well be a tremendous expansion
in

countermeasures technology.

This expansion could erode the
defense's

effectiveness and thereby enhance the
offense's ability to penetrate.
Ballistic missile defense countermeasures
can be categorized as both

active and passive.

Passive countermeasures include changes
to the

ball, stic missile, additions to its
ability to avoid and penetrate a

defense, and tactics designed to confuse
or overwhelm the system.

Active countermeasures to

a

U.S. BHD include ASAT weapons, space
mines,

and electromagnetic pulse from the
detonation of
in space or

in

a

nuclear weapon either

the atmosphere to blind or degrade
the defense's sensors.

The Soviets probably are actively seeking
effective countermeasures to

'
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*

POtentla, U.S. strategic
defense.

t*

wi„ perfect

ef6nSe

^

They have repeat

—

and deploy countermeasures
to prevent

CreStln9 aS

;
between the superpowers.

~"

«"

^^^
a

U.S. strategic

m i lit ary reUtlonshlp

Among the countermeasures
often mentioned by
the Soviets are
methods to attack and degrade
or destroy space-based
User stations
The Soviets have listed
among these space
m,nes and ground-based
Users
The Soviets have pointed
out that a ground-based
User countenmeasure is
cheaper and easier to operate
than a
space system.

reared

power

to disaoie

a

In

addition, the

space platform is ,ess as
the dwel,

tim

is

substantia, as satellites pass
over the Soviet Union.

The Sov,ets a,so
have stated their intention
to upgrade their offensive
forces should the
U.S. proceed with depioying
a defense.
Such measures include increases
in the numbers of missiles,
warheads, and dummy reentry
vehicles
creating difficulties for the
detection systems of a U.S.
defense. They
have spoken of depressing their
SLBMs and adding cruise missiles
in

different basing modes to their
strategic arsenal. 28
prove highly effective against

a

U.S. missile defense.

The U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal

modernization program.

These methods may

is

in the midst of a major

That program will be nearing
completion by the

time the U.S. could decide to deploy

a

strategic missile defense.

By

the mid 1990s, the U.S. will have new
ICBMs, SLBMs, and two new

strategic bombers in its strategic force.

These weapons will be far

more capable than the current force for carrying
out counterforce
strikes on Soviet strategic forces and other critical
war-supporting
assets.

The introduction of strategic defenses of the
kind envisioned
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^

PPeSident Reaga
"

offence

f orces.

™"

^

the U.S. to debate
the ro,e of its

However, the tec h „o,o
g ica ,

strateg1c , and
.
Obstacles to an effective
strategic defense are
numerous an, may
Precede its eve, b ein dep,oyed.
g
Given the number and
nature of tnese
obstacles and the uncertainty
oven the nature of
the strategic haiance

'"the

,990s,

deterrent.

it

is

„ k e,y

that the U.S. wil,
maintain

Any effort to radically
aiter the

coition

U.S. offensive nuclear
forces nrinr
„
prior t,
to or during

11*1,

to be considered
premature.

Us

a

offensive
and mission of

defense deployment is

Finally, wh i.e strategic
defense

technology appears to be
gaining leverage on
offensive forces, there is
little doubt that offensive
countermeasures as we,, as new
offensive
technology wi „ be deve,oped
that may assure the offense's
dominance in
the coming decades.
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CHAPTER FIVE

STRATEGIC DEFENSES AND
STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL

Strategic arms control has
played an important role
in 0 S
deterrence policy since the
late 19,0s when U.S.
officials be 9 an to
appreciate that the U.S. was
becoming increasing
vulnerable to Sov,et
nuclear forces. As a result,
the view of arms control
as an effective
means of enhancing the
deterrent relat,onsh,p
between the superpowers
intensified.
[„ addition, the signing and
negotiation of an arms
control agreement ca.e to he
perceived as one measure of
the stability
of the strategic balance.
While negotiations and
agreements have been
difficult If not il.usive for
the past six years,

ams

control

remains
critical measure of stability and
key to the future of the
strategic

a

bal ance

The objectives and roles promoted
for strategic arms control
have
expanded since the 1960s and resulted
in the signing of a number
of

agreements between the U.S. and Soviet
Union.
structured in

a

These agreements were

fashion as to regulate the strategic
competition between

the superpowers and, in turn, to help
reduce the risks of

a

nuclear war.

While strategic analysts and politicians
have argued over the relative

merits and faults of the various standing
agreements as well as the arms
control

process, arms control continues to 0e an
important component of

U.S. deterrence policy.

A substantial

part of the debate concerning

U.S. deterrence policy that emerged in the
late 197us focused on the
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strategic value of arms
control for U.S.
security

Preset

Keagan's strate ic defense
g
initiative

to so.e extent, of

Ms

is

a

conseguence

^_

Adninlstration-s

wlth
control agree m ents in
force and the
Ministration's perception of
tUWed drmS C ° ntr0
a»y
strains. The Reagan
Ministration also is concerns
w ith the pattern of
the Soviet nuclear
buildup and is part,cularl
y interested ,„ the

a

»*

'

^

^

emergence of ne w defense
technoiogies and their
potential role for
enhancing U.S. security.
Regardless of
Kegaraiess
of the
tho justification
yfor the SDI
that relates to ar ms control,
it is difficult to
ignore the i,„pact

that

stand,ng agreercents and the
arm s control process
continue to have on
U.S. pol icy.

The U.S. has advocated arms
control to help promote and
maintain
its national security, in
the broadest sense.
The U.S. also has sought
to restrain Soviet aspirations
to use nuclear weapons,
either directly
on indirectly, to defeat the
U.S. and its allies by tying
the Soviets to

certain mutually accepted 'rules'
of the game.

In

this case, these

rules concern the numbers, types,
and capabilities of strategic
nuclear

forces that the superpowers are
allowed to develop and deploy.

Chapter One reviewed some of the various
arguments made against ABM
systems in the 1960s, one of which charged
that defensive weapons would

accelerate the arms race.
a

In

addition, critics of the ABM claimed that

defensive arms control agreement could restrain
an arms race between

the superpowers.

Similar arguments have re-appeared since President

Reagan's initiation of the SDI and his call to
"render ballistic

missiles obsolete".

For example, the New York Bar Association's

«««

on

prog™

u.s.

deration

Internationa, Arms
Contpfll

M SKupity ^ ^
Afr

o„ nationwide
bsll1st1c ffl1ss1le
o f the

Soviet Offensive
buildup

unregulated arms competition".

FOrmeP SeCreUry

s

defms

...

snd Wl|

,

|( ,

dd

^

1

"

McNamara, an Sreh1t
ect of U.S. nuclear
policy 1n the 1960s that
ultimately ,e.d to the
control or defenses to
prevent an arms race, has
active,, spoken against
the SDI on the
grounds
th«1tw1ll "sharp,, esca,ate the
arms race because",
as he states
"^Soviets will expend unlimited
funds to invent weapons
to defeat
It".
ncNamara has argued that,
although the SI) ,„ay develop
a
deployable missile defense
system for the U.S.
"the concept" of a
defensive balance "can not work
because all of the (Reagan)
I

,

Administration's star wars plans
rely on offensive weapons"/

.

.

.

„11

for the U.S. to continue
to

The arms race critigue
of the SDI is one

part of an ongoing debate
concerning the very nature and
role of arms
control in U.S. deterrence
policy.
That role, Illustrated by
the

Signing of the ABM Treaty and
SALT agreements, has been
characterized by
efforts to preserve U.S. security
while setting limits on the
offensive
nuclear forces and defensive forces
of both superpowers.
The Reagan

Administration came to power criticizing
both existing arms control
agreements, in particular the unratified
SALT
control

proposal

process In general.

II

Treaty and the arms

The Administration's missile defense

has heightened the arms control debate by
questioning the basis

of the existing artns control

regime.

Ity

establishing the goal or

a

strategic defense aga,nst
bal Hstic m ,ssi,es,
the A^stration
has
questioned the deterrence
value of the ABM Treaty.

Ad,scuss 10 n of the

i

mp Mcat,ons of
the SDI for ar ms
control can

divided into two m a or
sections.
0
role of ar ms contro,

balance.

in a

The first section
will ana

defense

The second section

a

U9TO nted or

donated

*,„ address locations

ly ze

be

the

strategic

for existing

treaties.

I.

Strategic Defenses and the
U.S. Arm.

Cmtmi

The possibilities of an
effective defense against a
ballistic
missile attack pose a number
of problems for strategic
arms control
between the U.S. and Soviet
Union including the potential
violate of
existing treaties and the more
fundamental issue concerning
the future
of arms contro! as traditionally
approached. Donald Snow goes as
far as
to argue that "the introduction
of BMD on any meaningful

scale will

require some basic adjustments to
our conceptions of deterrence,
and

because arms control nas been based
on these conceptions,
to be traumatic for arms control
U.S.

as well".

it

likely

4

strategic arms control policy has been
nearly coequal in

importance with other components of U.S.
deterrence policy.
Reagan Administration, arms control had
played
U.S.

is

a

Until the

more active role in

efforts to reduce the risks of war, reduce the
potential damage

that might otherwise be suffered should war
occur, and reduce the

burdens of peacetime defense preparations by slowing
the nuclear arms
race.

5

These objectives appear to be very similar on

a

strategic level
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th.

a,0Wenn9

associate, with the

" "e

neater incentive
later goals were

St

M

r ate 9l c ,a
fense lnit 1a t1 v e

for reductions ,„
offensive nuclear
weapons

elated

namely

,

increase in crisis
stability, and

in the Hoffman Rep0
rt

_

missioned

^

by

control policies in the
past and the defense
initiative of the present
clash from a practical,
if not philosophical,
stand. A sol id
understanding of this conflict
begins with a review
of the foundations
upon which strategic arms
control in tne U.S. has
been built.
The primary purpose for
which arms control has
been sought b y the
U.S. is a reduction in the
risks of a nuclear war.
The first official
consideration of an arms control
policy by the U.S. came in
1954 with
the establishment of a Panel
of Consultants on disarmament
chaired by
Robert Oppenheimer. 5 The
Oppenheimer Panel concluded that
the U.S.
needed to pay particular attention
to reducing the dangers of
a surprise
nuclear attack on U.S. strategic
nuclear forces. The issue of
force

vulnerability was later grafted
onto the concept of crisis and
strategic
stability and has been a part of
the nuclear debate since this
time.
The threat to U.S. strategic
forces, namely U.S. bomber bases,
was under

review by Albert Wolhsetter at the Rand
Corporation when the Panel's

Report was issued.

The combination of these studies
highlighted the

problems associated with reducing the
threat of
U.S.

forces and provided an impetus to

on arms control.

a

a

surprise attack on

number of academic discussions

The development of theories concerning the
role that

arms control

could play in U.S. deterrence policy followed
shortly

thereafter.

In

effect, these studies asked the question: can strategic

•«

-tro,

provide

.

usefu

,

means fop stabi]j2ing

balance and enhancing
U.S. security? 7

Jtu.es
0t

~ted
^-

-

by analysts such

asMorton Haiperin>

anns contro, theory
ln the 196us 8
*

4H

identified four major
themes as

a

Jos P en Kr uzel
,

has

result of his
hi
review of these works.

The primary importance
for arms mntmi
control is to enhance
stability
and reduce the
vulnerability of the
<-ne U
u.b.
S
to a* «surprise attack. 9
The
emergence of the ICBM
as the central
tral Qtratstrate ^c weapon of
the superpowers
,
h
nad further dramatized
the tnreat
threat of
nf aa esurprise
attack on U.S. forces
A critical objective
in these authors'
opinions was for the U.S.
to
develop and deploy
invulnerable weapon systems.
These early remarks
1.

were accurate in projecting
the vulnerability
problem as
of the deterrence debate
of

a

major issue

the ly/Os.

Secondly, these ear,y
theorists placed particular
importance on
the avoidance of an
acddenta, nuclear war for which
they argued was a
need to , .prove communication
,i„ ks between the
su
2.

Union.

U

m

^^

^

The establishment of the
Washington to Moscow 'Hot Line'
was
one result of this idea and
the advances of
communication links has

remained an important project
among arms control advocates.

S^e

of the

more recent examples of these
kinds of communication
mechan,sms include
the Standing Consultative
Committee (SCC) established by the
SALT I
accords in which the superpowers
can raise questions of treaty

compliance or any other strategic
issue.

A recent proposal by Senator

John Warner of Virginia calls for
the establishment of

a

Crisis Command

Center permanently and jointly manned
by Sbviet and U.S. delegates which

~W

P-

^

critic., military and
pol1tical

superpowers as

a

means of diffusing

"ne of the proponents'

potmja

,

219

ly

argents

for the ABM s ste
m ,„ the 1960s
y
was that an ABM system
could help protect
i" u, -ect aaain.t
,
against an
accidental war.
S^uld a oallistic missile
be accidental,,
Uunched by a superpower
or
.

a

e

Before

a

retaliation mi au ht be ordered.
ordered

have reiterated this
argument today.

a „
k
A
number
of defense advocates

Another major concern

that the

proliferation of nuclear
weapons could increase
the likelihood of an
accidental missile launch or
nuclear detonation and
that these
conditions might quickly draw
the superpowers into

a war.

A third theme was the
notion that the new
enterprise of arms
control need not be explicit. 11
In effect, these theorists
suggested
that arms control need not
involve formal negotiations
or treaties.
3.

Some of the early theorists
argued that unilateral measures
and/or
informally agreed upon steps to
reduce weapons or control
certain
aspects of the strategic balance
could provide equally successful

measures to reduce the risks of war
as could formal agreements.

While
there have been proposals for
unilateral arms reductions efforts
since
the 1960s, particularly in the
West, neither superpower has taken
major
steps in this direction.
For example, the U.S. has continued
to reject

Soviet proposals to follow its lead
in declaring

moratorium.

a

nuclear weapons test

The Reagan Administration's response
has been to argue that

the U.S. must continue testing in order
to catch up with Soviet weapons

development efforts.

In addition,

Teller's SDI program for

a

nuclear

pumped X-ray laser defense requires the testing
of nuclear weapons.

-1-U1..W
h

r

as a clyar under

;; U

:
out; that

was

a

strategic balance
U.S.

—^-—

appreciation for the

Hm1tations

of arms

contror

u

,

w
not aisarmam ; nt
potentially effects
y errective instrument for
stabilizing the
That

ic

,

strategic security problems;
rather
duner,

h
it minht
might help
prevent certain
of superpower activities
or events that
could have v ery serious
and adverse influence
on the security
of the United States.
As Kruze, has ar.ued,
and taken as a whole,
the basic principles
of
these early theorists
present arms contro, as
a modest hut
useful
process.
Tnese tneorists were lar
gely anns contro
£onsermtves
The task, then, for arms
contro, was to help
safeguard the condition of
mutual deterrence. Arms
contro! was to be a coequal
part of U.S.
defense policy, rather than
14
a substitute for
it.
i

,

The arms control process
has been expanded beyond
these modest
principles and goals and has
been charged with a broader
task. While
the preservation of stab„ity
was an overriding objective
of the early
arms controllers, it has often
taken an equal or second seat
to other

objectives.

"A serious problem for modern
U.S.

arms control

nas been

confusion over objectives, over
the basic purpose of the entire
enterprise".

b

That is, it has become increasingly
more difficult to

obtain agreement within the U.S. and
Western strategic community on the
nature of more comprehensive and
complex accords.
For example, the ABM
Treaty and SALT 1 accords were presented
to the U.S. Congress and public
and justified as appropriate steps
that would lead to offensive nuclear

arms reductions.

Having failed to achieve arms reductions,
arms control

1
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"in its objective
of security in »h

nation

"

tec hn1ques ,, has

««^.i M 11«i

P rese

"

an

"«of

^^^

but

~-chno,ogy

r

»

arms, by means of

bas a,l o ut

ecHpsed

number of obstacles
have developed that

most important factor
is the general
degree
e of
„•
ur oolitic,
a
Political willingness
displayed by the superpowers
v
to rparhi™
a
reaching an
agreement.
However, there
are a number of domestic
estic political
nnlitiVai
impediments to arms control.
Steven Miller has suqqesteri
suggested th.t
that th
the arms control
process does not
lack for ideas and
proposals, just
jubt success.
success
Mi
Miller argues that much
of
the failure to achieve
agreements is due to domestic
political
factors.
Miner further suggests that
while politics can prevent
,•

1

agents,

it

is

not always to the
detriment of U.S. security.

Phases of arms control can
be described.

Two

On the one hand, the
policy

formulation process occurs in
„h,ch negotiations among
the various
branches of the government are
conducted. The Department
of State,

Department of Defense, the Arms
Control and Disamament
Agency (ACDA),'
and Congress often have their
own differing arms control
agendas
for

political and foreign policy
18
concerns.
this juncture is the White
House.

The most important player
at

Any policy, therefore, is
the result

of considerable position
jockeying and political bargain,
ng as tne

vanous interests of the players are
often quite opposed.
the Department of Defense is
concerned with

-

a

budgetary, weapons procurement, and
safety

For example,

myriad of defense issues

-

all

of which become

very complex when interfered and
constrained by arms agreements.

However, these conflicts do not take
away from the fact that arms

control agreements
can enhance U.S.
securitv
-c
h
Urlty by
constraining obtain
weapons systems.
On the other hanU,
a second phase
Qf

politics of ratification 19
'"tion.

^

n

Donng the

initial phase the
White House
leads, however, the
Senate becomes the
> during
center
ter of attention
a tt
the
ratmcation process. The criti^i f ^
crmcal factor i„ this
regard concerns the
handling of minority
groups, either for
or against the
ur
fh» agreement.
For
example, 34 Senators
can block the ratify,ratification of a treaty,
while
public opinion also can
be nought
brouaht intn
rh
into the ratification
process, the
yame of politics rules.
And, as demonstrated
by the SALT II

ratification debates, the
outcome

is

not necessarily
guaranteed even

after an agreement has
been signed. 20

Miller concludes that
the "results of arm,
control"
seen, in
9enera,, as disappointing
- "seems to be a consequence of the
effects
of an imposing set of
political impediments:
policy formation, the

-

ratification process, electoral
politics, congressional
politics
bureaucratic politics, public
opinion, even international
Of which)

control

is

politics, (all
have to be aligned properly
or managed effectively if
arms
to be pursued successfully." 21

Finally, the absence of
can prevent its successful

a

few components in favor of
an agreement

completion.

For example, while there
appears

to be strong public and
Congressional support for arms
control today,

the Reagan white House has
appeared less interested and
consequently no

agreements have been reached during
the Reagan Presidency.
In

uniliteral Statement A of the ABM
Treaty, the U.S. specified

that it considered an offensive
arms reductions treaty critical to

Us
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'supreme interests'

represent

a

and the failure to
achieve
eve such
sucn an „„
agreement would
sufficient has,s for
withdraw,, from the
Treat,
It

«

retired more tnan five ears,
the time prescribed
y
new strategic arms
limitations treat, to he

by

statement A, for

a

negated and s,gned. The
Treaty
has never been
,1
ratified by the U.S. for
various reasons
among them the growing
debate in the U.S. over
the value of such
treaties to U.S national
security
seLunty.
+i
In addition,
in
the Reayan
Administration has put added
pressure on
nn fthe
ha standing
+
treaties as well
as U.S. compliance with
SALT II by publishing
reports of Soviet
violations of the Treaty.
Some arms control critics,
such as the
SALT

conservative Heritage Foundation,
have urged the U.S. to
take steps to
counter reported Soviet Treaty
violations to include withdrawal

from the

Treaty.

However, the Administration
had decided until recently
to keep
the U.S. in Treaty compliance.
The Administration now plans
to deploy
cruise missiles on U.S. B-52
strategic bombers in late 1986
which would
be in violation of the
SALT II Treaty.

Another critique, espoused by Magnus
Clarke, sees arms control so
far behind technology that "the
complete

abandonment of the arms control

process, as it exists, and consequent
total de-regulation of the

superpower arms race in all
policy.

its aspects may now be the more
appropriate

To continue in the pursuit of arms
control

...

is to

avenues which offer more promise to the
goal of security". 23
of other arms control

ignore

A number

critics, including Reagan Administration

officials, go beyond these conclusions and
argue that arms control has
in

fact had

a

negative effect on U.S. national security.

These critiques are neither accepted by the entire
policy community
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39reementS

" ^ «*

of ma Jor weapons
programs

to such efforts by
the Administration

™—

In add 't'°".

•

have strongly backed
the arms control
process.
p rocess
'

•

nt

-,ear

--called 'two-tracked'
approach

U.S.

NATO partners

.

Thp „
The
deployment of new

weapons (INF) 1n Europe
was

^^^

in wnic n the Europea
„

support INF deployments
so longa as tne
the U
S
U.S.
sought an arms agreement
on
these weapons at the
same time.
The NATO allies are
sensitive to any
suggestion that the O.S.
abandon Us nuclear

™

"-sting treaties or the arms
control process.

While the European
oovernments w,sh to encourage
efforts such as the SO,
that may lead

to

-creased security, they are
fearful that current
U.S. efforts outs,de
of an arms agreement
may de-couple U.S. and
NATO security.

These

governments are likely to
pressure
s
c„ .seekl an
P essure the U.S.
to
arms agreement on
offensive forces before the
U.S. can begin dep.oy,ng
a missile defense.
In addition, any
anti-tactical baUistlc missile
defense (ATBM) designed
for NATO is likely to be
accompanied oy great pressure
in the arms
contro, arena as Soviet
offensive weapons related efforts
to counter a
defense would agitate the
Europeans.
II

Kenneth Adelman. Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency for the Reagan Administration,
has criticized the arms control
process from another perspective
reminiscent of the early theorists.
Adelman argues that the arms control
process has become overly political
and a process in which the
U.S. has not played very well.

Adelman has

argued that the U.S. "changes its
positions on arms control so often
that the Soviets can take pleasure in
the expectation that if they stand

«.»

«aresuU».

trance

win negate

with itself ano probably
[hMje j(s
Arms control took on
an

,„ U.S.

concerns

po,itical

re, ations wi th

^^ ^

Waord.an

W

for botn
i

ts

a„

^

,

y symbol ic

^

ies

«

stood fir™ on certain arms
centre, positions
for .est of Ms first
term
but has new shewn himse.f
to be .ore flexible,
in part, Oue to
pressures
to include arms control
in nis Administration's
deterrence policies
That is, Reagan increasing,,
h as sought to
portray arms centre, as
an

of strategic defenses.

These pressures have been
generated by the

Congress as wel, as U.S.
allies.

Aden's

argument, a,ong with the

critique that arms control has
been unable to account for
the
differences in Soviet and U.S.
strategic policy and objectives,
is
central to the Reagan Administration's
position.

Strategic missile defenses run
against the central tenets of
existing arms control treaties
which purport to regulate the
strategic
nuclear balance by confining the
arms competition to the offensive
arena.

The decision to rely on offensive
deterrence rests with the

realization that defenses could not
prevent an enemy from causing

unacceptable damage to the United States.
dismantled its defenses against

a

nuclear attack and has,

sought to preserve its security through
control

agreements.

The U.S. has basically

a

in turn,

policy of retaliation and arms

For example, the U.S. dismantled its
surface-to-air

missile network, has allowed its air defense
interceptor force to
dwindle, ana mothballed all but the radars of the
Safeguard ABM defense
system constructed in the early 1970s.

A shift

in favor of strategic

226

defenses could overturn

number of the
tne stratwlr
strategic assumptions
upon which
the current nuclear
balance rrests
«t. and
>»j the
arms contro! policies
proposed

•*

control

a

istied to the traditional
strategic concepts, name,,

offensive dominance,
national vulnerability,
and strategic stability
through invulnerable
offensive forces, it is

ke y t0
U.S. deterrence theory
dominated b y strategic
defenses.
While not exhaustive,
C,ar,e has identified
"two principle factors"
which he concludes "have
been held to threaten
the stability of the
,i

Within

,

a

deterrent relationship"
between the superpowers. 26

possession of

a

first str, k e disarming
capability and the second is
the

possession of an effective
ve defensp
aerense. 27

ly

n

Rnth
«
Both would
weaken the assurance

that an enemy was deterred
from launching
general

The first is the

a

nuclear attack and are

attributable to assured destruction
theory and policies.

control, in this context, has
been associated as

a

means for preventing

the emergence of destabilizing
efforts by the superpowers.

arms control

Arms

That is,

has served to restrain those
activities deemed most likely

to destabilize the nuclear balance
as well as those most easily

verified.

However, "the reality of the central
deterrent relationship

has diverged from both deterrence
theory and the arms control

image".

28

Both the United States and the Soviet
Union have sought to procure

counterforce capable weapons which could give
them

a

limited first

strike capability and as such limited defense
capabilities when used
a

damage limitation mode.

in

Constraint on counterforce weapons has been

relatively unsuccessful as the accuracy of
ballistic missiles has
improved and the superpowers have deployed thousands
of warheads on

—

_

—

MIRVed bal listic missile
missiles.
,
fha re,a

—

.

.

e success

f

°

r

tu

The arms control
process
M'ucess has contributed
*
to

tlypr e Sslngthecred ,

regulate this arena.

" "e
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—

of

control

t0 portray arms
contro ,

Existing treaties are

part, by the str at e
9 1c defense Initiative.

regime and enterprise
enternrico

effective

imyofthearmscontro]

weakening element of
U.S. deterrence
policy.

'"aliens

M

^
,s

The anms

k
being
critiqued for undermining
u

security rather than
providing for it .

However

_

the

^

Administration believes "the
pursuit o, the SO, and
eguitahle and
verifiable arms control
agreements are not mutually
exclusive, in
they 'may be' mutually
supportive"."

H*e,y to be the future of arms
contro,

The question remains:
What

S

fact
is

as the U.S seeks to
implement a

defense deterrence doctrine,
policy, and force structure?

Secretary of Defense Weinberger
has argued that arms
control can
serve U.S. national security
interests as one component
of the U.S.'s
larger national security
policy but not as an isolated
objective or
30
independent instrument.
As such, Weinberger believes
that the U.S.
nnly can achieve effective
arms agreements when negotiating
from

strength.

For example, the Reagan
Administration has touted the

argument that the SDI has brought
the Soviets back to the bargaining
table and will further lead to
greater flexibility on the part of the
Soviets.

In

addition, the Reagan Administration
has made the reduction

in numbers of weapons

(measured by their effectiveness) the
primary

Str6n9thenin9
*"«
a

—
^

concern for an arms

control

a™s

^
<"

arms centre,

contro,

d 1S cuss,on

-

^

has made

ams

among

m

p

from the critically
m.noed t0 those

in some fashion
an,

see lmport ant
options emerging as

result of the strategic
defense initiative.

fe

-ces

^

more difficult enterprise
under

T^ere has emerged an
interesting

—in,
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.neatest ,mpetus to arms
control or the

a

m^ ^
As such,

the SO, couid be

^

Sov,ets nave been adament
about an agreement on
the SO, which ,nOicates
eventual difficulty in reaching
any agreements, the,
are back at the
negotiating tab,es and
desperatiy want to reach
some agrees.
The
lesson of these developments
for Administration
hard-liners is to hold
fast on the SO, in Geneva
while moderates see the SO.
as a critica,

negotiating card to obtain
meaningful offensive reductions.
A number of
ams contro, critics, such as the
Heritage Foundation, foresee
little if
any role for arms control
and have urged the
Administration to abandon
U.S. Treaty obligations.
Other strategic defense
proponents, including
President Reagan, forsee an
important role emerging for
arms agreements
in a

nuclear balance which includes
controlled defensive deployments.
Hence, arms contro, could range
from unhindered defenses and
no arms
control to offensive arms

limits and no defense.

Between these two

extremes there could be various
combinations for mutual offensive
cuts
and restraints on defensive
deployments.
A number of critics believe the
Reagan Administration is insincere

about arms control.

As outlined above, the SOI could
require

shift in the traditional U.S. approach
toward arms control.

a

The

major
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important

"

*"-""««.

of a defense

regard, the superpowers
have agreed to

a

demoted

balance.

U

th1s

three subject arms
control

approach in Geneva.

The first meetings
held in Harch 1,85
divided the
agenda into strategic
intercontinental weapons,

-lean

weapons, and space-based
weapons systems.

^

U-S
-

^

Adelman announce, in

to the

,«

contro, talts

more defense-oriented
deterrents could lead to
a situation where
the
peace was not rest,ng on the
threat of mu tua, annihi

That is
the Reagan tea, Oe| le ves
that strategic miss.le
defenses eventually can'
he deveioped and deployed
in an arms control
context. Reagan has stated
that the U.S. would be
willing to share defense
technology with the
Soviets if they were to agree
to an arms control accord
that called for

mutual deployments of ballistic
missile defenses.

The Administration

effectively is seeking to preclude
any agreement that would
constrain
the SDI

research program during its current
phase and leave open to
discussion agreements on later phases.
A cornerstone of the Reagan
Administration's arms control policy
to

date has been

a

proposal to reduce the size of the
offensive land based

forces of the superpowers.

Since his strategic defense speech,
Reagan

has emphasized the need for offensive
arms reductions as

defense deployment process.
a

a

part of

a

The Administration recognizes the
threat of

simultaneous offensive and defensive arms race
should the Soviets seek

to overcome a U.S. missile defense by
employing offensive

counter-measures to include an increase in the size
of their offensive

-eararsena!.
offensive arms reductions
are possible if
the b. s . iswiIMng
tQ
constrain the SDI bv a treat,,
u„
tPeaty
y
H0Wever the Reagan
Administration has
said that the SDI is
not negotiable
gotiable. Th„
«h
The Admin,
-

strati on appears to
have
every intent to continue
the researrh
research and „development
phases or the SDI
with or without an arms
control agreement.
,

While there ma, be room
in the Keagan
Administration's position
for agreements on later
stages to include a
transitional deployment
it
has not been revea.ed
as yet.
Weinberger
has argued,

in this regard
that the pursuit of defensive
deterrence by the superpowers
may provide
the Soviets with a reason
to consider offensive
reductions.
The

Administration's optimism may not
be well thought out as
Soviet and
domestic objections could act
as powerful obstacles
to defense
deployments.

A number of SDI critics
have argued that the Reagan

Administration actually wishes to
force the Soviets into an
offensive
arms reduction accord by
deploying a U.S. missile defense.
Former
Secretary of Defense Brown has
responoed to this idea by arguing
that
"deployment of a U.S. missile defense

...

fails on logic.

to gain arms reductions

U.S. MIRVs may have produced the
ABM Treaty but it is

difficult to see how U.S. ABMs will
produce constraint on Soviet
it

MIRVs".

32
It

the U.S. continues to insist that
the SDI is

non-negotiable, there

is

unlikely to be any arms control agreements
on

strategic offensive and defensive forces
at all.

Moderates in

Washington are hoping that the Soviets will
accept deep offensive cuts
in

returen for some restraint on the SDI.

Assessment concluded that this would be

a

The Office of Technology

logical choice as limited

-fenses are feasible

on ly

a

, inst

reduced

but that area defenses
would not work.

^
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,f

A number of arms
contro,

^

advocates have suggested
that the SDI can
serve as a bargain,ng
chip, much as the
orig,„ d U-S ABM
eventually served, to
encourage Soviet
flexibility in Geneva on
an
offensive arms contro,
accord.
Critics claim that
failure to ne 9 otiate
on SDI risks provoking
a similar ouviei
Soviet strategic
stratPnir hdefense
effort and
thereby an escalation in
the arms race.
The Reagan Ministration
,

.

has

Publishing its account of
Soviet violates of
existing treat.es and by
documenting existing Soviet
strategic defense program.
As such,
the

Reagan Administration is
seem,ng,y
'reprisals'

p,

acing the s0 , ,„

th(j

Qf

for Preach of Treaty
obligations by

a second party.
In this
case, the Adm,nistration my
have some justification
for calling the SDI
legal in response to specific
Soviet violations of the ABM
Treaty,

namely the construction of large
phased-array, early warning radar
at
33
Krasnoyarsk.

President Reagan has suggested that
the U.S consider discussing
a
sharing and coordinated deployment
of ballistic missile defenses
with
the Soviets.

In this

regard, "the President

...

is

known to believe

that unilateral deployment by the
U.S. would be destabilizing.

Soviets would be convinced that the U.S.
was interested
first strike capability and might respond
with

their own."

34

a

in

The

developing

pre-emptive strike of

The Administration may believe it can
pressure the

Soviets into an offensive arms control accord
and then establish an

agreement on phased defense deployments.

However, the Administration

a

r
232

"as not proposed
pub, Icly .„ arms
control

ayenaa

that would achieve
Confusion persists
due to confix
inflicting reports
that the
„h
Administration
is inflexible
on the SDT
f,

these ends.
•

„

'

feeders
tee
ens and hints of
flexibility

—
—
T ^ —

associated

"

e

;

7

wth

J^esof

the fMrStS
1rst

additi

°-

ram

f a

*

"

*

y

5

-

Un '° n

—egic

Thi,

^*

„

^
«

" hUe 3,50 pu
"'"9 out

"

'

„e w arW s control

—
-es

negotiating

not want to bind
the

~- ~s

to the goestion
of

-tate

Shult, ,„ formPd
_

revise its plans to
dep, oy

a

defense ,f the Soviets
wene willing to agree
on significant
offensive arms reductions
Tbis announcement
may nepnesent the
first
'oo, at a U.S. arms
control position
relative to defense
weapons.
,„
fact, the U.S. may
ultimate , y seek t0 obuin

^

cuts in offensive forces
and

-gh

a„ow

a

^^^

some strategic defenses.

This avenue
be far .one effective
in enhancing
deterrence and stabilizing
the

strategic balance.
what are the arms control
options available to the
U.S. should it
decide to proceed with
a strategic missile
defense? Ueorge Keyworth
science adviser to President
Reagan, has outlined three
goals for arms
control in the context of
the SD1.
He argues that arms
control, to be
effective in promoting U.S.
security must reduce the
risks of nuclear
wan, reduce the level of
arms, and lessen the
consequences of wan. 36
The Reagan Administration
may attempt to achieve
these goals in a number
of ways.
As described above, the
Administration has argued that it

«ould like to conclude an
offensive anms control agreement
which, in
turn, might provide the basis
for an eventual BHD deployment.

While it
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is not

inconceivable that the
Soviets would agree
to an ,arms control
treaty that cuts
offensive
j™= and prov,des
eisive arms
for scheduled
defense

events,

^'-e

of power.

—
verity

the

Soviet Union, unlike
the U.S., maintains
the
of its nuclear
capability on land-hased
Qbt?u i^bMs.
,CB Ms
Thes
These
weapons
to he the first tar
et
of a d,. defense.
y
9
Hence, the

Sov,ets

than by opposing it.

The resolution of thesp p nn fn,^
tnese conflicting
positions

advantageous ro,e in arms
control

—

- „

-

dependent on

SDI's most

^

„ umber Qf
F,rst,
the
s.
techn,ca, feasibility
of a missile defense
wil,
erectly constrain the
positions the U.S. can
advocate in an arms
control regime,
for example, should
traditional ABM ,nterceptors
prove
feasible while more exot,c
defenses do not, the U.S.
may seek
modifications to existing treaties
rather than scrapping them.
Second
the overall military/political
implications of a U.S. BHD for the
superpowers' nuclear arsenals
and the stability of the
strategic balance
Will have to be cons,dered
critically before advancing
a defined arms

control position.

That is, the benefits of

a

,

U.S. BMU may not outweigh

the continued or enhanced
benefits of maintaining and
strengthening

control.
will

a™

Finally, the options for arms
control available to the U.S.

influence the U.S.'s decis,ons as
to its future arms control

approach.
A more detailed example of
the offensive reduction and defensive

deployment scheme has been labelled
(DPB).

The proposal calls for

a

a

'defense protected builddown'

phased introduction of strategic

-

Where lnitjal defenses
would be deployed
t0 protect retal1at0

StPUCtUred t0 inC Ude
'

-e

capa b ,e

tenses

~—
S

a round a

-

forces and deployment

^

greater number Qf
38
targets
_

defense problem might be
made easjer

environs,
was

a

it

^

an

would not automatica
„ y mea „

^

^

wise decision for U.S.
security.

m

Nitze's defense criteria

offensive reduced world.
of inherent technical

only p e met somewhat
more easily ,„ an

39
A defense
ense

U

,s

still i-l
stin
''^ly
,

to have

a

number

limitations and flaws,
such as

command-control-communication UnKage
problems,

in addition to

difficulty handling remaining
Soviet penaided offensive
forces.
Secondly, the cost savings
associated with reduced
offensive forces are
unlikely to compensate entirely
for expenditures toward
a defense.
Final,,, fitting the defense
deployments into an arms control
framework
in order to maintain
stability in a manner acceptable
to the superpowers
is a major task. 40
An additional

arms control

option to constructing

a

could involve the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC).

new agreement
The

Commission is not well known but has
been critically important to
the
arms control

regime for the past decade and

established during the SALT

I

a

half.

The Commission,

accords, can consider compliance

questions, changes to the strategic balance
that may bear on Treaty

provisions, measures to increase the viability
of existing agreements
including amendments, as well as proposals
for limiting strategic
weapons.

41

The SCC has had success in clarifying
provisions of the ABM

1
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Treat, ana ecu,. prove
useful

in

clarify1ng lBtarpprt
, tl0M of

provisions of the Treaty
bearing on the strategic
defense initiative
program.
However, the SCCs
effectiveness i„ th,s regard
dependent
on the attitudes of
the superpowers regarding
the overall

value of arms

control

advocates.

Thp SCC
srr could
The
prove useful

to achiev lng less
formal
arms agreements as suggested
by AC DA Director
Adelman
m
Aaeiman and may
avoid some
of the domestic poHtlcal
a rms contro,
pitfalls and barr1ers nomd]]y

accompanying the more forma!
arms contro, negotiating
process.

1

•

Mense

and

Existina^ 1 £nn^j^

j t lj

^

The U.S. and Soviet Union
have entered into a number
of arms
contro! agreements over the
past two and a half decades
of which three
have an impact on the current
and future character of
the strategic
defense Initiative and any possible
U.S. strategic defense system.
These treaties are: the 1963
Multilateral Limited Test Ban Treaty,
the
1967 Mult, lateral Outer Space Treaty,
and the 1972 ABM Treaty and its

amendments of 1974.

Should the U.S. decide to move beyond
its present

defense technology research program as
defined by the SDI to the full

development of ballistic mis S1

le defenses or to expand the
scope of its

technology test programs, it could begin
to bump up against limitatibns
on these activities as established by
these Treaties.

Each of the

Treaties place specific as well as general
controls and limits on
various aspects of strategic defense technology
(ie. mobile ABMs are

prohibited by the ABM Treaty), and/or the development
and deployment of

defense systems.

President Reagan's SDI may require modification or

.

J
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U.S. withdrawal

from these Treatipc
Ireaties if
,f pursued beyond

u$

configuration.

the U.S.', effort
t0 estab)1sh ru|es

between the superpowers
Powers.

,

nthe stmeg1c
cMpetuion

Ypit-h^
Yet,
the measure of
their success

is dependent
number of factors
includinga one'ss strategic
strain, perspective,
the extent
of change in the
strategic balance over
time and the
cine,
th„ relative
adherence
by the signing parties
to the Treaties
provisions. An additional

on

a

Wi.,'

point

else, to reduce the risks
of war and not as an
end in itself .« That
1.. not a„ forma, treaties serve
or continue to serve
the objective of
reducing the risks of W ar
and promoting U.S.
nationa, security.
Neither
an individual treaty
nor the arms control
regime can be considered

sacrosanct

A-

Limited.

est Ban Treaty

The 1963 Limited Test Ban
Treaty was the first important
Treaty to
emerge in what might be termed
the arms control era, roughly
represented
by the period from 1963
to 1979.
Th 1S period represents
the heyday of
the 'traditional approach' to
strategic arms control between the
U.S.
and Soviet Union.

That approach came to be centered
on efforts to

confine the activities of the superpower
competition to quantifiable and
verifiable areas. The Limited Test Ban
Treaty regulates the area in
which nuclear tests can be conducted;
in this case, the areas are the
earth's atmosphere, outer space, and the
oceans.

The ABM Treaty and

SALT accords regulate the numbers of
launchers for ABM interceptors and
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strategic nuclear
weapons, respectively
ve 'J'' that
tn at the
th. superpowers
can
deploy. Generally,
these regulated or
control
led'
led

ver,f,ed by 'national
techn.cal means'.

areas can be

in

1963, President Kennedy
called the Limited
Test Ban Treaty "an
important step in man's
effort to escape from
the darkening
prospects of
ore -ruction and
saw in Us Sign, ng
the prospects of
detente between
tne two superpowers"
Thie
P
Th
1S enthusiasm for
arms control has
been
embraced by every president
since President
,
Presidpnt Kennedy
A
until the Reagan

Administration.

The political

appeal of arms control
can be

as these agreements
can offer, according
to Kruze,
°f slowing the arms
race and improving

,

U.S.-Soviet

record

"the double virtue

relates"

+«

whether one believes that
either the arms race has
been slowed or
superpower relations improved

does not taKe away from
the appeal of arms

control.

fact, the Reagan
Administration has embraced
arms control
its effort to improve
the superpowers' relations.
The Administrate
also has raised the prospects
of an arms agreement in
a defense
,„

m

dominated strategic balance.

However, the Adm,n,stration
has not been

willing to discuss the possibility
of limiting the SD. program
in order
to promote an arms agreement.
The Soviet Union, on the
other hand, has
stated that is unwilling to agree
to an arms control

areas unless the SOI is included.

accord in other

The reasons for arms control's
appeal

and the commensurate expansion
of its role in U.S. policy
as well as its
inability to fulfill all presidential
dreams will be addressed further
in

later sections of this chapter.

The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
concluded

nuclear explosions

in the

a

comprehensive ban on

atmosphere, in outer space, and under the

oceans.

Although the initial
focus of the
6 SDI
bUI had been
h
on non-nuclear
defense technology and
weapons
P^ns systems,
systems a* number
„
k
of defenses under
nS ' derati0n
COnf,
ed
weapons.
The ABM
.

^

:

—

- *-

-

th6Nik

"

—

systans of

ol,o w -onSen t 1„ a l and
Safeguard

employed nuclear warheads
warneads Sasc their
operative kill mechanisms
against reentry vehicles.
Currently, there
Lnere are a f«
h
,
few defense

^^
systems

under ,nvest,ga tl on by
the SUI0 , such a$
„„.,..,
defense, that would be
dependent on „ uc , ear
explosions
generate missile killing
lasers.

fn

outer $pace

^

The Test Ban Treaty
preCu.es the testing of
nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere or in outer space,
thereby preventing actua,
'envi

ro^enta,

testmg

of these weapons.

•

The Treaty would preclude
the deployment of

nuclear exp,osion dependent
defense if It were designed
to be deployed
in space.
The future development or
testing of this kind of

system in

an operational mode would
entail

a

U.S.

violation of the Treaty.

Relative to these kinds of
restrictions, President Reagan has
stated
that the SDI will

not violate the

currently in force.

provisos

of any arms control

treaty

However, research by the U.S.
to develop an

effective defense of the kind
envisioned by the Reagan Administrate
may eventually require the
violation of

B.

a

number of treaty provisions.

Outer Space Treaty
A second treaty which will

have some impact on the development
or

deployment of strategic defenses being
explored by the SDIO

is

the 1967

Outer Space Treaty, formally called the
Treaty of Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space,

a
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including the Koon and
other Celestial Bodies. 4 *
Art icie
Treaty prohibits the
stationing of nuclear
weapons

„ „

^

^

The Treaty also
precludes tbe

establ1sh ra ent of

~s,

bases,

Inflations

or fortifications

or weapons test1„
g on celestial bod,es.

Treat, was to

deploys

™mtary

b an

The objective of
the

the nuclear weaponization
of space and

P

rec lude the

of weapons systens
si m l, ar to a
fractional orbital

bombardment system (FOBS),
essentially nuclear tipped
orbital ba ll1st1c
""ssi.es.
However, the Treaty
failed to effective,.
Pan FOBS and does
not preclude the
passing of nuclear armed
,CBMs through space.
The
Treaty, as in the case
of the Limited Test
Ban Treaty,

would Hn.it to
some extent the deploy.ent
of ballistic .issile
defenses stationed in
space that employed nuclear
weapons to destroy ballistic
missiles.
However, the interpretation
of these restrictions
is likely to be

subject to debate between the
superpowers. 46

According to Thomas Beer,
strategic defense systems, such
as a
directed energy weapon (DEW),
which would draw their energy
from a
nuclear source can not be considered

a

'nuclear weapon'

nuclear component of the energy
production source
itself to define it as

a

nuclear weapon. 47

is

since the

not enough in

Even though the specific

technical components of Teller's
nuclear pumped laser may not
qualify
as

a

it

violation of the specific prohibitions
of the Treaty, according to

the previous interpretation, these
weapons would clearly violate the

spirit of the Treaty.

Beer has concluded that the "relevance of
the

Treaty to the prevention of the militarization
of space is marginal.
leaves loopholes for

.

.

.

military activities, such as the deployment

It

—
of
.

u s

.

.

space-based BMU weapons." 48
t0 in Chapter
Four
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the

-

—-

,SSiledefenSeWedPOnSySt

'

s P ,ce

by the 0uter
space

Treny

W - ie.
„

P-mpt^e
-ces,

attack on Sov,et fonces

-

.

"—-designed

a

^

strat
th
stnategy
that relied on

in conjunct , 0 „

th e y can not function
as an offensive

that

While

_

prove useful to an
offensive strategy

-

a

y $

.neat, pen se. The oniy
true offensive role U.S.
U S
mi^ii*
h *
m ,ss,le defenses
could play by themselves
would
°e as anti-satellite
weapons (ASAT).
In an ASAT role,
a U.S. laser
defense or Hnetlc k n,
weapon might be able
t0 destroy Soviet
warn,n 9 and reconna, sance
satellites as a precursor
to a nuclear strike
on the Soviet Un,on or
as a means to enhance
the survivability of
a U.S.
missHe defense system prior
to or during a war.

^

In

of a

addition, there is considerable
concern about the survivability
U.S. space-based missile
defense. While hardening
and overlapping

deployments can enhance the
system's survivability, the
U.S. would have
to ultimately consider some
anti-countermeasure role for some
of its

defense assets.

That is, the U.S. is likely
to require ASAT dedicated

Platforms or defense systems with
inherent self-defense
capabilities
against possible Soviet direct
attack countermeasures. The
issue of

discriminating ASAT from missile
defenses will be particularly
difficult
in an arms control

C.

agreement.

The ABM Treaty
The most important strategic arms
control treaty to date

is

the

1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty 49
y

Tho
The t
Treat

^ ^presented the formal
express.on cf U.S.
strategic nuclear
deterrence
eierrence tho
ht of
,
thought
the early
*

1970,
1970s.

tk
t
The
Treaty symbolizes
the essence
nCe of the
fh« concept
of mutual
deterrence as enshrined
by
7 the mutual
UtUal «c
a5SUred* destruction
doctrine and
suggests a common
understanding on the
relating
relationship kbetween
offensive
,
n
and defence weapons.**
That is, "the Treaty
reflected the

m
— -^
•

temporary

^

predictions
ed

the superpowers'

SerVed

-her

^

probable trends ln
strategy

-

of the arms control

As such, the Treaty
has

regime for the past
decade

and a half.
The Treaty, m od,fied
by protoco

,

sjgned )n

^

^^

depioyment of an ABM system
around the nationa,
capita, or an 1CBM
launch field to include
one hundred Punchers
and no
more than one

hundred ABM missiles.

Both the U.S. and Soviet
Union have deployed ABM

defenses; the Soviets dep,oyed
the Galosh ABM system
around Moscow and
the U.S. deployed the
Safeguard defense around a
U.S. Minuteman field
While the Soviet Union has
mainta,ned its ABM system
since the signing
of the Treaty, the U.S.
dismantled all but the system's
radars in the

mid-1970s.
The Treaty contains

a

number of provisions which
prohibit or place

restrictions on ABM activities and
systems.

Article

V

bans the

'development, testing, and deployment
of ABM systems and components
that
are sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based'
and

precludes deployment of launchers
capable of multiple shots or rapid

reload."

Article

V

„

reasons, to help
forestall the growth
of

offensive nuclear arsenals.*'

"

f orces

represents the heart of the Treaty with
respect to

o
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the goals and scope
of activities
ties th*+
that can be
undertaken by the
Strategic Defense
Initiative
As such 9 any d1
y plans t0 move
*
miccil* adefense
technolog, development
into these restricted
areas, such
*
as art,,,!
actual cs,stem
testing or to dep,o,men
t
would violate
Host ana„sts would
a g ree that the
Keagan Administration
tfl
remain within the
Treaty boundaries
with respect to
»'in
„ traditional
ABM
-apons development. That
„. the deve.opment of land-based
ABM
-erceptors, similar to those
emp,o,ed in the Sa f e
9 uard s,stem, are
to retire the
violation of the Treat,
Tor sometime as
this
techno, 9y a, read, has
been proven feasible.
In addition, the
Treat,
Provides tor the operation
ot an ABM research
facilit, b, ooth nations
However, there are a number
ot 'exotic' techno,o
g ,es under consideration
the
SOIO that do not fall
0*
into the traditona,
anti-ballistic missile
interceptor category.

Oration.

,

^

^J,

in

anticipation of the development
of advanced technologies,
Agreed
Statement 0 was attached to
the Treat, to help with
the handling of
these weapons. Statement
D stipulates
that "the parties agree
that in

the event ABM s,stems based
on other ph,sica,
principles and including
components capable of substituting
for ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM
launchers, or ABM radars are
created in the future, specific
limitations
on such s,stems and their
components would be subject to
discussion in

accordance with Article XIII"."

Until the Fall of 1985 the
Reagan

Administration's justification for certain
SDI related testing was that
the, were too rudimentar, or
peripheral
to be the kind barred b, the

Treaty.

54

However, this issue

is

now the subject of intense debate
as

the Reagan Administration has
sought to define Treaty interpretation

-

—

addUi0na

;

'

ewofthe

testing and development
b een a

—
^^

„
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'*

is

»CH

negotiating records
conducte ;

by officials
invo]vfid

—ate

^ ^^

^

U.S. objective" during

-cent statements

less restricted

,„

^

on

had

^

that the U.S. sought
t0 provlde cover
in the ABM
U-hasea laser ABM defense then
under consideration by
the Department
of Defense.
This basic conflict
locates the latitude of
interpretation which the
Reagan Administration
feels it may need to
continue strategic defense
research and testing
beyond its current
status.
It also inmates a
desire on the part of the
Administration to
stay within the Treaty
provisions while bringing
up the question of
Treaty compliance for
debate domestically.
The interpretation of

ArtiCe U, Article

and Agreed statement
D
poses the greatest threat
to the viability of the
ABM Treaty's continued
control on ballistic missile
defenses.
It also may provide
the
'loophole' through which the
SDI may progress without
running afoul of
the Treaty and could either
prevent or instigate a major
political and
strategic setback to arms control.
In October 1985, Reagan
V,

Administration officials stated that
the Administration's interpretation
of the Treaty, precipitated by
the Pentagon Report mentioned
above,

would "not prohibit the testing or
development on new technologies such
57
as kinetic or directed energy
weapons".

Critics of the SDI, including

former negotiator uerard Smith, charged
that this 'broao interpretation'

would sound the death knell of the ABM
Treaty.

Smith's position

is

that
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«««

defense weapons were
banned

„

:::rr

^

^

of Art,cie v and that
A9reed

^

the handHng of e*ot,c
weapon systans and
components.**

ministration Uter stated
interpretation

The

that ,t wou,d adhere
to the more restrictive

« „ acknowledge

th4t it

applying the 'broad
interpretation'. 59

„

^

,

^

y

The debate has become
more intense due, in
part, to the fact
that

the Reagan Administration
appears to have assaulted
past

Adm,nistrat,ons' and their
own .nterpretation
of the Treat,.
Arms Control and
Csanmament Agency's report
to the U.S.

1** applied
-u.d

he

The U

S

Congress in
the interpretation that
the creat,on of
space-based ABMs

breach of Treat,
obligations, whereas the creation
of new
fixed land-based ABM technology
6"
would not.
,„ ddd1tion
, March
report to Congress "did not
offer a reinterpretation
of Treaty
a

^

,

limitations;

rather,

it

argued that prospective
tests were compatible

with the Treaty because
devices tested in space did not
constitute full
fledged substitutes for ABM
systems or their components". 61
The restrictive interpretation,
with respect to the development
of
exotic defense weapons and as
explained to the press, limits
defense

weapons testing in three ways:

power levels;
prohibited,

2.

Tests must be conducted at
reduced

1.

The development of defense system
prototypes is

Additional technical

3.

prohibition on automatic reloading.
similar to this interpretation
to Congress.

occurring

in

62

its

limits also apply such as

a

The U.S.'s position was very
Iga5 Arms Control

Impact Statement

According to the Statement, the Treaty allows
research

in the

laboratory and prohibits development and testing
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-™

ypeSorabroa , basedmodel ,3

researrh
ese r chlin „„, Vlng
de

7

Pment
-

»«-

—

^
—

as announced by
National

_

tes ting outs1de

Secu

„

thfi

McFarlane, would
allow

^

^^^

,som,ghta Udw

Ubomory

tMscontnovens.ne.Wes

,,

thepeby ppoviding

rtilutlc assessments of
operating limitations
Much of

the

t0 conduct

^

anound the ,nten
P retat,on of the

components'.
tech„o, 0gi es used in
ABM defense systems
developed at the time
of th.
Treaty
inte ncepton missies,
launchers, and nadans."
G1ven thjs
definition of an ABM system,
debate centens on the
handling of new
defense weapons technology.
Milton Smith pointed
out that "nowhene in
the ABM Tneaty ane lasens
'asens, nart
iri. kbeams,
panticle
infrared sensons, on othen
types of new ABM technologies
mentioned. The question
thenefone anises
-ethen the ABM Tneaty covers
these new techno,og,es.»"
Been has added
that "while the wording"
cunnently "suggests that"
advanced weapons "are
-Coded, the matter is . .
.
completed by Agneed statement D
that
.
specific limitations on exotic
systems and thein components
will be
subject to consultations." 67
Acconding to the Admi„ ls tnation's
bnoad
intenpnetation, Article V does
not apply to new defense
technologies
which ane the centnal part of
the SOI.
Both Abraham Sofaer and Paul

-

.

•

Nitze, anms contnol advisors
to the Reagan Administnation,
defended this
intenpnetation to the Congress.
Sofaer's pos,t,on is that Article
II
and V nelate only to conventional
ABM systems and not futuristic

,

"

SyStems 68
-

TheAdm,n,st

eq ,res the u - s and
;
deployment
n

r;;

~——

™«

—-—-

;

provision for uiscussion
on

-systems
Treaty

i

mplies an,ntent,on

^nations,

^he

tA9reedsutementDon ,y

the devel0Praent
and

based „„ new

f,t this c
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include

^^

*

<- 0Ped

sped

;

However

.

negation,

s

0„

them within the genera,

parties had intended
for n0 limjtat1ons

^

^

apply to such systems
they would not have
needed t „
the
SPeC,f1C ""Whilethe
for an d against
certain
interpretations areeguaHy
compe„i n9 the overall
issue is, as C. R a
0
Mohan states, "only
symptomatic of the ,arger
crisis in nuclear arm
/u
control

_

-~s

,

.

light of the restrictions
placed upon BHD by the
ABM Treaty the
U.S. will he faced with
a numher of choices
should it pr0 cee d with
In

strategic defense development,
testing, and deployment
of
system.
Although It is too early to
know what a

a

defense

HKely 8MU system will

look

like should the U.S. deploy
such

a

defense, there are three
hasic

avenues which the U.S might
follow from the current
status of BHD
development that would affect the
ABM Treaty. The U.S. may
decide to
forgo a BMD deployment and only
maintain an active defense
research
effort in order to hedge itself
against a Soviet breakout, thereby,

protecting the ABM Treaty as

it

currently stands.

This approach has

been widely advocated by such
former government officials as
Robert

McNamara and Harold Brown who feel
that the potent,
to achieve a BMD system include

a

al

hazards in trying

vigorous arms race and

a

more

a
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--h

P ro 9 r araof somewhat

sm.Her

s1 ze th an

prudent course of action
for the United
states
The second and third
options open to the

"l.dep.o, either

a

the SD,

,S.

11mited counterforce
defense or

countervalue defense as
discussed in Chapter
Two.

ePl0ya,imUed

assume that

dete " Se

—

'"«**«

a

^rces

^

of launchers and
m,ssi,es and their
deployment

»y

atte.pt

seen as a

a

would necessitate

a

^^

^^^

Nations.

more comprehensive
defense that would

'breakout'

broader

The U.S may seek
to

assets and to do so by
seek,ng minor
modificatfon$ tQ
Modifications may ,„ clude
amenaments
t0

the.,

In

.„

The U.S. also
,

ikeHn00d

he

from the ABM Treaty,
he It gradual or
radical, and

ma.or renegotiation or

auction

of the Treaty.

White House spokesman
Edward Ojerejian has
stated that the
Administration believes "that
that ... n.„
the aday will come when
we will have
answered the questions necessary
to consider going beyond
the
restrictions that we have" in
the Treaty."
Presumably> the

^^

attempt to renegotiate to allow
for exotic defense
deployment or simply
notify the Soviets of a U.S.
intention to withdraw from
the Treaty.

Among the issues which the U.S.
will be faced with by the
early
199US, when defense testing will
likely

require reversion to the broad

interpretation, are

a

final

interpretations of Article

resolution of the 'broad' and
'restrictive'
V

and Agreed Statement U as well
as

a

more

precise definition of ABM components,
launchers, missiles, and radars
Article II.

72

The Reagan Administration has already
created the

precedent of declaring

it

legally justifiable to use the 'broad'

in
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«~~o,e
^
interpretation but has
declared

Us

under the restri

™.

St ,ons.

bP0M

current
""tnt intent
Intent to
t
continue researrh

At what pojnt w1

nterPreUti0n

„

"""«"'«« -

'

the results at
thit l1me?

atever tne outc^e of
the interpretat,on
debate

-taxation

j::

1

H

of tne

""'.tested.

broad interpretation
is likely to lead

to widespread condemnation
by the Sov.et
Union. NATO

a„,es

and

domestic arms control
advocates.
position may be weakened
as the Soyiets
interpretat,on to justify

Us

beajn

^

^

own strategic defense
program.

Another major prob.em that
has plagued the arms
control process
the past and is unlikely
to recede anytime
soon is compliance
verification. An agreement
that

for technical
by the U.S.

or tactical

policy community.

not verif,ab,e (can
not he verified

,s

reasons)

is general
,y believed to be useless

The
e u,0>
S
ha<;
QH „
nas in<:ictinsisted
on
IJ

mechanisms to achieve venfiabi.ity

in

in an arms

a

number of

reduction proposal.

However, the Soviets have been
unwilling to accept

a

number of these

proposals due in part to their
Internal security constraints.
A particular problem with
respect to verification is the

implicate
tnat cheats

of cheating on an agreement.
is

The threat posed by

roughly equal to the size of the
cheating.

In

a

nation

the

context of offensive arms reductions
(ie. fifty percent), the danger
of

unaccounted and clandestinely deployed
weapons may prove highly
destabilizing.

That is, the value of individual
weapons is increased

when the total number of weapons

is

reduced.

For example,

a

Soviet

249

™—

program for an add1tional
all ° Wed

"

3 50 P

OOwa^s

nftyss _ 24

^nslve

and might be
adequatfi

ICBMs

balance would be

h

Wf „

land-based nuclear arsenal

„

Sfien

^

(i.e. where the
U
u.i.
S
Sun Minuteman
has bUO
Ills
°r some combination
with the M x,. While
this kind of scenario
is

m

entire,, hypothetical,
it d0es provlde
ins1ght
"-ay

face In

^^^

offensive reduced and
defense dep,o ed world.
y
The introduction of
missile defenses may
render the probes of
arms control verification
as presented in
the scenario above
less
critical and thereb enhance
y
the prospects for
reaching an arms
agreement. A missile defense
system may be able to
facilitate arms
reductions b y reducing the
utllit, of offensive nuclear
73
forces.
That
is, the propensity to
cheat on an arms reduction
agreement ma y be
reouced as the individual
value of offensive weapons
is degraded.
Fift
a

y

clandestine!, deplo ed weapons
y

is

unlikely to represent

threat to the defense
capabHities of

a

a

significant

U.S. missile defense,

in

addition, there might be more
pressure on the Soviets not
to cheat in
order to prevent the U.S. from
scrapping a treat, and deplo ,ng
more
y

offensive forces and defenses.

The Soviets would need to
deploy

considerably more than fifty weapons
to gain
their offensive capabilities.

a

The size of such

meaningful increase in
a

deployment

is

unlikely

to go undetected by the U.S.
intelligence community.

While

a

lessening of the verification requirements
for offensive

forces may emerge from the deployment
of defenses,

defense verification may arise.

For example,

a

a

requirement for

mutual defense
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deployment and offensive
redurtinn
reductTon agreement
would require careful
,tor1n9 as ne
seek
°
advantages by deploying
;°;
defenses mone qu ic k
,y and cutt1ng offens1ves

— -^ ^ ^
=,

^-

problem

*

^

relianceon

could be threatened by
missile defend,
aerenses t-h>,
that are capable of
an ASAT
--isslon.
Oestruction or degr.dation
of these assets
'essen the U.S.',
capacity to monitor any arms
agreement
The strategic defense
initiative has instigated
a much broader
^ehate in U.S. policy
circles concerning the
future role of ar„,s contro,

^^
_

vn U.S.

deterrence po,icy than was
be,ng conducted before.

Arms contro,

support in the policy community,
the Congress, the public,
a nd with the
U.S.'. WTO allies.
While there are a number
of strategic and political
impediments to the conclusion
of arms agreements. ar
ms agreements have
served to confine the superpower
arms race to some weapons
areas.
Adam
Uarfinkle has characterized arms
control's contribution to the
strategic
baiance in the past and its
possible future contribution as
bringing
both a sense of the limits to
military competition and the
seriousness
of the matter.
In effect, the superpowers
have acknowledged that they
Will

not push

a

military advantage to its limits. 74

This was clearly

the case with the ABM Treaty when
the U.S., ahead in the ABM technology
at the time, accepted

forces.

In

limits in return for limits on Soviet
offensive

addition, there are

a

number of equally compelling obstacles

to the scrapping of the arms control
process.

The greatest success in

this regard concerns defensive weapons with
the signing of the ABM

Treaty.

The SOI and the defense/offensive deterrence
debate, in

251

general, have challanged
the very fn.mH
foundations upon wh
1C h U.S. arms
control policy has
rested.
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CONCLUSIONS

Removing the horror"
and thr^t
threat nf
of
our highest priorities

1,1

a

nuclear holocaust
"is one of

Thic
h
Th ^Pnrase

illustrates the
fundamental
nh
f
objective
of the Strategic
uerense Initiative
Defense
Initio
y
and the Reagan
Administration's commitment
to the Program.
program
<h
c
Since
Secretary
of Defense
*

.

u

.

1

.

rSSearCh

-unity

fistic
central

^ ~
h3S

0-tly

,„ sl2e

wh,,ethe policy

has b e 9un to seriously

missile defenses are
integrated, indeed
,

ch

.'

The concept of a
defense against ballistic
missiles

dem0nStrdtea

^

'«0s and ,960s.

*»«"•'.

-

a

assure deterrence of

a

it

not new

as

^

^

means of brin ging about

the Obso,esence of
offensive nuclear missiles.

equate to nuclear disarmament,

s

^

Safe g uard pro rams
g
of the

On,, recently, however,
nas the

deployment of a ballistic
missile defense as

i

^

While this idea does not

ooes ra,se the question
of what will

nuclear war in the future.

The SDI incorporates

the proposal that deterrence
can be shifted from
dependence on a policy
for nuclear retaliate
to a policy of strate ic
defense. Ultimately,
g
these ideas foster a debate
oetween deterrence as currently
thought of
threat of offensive punishment
and deterrence as traditionally

-

thou g nt of

-

-

strong defense and capable
offensives.

centered on the desirability and
feasibility of

a

This debate has

policy for retaliation

,

—

a

po,1cy for damage
.imitation.

s

t^onsts

and policy makers
t0

to U.S. strategic
assets,

The SOI has ,nspired
strategic

em ^ ^ ^

inc,ud,ng

Us

^

population, is possibie.

order for the U.S. to
deveiop and dep,
oy a bal istic missi e
oerense that wou,d provide
for a rad,ca, and
meaningful shift in nuc,
ear
Policy in favor of a defense,
a number of
significant obstacles and
uncertainties will have to he
overcome and resoived. The
major
technical obstacle centers
on the develops of
yet unproven or
undeveloped defense hardware
and software.
major breakthroughs win
have to be made in such
areas as ballistic m issi,e
acquisition and
tracking systems, battle
management radars that can digest
initial data
inputs and provide effective
responses to the missile threat
in
extreme.y ti„,e-constra,ned
environments, and finally, kill
mechanisms to
include kinetic and directed energy
weapons. While advances in each
of
In

,

these areas appear to have been
made in the last three years,
the

technology in general is far too
immature to support the development
of
a

space-based countervalue (area wide or
population) defense.
In

addition to the major technological
problems, uncertainty

continues to exist as to the potential
effectiveness of Soviet

countermeasure programs.
counter

a

The Soviets have stated their intent
to

U.S. BMD with offensive and defensive weapons
designed to

overwhelm, confuse, avoid, and possibly defeat
defense.

U.S. ballistic missile

These efforts have to be considered by U.S.
weapons scientists

and policy makers prior to

system.

a

a

decision to go forward with

Soviet counter-measures will require that

a

a

defensive

U.S. defense be

redundant to avoid catastrophe should the Soviets seek
to disable the
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6

nder
"

: ,uy,norderto
:

^ ™- - -

-ater

~-----c

miss

,,

accuracy and

eforcef i

tted
with fast booster
rocket*
rockets, hardened
casings, and employed
in cluster
attacks.

A" egually
a

i

raportant

obsUc

,

e

^

^

^^

strategic defense is
the growing policy
debate as to the
desiraMli ty
security.

*pl«~
otherwise

of

a

ba,„stic m,ssi

wi„h,nge

,e

That is, the development
and

defense in

^^

on its

^

strategic defense role
ro,
or

a

ty.

Current,,, U.S. security
with respect to the
nuCear threat rests on a
-ix of nuclear policies.
The centra, focus of
these policies
assured
oestruction, countervailing,
and war-fignting
strategies
is that the
U.S. can respond to
nuclear aggress,on with an
egual, ,esser, or greater
nuclear retaliation. The
mergence of a ballistic miss„e
defense cou,d
profound,, alter the nature
of these policies.
In addition, U.S.
nationa, security has been
intertwined with the arms

-

-

contro, process for

the past 25 years.

The U.S. currency is bound
by

that „ou,d either come into
direct conflict with

appear politically and
militarily useless In
power.

For example, the ABM Treaty

is

a

a

a

number of treaties

U.S. BMD or would

defensive balance of

likely to become an ineffective

agreement should the U.S. or Soviet
Union 'creep out' or 'breakout'
the Treaty's

limits.

from

These issues will create tremendous
inertia on the

p-

o f many w1th1n
the defense

policycommunUyas

procedure is pushed aside.
Once

—

a

^
^

BMD wn,cn can
provide area

^

j$

essentia,,, 1„ vulnerab ,
e t0 Sov]et

-eU.S.

co u ,dOe,„ to
adJust its

(jf
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^

deterpence

toward the defensive and
couid inc, U de

dis.ant, in g of offensive

a

weapons.

However, much of this
process win
will adepend on another
set of
decisions which are more nnliHraii,- u
politically charged, namely
arms control, as
well as actions by the
Soviet Union.

^

Reagan Administration has
stated that

a U.S. BMD would
not be
deployed without some form
of offensive arms control,
unless Soviet
actions were such that the
U.S.'s

vital

such

a

deployment, i.e.

Treaty.

in the event of a

A number of arms control

have charged that
arms control
arms race.

a

Soviet

interests called for
'breakout'

from the ABM

experts and strategic analysts
also

U.S. BMD deployment in the
absence of an offensive

agreement would lead to
In as

national

a

dangerous offensive/defensive

much as the Reagan Administration
believes this

argument, arms control will continue
to play an important role
manner, timing, and scope of

a

in the

U.S. BMD deployment.

The scenario spelled out above

is

theoretically logical; however,

each step is dependent on the other
and assumes that the U.S. can

perfect

a

ballistic missile defense of the kind
envisioned by President

Reagan and that the Soviet Union will not
create obstacles for
BMD that cannot be overcome.

It

a

U.S.

also assumes that offensive

countermeasures and offensive deterrence will not
continue to play havoc
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on
a

and finally> that

^

defensive strategic
balance.

-Ponents

Sovjets

of President Reagan's
vision from the

»

.ust be

r^ered,

SO, and the nuclear
balance,

exponent

^^ ^^

a

^^

number of ba sic
contusions can

however, that ,„ the
'rear
it

is

SDI program is still
too young and

woMd

of

impossiole to separate
eacn

as neatly as has been
done on paper above.

preclude an exact critique.

on of

Having separated
eacn of these

order to analyze them
independent,,,

redrawn.

wii|a

lacks overall

,„

addition, the

definition as to

The program fails,
according to Nevell

Brown, to meet the critenon
of scientific hypothesis
that it must be
testable.
The SDI has amplified a
,ong standing tension
in the defense policy
community.
That tension revolves
around the notion of deterrence
policy:
Is deterrence better
served by the threat to
punish an
aggressor for his attack or by
the capability to prevent
an aggressor's
attack from achieving its
objectives? The extremes of these
polices
are fraught with problems.

For example, the ultimate
threat of

punishment was symbolized and
incorporated into the massive retaliation
policy which would have resulted in
hundreds of millions of civilian
casualties once employed.

However, there is no way to guarantee
that

nuclear weapon will not be used and
hence prevention of an aggressor's
attack can never be assured without
complete and verifiable nuclear

disarmament at all levels of weaponry.
challenges remain.

deter

a

Hence, a range of options and

The policy community is faced with deciding
how to

nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies by

possible means.

In

a

number of

the most basic sense, these include continued

a

-lance

on

offens.e

„ uclear

^ ^^
„

.

to deter an attac*.
or a combination of
the two tn add lt
,on to efforts
in the arms control
arena.

Oiven the uncertainties
involved

U

may retire to ,mp,ement

that the U.S.

-chants
on

a

win

in the

a

in

perfecting

strategic defense pol

a

ic y

8MD an, tne ears
y
,

it

opt for some combina
tl on of the two
deterrence

i™ ediate
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future .

number of criticai factors.

Pau,
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Nitze has estabHshed

set of

a

criteria which when applied
to the strategic
defense debate make it
easier to understand the
requirements for changing
U.S. deterrence
Policy.

highly

First, the effectiveness
of

Citable

today.

a

strategic defense is at best

However, the type of defense
mission

to addressing this issue.

is

centra,

A counterforce defense
similiar to the

traditional ABM interceptor may
prove highly effective in
enhancing the
survivability of U.S. strategic
forces.
The .ore exotic defenses
potentially may prove effective
but are subject to the pace
of

technological development in both
the defensive and offensive
arenas.
Additionally, technological solutions
to complex problems are not
always

forthcoming.

The Soviet Union, while acknowledged
to have caught up in

strategic weapons technology in the
1980s, merely increased the numbers
and size of its strategic forces in
the 1960s and 1970s to compensate
for U.S. technological advantages.

namely that it fosters the spread of

The SDI "suffers from
a

a

... defect,

sort of neo-technol ogical

illusion that the problems of the present
strategic situation can be

resolved by the application of new, more
sophisticated technology." 4
Nitze also argued that

a

defense would have to prove cost

That,s>Uwou,dhavet

1T-T
nta,n

circumvent the defend
•
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Q
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defenses as well 35
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Mu new
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St1CmiSSi,eS
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a defense

-
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o fe se
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atedajr

so expensive as
to preclude
-

„
t
strategic

forces.

alMes against tactical

weaken the

^

to U.S. and soviet
offensive
;
forces and weapons
already developed
or oeing explore.
advanced

-

-eanh

bombers, air- an.
sea-launched cruise
missiles, penetration
aids
reentry vehiCes, a„d
ASAT weapons
are only
ikely to ennance
tne
Position offensive forces

^

-

,

Flnal.y, Nitze's criteria
recognizes that techno!
9y a, one can not
solve the basic probes
of the balance of
power between the
superpowers.
Rather, as hitze conclude,
correcting these problems
is
essential,, a politic,
problem in which arms
control has and can make
an important contribution.

Whi

,

e

past arms co „ tro

,

^^^

criticized more adamantly by
the Reagan Administration
than by any
previous administration, they
have imparted a degree of
predictability
into the strategic balance.
A completely unrestrained
arms race clearly
is

less stable and more
dangerous.

The costs of proceeding
with BMD

research and development in
terms of achieving arms control
accords are
likely to increase in the
caning decade and may in turn
create pressures
to place that research in an
arms control framework.
Additionally, a

defense transition can not be
accomplished without aggravating the
strategic balance and thereby creating
dangerous instabilities unless

vision of

a

defensive balance of
power.

The ABM of the
1960s proved to be
lessS miHtari,
mi itan ly
.
useful
to the
„ ,
u.5. tthan was
originally
thouaht
u„
cnou
y
9 nt However, the ABM
did prove

—

.

-mendously

useful

^7

^

1

the political/military
arena

-ro,

accord.

equally compelling
lauuurs, also
a Un h
a factors
helped ppush tne
thp

^

The ABM, among
other

1

-—ion

11
u

q

- i>

-

.

-

S-et

p„ 11cyand t0Mrd assured
destruction policy and
acceptance
strategic eguality.
Techno.ogy had transfer
U.S. strategic

SUPen ° rity

int
°

«"

ICBM.

a .«
*
aw
^y from massive

3

^

as a result of the
deve,op m ent of

Today, technology
has r.ced ahead
again and the continued

^^

The arms rac; has
continued and strategic
forces, namely icbms,
are
increasingly v „ )nerable .
The

presents

^

^

number of tremendous
opportunities to change these
vulnerabilities.
a

The decades ahead are
likely to be

a

period of great strategic

uncertainty stemming from new
offensive weapons, the
prospects of
defensive systems, and the
erosion of
the arms control

M

which BMD will play
».,<.
the strategic
«tpjt
i, future
P ay in tne

is

regime.

The ro!e

not only dependent on

technology's influence, but also
on factors such as the
system's
economic cost and the political
and military risks associated
with
developing such

a

defense.

As yet,

it

is

impossible to judge the

likelihood of the development of
an effective strategic defense
as
envisioned by the Reagan Administration.
However, there are currently

number of extremely problematical
issues which limit the debate to the

a

laboratory as well
as to the paper
pads of th
ana.ysts.
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POSTSCRIPT

This study has
emphasized that
tnat th»
the a
development of strateni,Policy is a complex
process which ,«
,
,s ladened
Py „ umerous
,

„.

,

ob

c^nge.

The SDI

i

s

„ ot

unique jn thjs
regard and faces

a

number

of
particularly critical
challenges
in th»
i9
the P oll t'cal and
technological
arenas aside from tho
the strategic
security problems.
„

.

,

.

Recent develbpments
with resnert
eSpeCt t„
t0

a numbe r of
these issues may
some insight on the
prospects for the success
of the SDI
pressure on the Reagan
Administration to account
control Citations
of the SOI program
may be growings

s^d

So-t

acute.

Onion has initiated

a

The

new set of arms
control proposals
which

Soviet union has dropped
their demand that the
U.S. completely end
the
SOI program
They are currently
proposing that the
superpowers abide by
the ABM Treaty for a
period of 15 years during
wh ich the development
and
deployment of ballistic
missile defenses would
be banned.
,„ tra de for
this re-cogent to
the Treaty, which would
allow for laboratory
research' (a tern, which
requires elaboration), the
Soviet Union is
proposing a sizeable (30* to
50%) cut in strategic
offensive forces.
This proposal sounds very
familiar, in some respects,
to the line of

argument made by the U.S. in
19/2 that the superpowers
agree to
constrain defenses in order
to achieve offensive arms
reductions.
However, the Reagan Administration
clearly would like to stall any

agreement on defpncoc
uerenses ,„
in order to
get the Sin

r

«~ -«

^^

initiative.

A-her

issue ga,ning m ore

—cos,

Institute charges that

—

°
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Johns Hopkins Foreign
Policy

a

space-baspH

an, operate over
Ver ad tten

^

that
thatth
these k,nds of
estimates of
•

ir;;;:"
fa

r

^

*

«'»•"

continues to respond
a

t^t

BMD system'ss cost .r.
are exagerated and
^

the true costs cannot
be estimated at
present.
magnitude would compare
roughly to what

Whi ,e costs of this

spend on weapons
development and procurement
for the same per,od
the
.mtnl research and development
phase is heing cut hack
by Congress
thereby potent.ally
hampering the development
schedule.' The Asslstant

D-ector for Sensors Technology

at the SDIO,

that Congress's current
cuts in the

,g 87

Bin Fredencks,

has stated

appropriate request (from

5

2

billion to 3.1 biHion),
cou,d prevent the SD,0
from conducting certain
*ey technology demonstration
tests and further hamper
basic technology
stud,es.
Congress's motivation in cutting
the Adm,„,stration's
reguest
is not strictly budgetary
but relate to questions
regarding the
Program's goals (counterforce
versus countervalue defense).
Resolution
of this issue is dependent
on the technological
feasibility of a

countervalue or counterforce defense
as well as the relative
contributions of the different
defense models to U.S. national
security.
This debate already has shown
signs of heating up within the

~

h
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However, the cost
of procuring
an effective
at, ° na
a,r
-"national
cou,d he staggering
and therefore
might b
'

NATO allies genera,,,
have agreed to
either Participate
parties
formally
in
ln
thp
snr
th e SOI program
y
or allow their
t-neir nigh
u
hinh t*
technology
industry t-n
compete for research
work. Additionally
tonally, the
th P fEuropean
allies appear to
ha
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i-'ieir initial ,
critiques of thp
,

,
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as a conceptoa,,,
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to ,nc,ude the
stud, of

J

wh ,ch has a different
t of
strategic threats
(name,, hundreds of
med,um-range Soviet
ballistic
-SSl.es .thin minutes of
W ester„ European
targets).
Of an atactica,
ballistic missiie (ATBM)
on, y recent,, has
Peen
-1«d by SDIO program directors.
The a„ies are
fearful that faiiure
hy the U.S. to
appreciate their concerns
cou,d ,ead to a de-coup,i„g
of
NATO Europe from the
United States' nuclear
um b re„a (which
w1l, have
become defensive as
opposed to the current
offensive umbre„a,. Another
Plaus,b,e European fear cou,d
Pe a defense protected
U.S. might fee,

less constrained
by Soviet

-lit.-,,, active

mint,

aPabimi6S andth
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Finally, while
political support at *h
the executive
levels of the
U.S. government may
wain after the Re.n.n ah
Reagan Administration
leaves
the sn
program has become
the larapct
•

^-~al,1

'

ng behind. The
SDI prog ra m
unlikely to be dismantled
and. as a result „,
of recent success
in
technology

lenses

^

into

us

weapons arsena,.

accepted offensive
Oeterrence as

a

ls

^_

Wh11e strate ic
nuciear pol 1cy is
9

part

*

the fflatured Nuclear
£ra

^

ballistic m issi le defense
concept has proven
Itself to be endearing
and
-n the opinion of
SO, proponents,
p„ tent1ally iJSeful £Q
pol icy.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 9.

DELIVERY
SYSTEMS
LAND BASED

SEA BASED

Titan II
Minuteman
Minuteman

WEAPON
YIELDS

IQ C

5-9mt
1.2mt
17G/335kt

II

in

DEPLOYED

1961
1966
1970

17

450
550

Subtotal 1017

Poseidon C-3
Trident C-4

40kt
lOOkt

1975
1980

288
360

Subtotal 648

AIR BASED

B-52G

12 ALCM

1959

167

(2U0kt) or
20 bombs of

various yields,

B-52H
FB-111

up to 9mt

ALCM
SCRAMS
(170kt)
16

1961

2

1970

96
60

Subtotal 323*
Total

NEW STRATEGIC
WEAPONS

Bib

SLCM

JLCM or
1986
bombs of
various yields
20Ukt

1988

17

by
pct
J Sep

1986
**

iy 8 4

10u

Sources: /'Strategic Nuclear
forces of the United States
and
n
the
U.S.S.R., Arms Control Today,
lb (June
yfts
u
?
U
"Start and
.
Ill
^986): 3

^l^m^inl

1

)

>Xlu

*13U ALCM equipped bombers
are allowed by the SALT

1

T

II

V

Treaty.

"Estimated number of SLCMs that could
have been deployed

by 1986.
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TABLE

B

lu.

WEAP0N
LAND BASED

SS-il
SS-13
SS-17
SS-18
SS-19
SS-25

WARHEADS
1

-

3

DEPLOYED
448

1

60
150

4

10 +

308
360

6
1

SEA BASED

70

SS-N-5
SS-N-6
SS-N-8
SS-N-17

1

-

2

1

-

7

6

-

y

1

1

39
304
292

1

SS-N-ltf

SS-N-20
SS-NX-23
AIR BASED

BISON
BEAR

BADGER
BLINDER
BACKFIRE

Source:

Soviet Military

Printing 0f?TceTT985~

ImjiVm,

12

10

Bombs
Bomos and cruise
missi les
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs and cruise
missi les

(Washington, D.C.: U.S,

224
80
32

30
150
262
135
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